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Abstract 
The systemic origins of many accidents have led to heightened interest in the way in 
which organisations identify and manage risks within the airline industry. The 
activities which are thought to represent the term "organisational accident", "safety 
culture" and "proactive approach" are documented and seek to explain the fact that 
airlines differ in their willingness and ability to conduct safety management. However, 
an important but yet relatively undefined task in the airline industry is to 
conceptualise the safety mechanism in proactive safety, and its influential factors. 
What is required is a model of a proactive safety mechanism which builds upon 
existing knowledge of what is thought to contribute to safety by adding an increased 
knowledge of the organisational factors. These factors not only serve to influence the 
safety mechanism, but also serve to be the predictors of the performance of safety 
management system. 
This thesis aims to fill that gap. It firstly conducts an overview of the current airline 
safety management system literature and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of 
the current system. Given the need to explore the important but undefined field, a 
proactive safety mechanism model is then developed and tested to identify the 
organisational factors which exert an influence upon the safety mechanism. 
Four hypotheses were set out to be tested in an attempt to justify the 
multi-dimensional and complex nature of the safety mechanism model. The model is 
then tested by applying it to a past accident (case study) and a survey of opinions with 
questionnaire. The results of this research work show that the safety mechanism 
model is a model of the evolution of safety management system in the context of 
proactive safety management. Further study can apply the proposed model to the 
re-organisation of an airline safety management system and evaluate the impact upon 
the company's system. It leads to the suggestion that an airline's safety health and 
performance needs the co-ordination of both retroactive and proactive safety 
management, and concludes that the ultimate contribution of this research is to 
provide airlines with reliable data, applicable references and a practicable 
methodology to enable their safety management system to evolve at a fundamentally 
"genetic" level. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
"How, then, do we get this company ahead of change, 
ahead of these strong global players, permanently out in front 
in the '90s? How do we set the pace. " 
Jack Welch, 1989 
1.1 Research Background 
Air transport is experiencing increasing growth year by year, with passenger air 
transport, in particular, becoming more affordable and feasible for both short journeys 
and long haul flights (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002). During the past decade, although 
the growth in air travel varied from region to region, global demand for air travel 
increased strongly according to the statistics of IATA (2001). Doganis (2001) stated that 
long-term traffic growth from 2000 to 2010 will average close to 5 percent per annum. 
Boeing, too, predicts that world air traffic, measured in Revenue Passenger Kilometres 
(RPKs) 1, will grow by 4.7 % annually over the next 20 years2 (Boeing, 2001). 
1 Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPKs) are obtained by multiplying the number of fare paying 
passengers on each flight stage by the distance of that stage. 
2 IATA (2002) has stated in its new interim five-year forecast that the global airline industry will 
recover by 2003 from the effects of September 110', and traffic demand might return to the long-term 
predictions based on the relationship with GDP (Gross Domestic Product), which is forecasted to 
grow by 3 percent over the next 20 years, during which period air travel will grow about 2 
percentage points faster than economics will grow. 
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Advanced aeronautical technology and the reliability of aircraft constitute great 
achievements of human ingenuity, but the increasing demand for air travel presents the 
air transport industry with some of its greatest challenges. Statistics showed that 
aviation industry has achieved a remarkable safety record, making it currently the safest 
form of mass transportation in the world today (Muir and Thomas, 2003). However, if 
the risks are measured by comparing numbers of casualties with the number of trips 
made, rather than the miles covered, air transport is less safe than ground transport (The 
Economist, 1997). As passenger numbers rise, at least one major accident is predicted 
to occur every week by 2010 (IFA, 1998), and this is unlikely to be acceptable. 
For the airline industry, transport and safety constitute value; each is mutually 
dependent on, and worthless without, the other. It is taken for granted that the airline 
has done everything practically possible to maintain safety standards by proper 
maintenance, operations and training. Nonetheless, even following the greatest 
advances in airframe designs, and the hardware and electronics in commercial aircraft, 
accidents still occur. With each accident, public fears about air safety are magnified, 
regardless of the cause of the accident. Moreover, risks in the aviation industry are 
usually associated with threats to life and body, so an aircraft accident always attracts a 
great deal of public interest, frequently resulting in enormous media coverage and a 
high impact on the airline's performance. The possibility of a serious and costly impact 
on business, perhaps including the company's demise, makes safety an airline's largest 
area of concern. 
Profit (1995) summarised the situation clearly: "Aircraft accident rates are usually 
expressed as accidents per million flying hours, aircraft or passenger kilometres flown, 
and there has been a dramatic reduction in the commercial air transport accident rate 
since the 1950s. However, ... as air traffic is expected to double over the next decade in 
terms of annual passenger hours flown, the number of accidents per annum due to all 
causes could rise, even though the accident rate remained constant. Hence there is a 
perception that flying is becoming more dangerous. The downward trend in accident 
rates must therefore be maintained if high public confidence in air transport safety is to 
be sustained. " 
2 
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Given the concerns of carriers in this decade, Hollnagel (1993) claimed that past 
accidents should be studied more closely, to see whether something can be learned that 
can prevent future accidents. Maurino (2001) also noted that the most widely used tool 
for documenting operational performance and defining remedial strategies is the 
investigation of accidents. Fatal or serious accidents/incidents often catalyse the 
improvement of a safety system, because a thorough accident investigation can reveal 
how specific behaviours, including errors and error management, can generate an 
unstable or catastrophic situation. Such events can cause an airline either temporarily or 
permanently to change the management of its safety system. 
Consequently, the analysis of the behaviour of operational personnel in accidents and 
incidents was traditionally adapted to assess the impact of human performance on 
safety. Investigators seek to discover the potentially detrimental behaviours of 
operational personnel, in order to identify and manage risks. Such investigations of 
human performance enjoy the benefit of hindsight. Risk management tools have been 
accordingly developed to collect safety information and prevent the recurrence of 
identified errors. 
However, looking only at data after the fact (i. e. after an accident) is a little like trying 
to design a good celebration by focusing on the "sweeping up after the parade" 
(Maurino, 2001), and is a retroactive approach to safety. The causes of accidents and 
the primary contributory factors that are identified through accident investigation do 
constitute a form of risk management, especially if the lessons learned are properly 
applied. However, so few accidents occur that analysing trends and patterns with such 
limited data is difficult. Savage (1999) indicated that another way of preventing the 
next accident is needed. One must look beyond the visible manifestations of errors in 
designing remedial strategies, to uncover the mechanism that underlies human 
contributions to failure (and success) in aviation safety. 
It is increasingly recognised that organisational risk management requires the active 
support of managers and employees at all organisational levels. Effective prevention 
3 
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strategies must focus upon the identification, removal or amelioration of systematic risk 
factors. The control of operational risk in the aviation system may require greater 
proactive intervention by airline management in the future. Reason (1995a) and 
Johnston (1996) proposed that proactive and systematic risk management approaches 
will be more effective in preventing accidents than ad hoc reactions to individual 
failures or, than reactive interventions directed towards individual workers. 
Within the airline industry in particular, systematic study of the origins of accidents and 
incidents have led to heightened interest in the way in which organisations identify and 
manage risk. The activities which are thought to represent the term "organisational 
accident", "safety culture" and "proactive approach" are well documented in the 
literature, and have been used to explain the fact that airlines differ in their willingness 
and ability to manage safety. However, an important but yet relatively undefined area in 
the airline industry is to conceptualise the `safety mechanism' in proactive safety, and 
the factors that influence the mechanism. 
0. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Accordingly, this thesis is designed to contribute to the pool of knowledge, by meeting 
the following objectives: 
+ To evaluate current airline safety management systems and become a reference 
text which can be used by academics and industry. 
+ To investigate retroactive and proactive approaches to safety and their 
application within the airline industry. 
+ To develop a model for a `safety mechanism' in the context of proactive safety 
management. 
4 
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+ To verify organisational factors which affect the safety mechanism, and 
investigate the relationship between the factors. 
+ To make recommendations concerning how airlines can fit the proposed safety 
mechanism model to the industry for the evolution of a safety management 
system. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
In keeping with the aims of this research project, this thesis is divided into seven 
chapters. Chapter 2 is the literature review and empirical industry analysis. The 
rationale behind this section is to explore the framework of the airline safety 
management system. The results of the analysis serve to explore what has been done in 
airline safety management, to identify the problem generated from the current system, 
and to verify what is needed for the continual improvement of airline safety services. 
Chapter 3 states the methodologies applied in the research, such as the interview study 
and how the safety survey is designed and conducted, in the thesis in order to achieve 
the aims stated in Chapter 1 and the problem identified in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 is 
designed to develop the safety mechanism model and further determine its influential 
factors by employing a safety survey. Chapter 5 presents a qualitative and quantitative 
study to test the model and the results, including a case study and a survey of opinions 
with questionnaire. Chapter 6 serves to analyse the survey results, to discuss the 
structure underlying the model and the implication of results. It also probes into the 
applications and limitation of this model. Chapter 7 summarises the knowledge 
obtained from this study project as a whole with respect to the development of 
proactive safety mechanism, as well as the recommendations for future research areas 
to improve airline, safety management system. 
Figure 1-1 demonstrates the research structure and methods used in thesis. 
5 
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Figure 1-1 Research Structure and Methods Used 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review & 
Empirical Analysis 
"Disasters do not cause effects. 
The effects are what we call disasters. " 
WR Dombrowsky, 1995 
2.0 Role and Definition of Safety 
The primary objectives of an airline are associated with profitability, namely providing 
services and receiving monetary remuneration. While flying is widely accepted as an 
extremely efficient means of quickly transporting people, cargo or equipment, and 
performing a wide range of various other activities, safety is not only the compulsory 
responsibility of an airline but "safety" also supports airline profitability, for example 
through brand image. 
However, exactly defining safety is rather difficult. According to the Flight Safety 
Foundation (1999a): "Safety is an abstraction, and in a sense a negative one - the 
absence of accidents and incidents - which makes safety difficult to visualize". Indeed, 
compared with risks and hazards, hazards are usually easier to identify than risks, and 
thus are easier to measure through practical approaches. 
Previous literature defines safety as freedom from danger or risk (Profit, 1995). Prof J 
Reason notes that "safety is a dynamic non-event, so we have to work hard to make 
nothing happen" (IFA, 1998). Moreover, McIntyre (2002) argues that safety is more 
7 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
than the absence of accidents. Safety is also a goal of reducing the levels of risk that are 
inherent in all human activity. 
It is a fact that no human activities or man-made systems are absolutely safe. Instead, all 
that can be discussed is relative safety and acceptable risk. This concept is reflected in 
Lowrance's (1976) argument that "safety is a judgment of acceptability of risk" and the 
definition of safety of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that holds 
that safety is where: "risks are minimized to an acceptable level". This ICAO 
definition of safety is commonly adopted in the modem aviation world. 
2.1 External Impact on Airline Safety 
Figure 2-1, developed by Dannatt (2000), is used as a guide to understanding the 
complexity of the variables that determine the effectiveness of the government 
regulation of air transport safety. It illustrates the systematic interactions between 
airlines and government, the regulatory agency, airlines, air travellers, the legal system, 
the insurance industry, and infrastructure, which, in turn, determine the safety 
relationship in the air transport system. The safety relationship concept in this diagram 
is found to be useful as a guide to understanding the organisations which exert an 
influence on airline safety services. 
Most of these organisations in Figure 2-1 have differing, and sometimes conflicting 
objectives. However, these relationships also reveal the supply and demand 
relationships within this system, which decide the sustainability of the air transport 
industry. As airline services have gone through a period of historical development and 
have therefore formed through a process in which professional, political and economic 
interests have played a part, there is no easy solution to the question of the right way to 
manage airline safety. Therefore, following sections will firstly discuss the external 
impact of these organisations which are categorised from all elements in Figure 2-1 
including manufacturers, travellers (the public), and regulatory agencies, on airline 
safety. 
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Figure 2-1 Safety Relationships in the Air Transport System 
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Note: 
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2. Quality assurance for underinformed airlines + remedy for monopoly supply 
Source: Adapted from Dannatt, 2000 
2.1.1 Technological Innovation and Its Impact 
The most important milestone in the history of aviation occurred in 1903, when the 
Wright brothers flew a heavier-than-air craft for almost one minute, thus launching the 
era of the power plane (Kuang Fu publishing, 1988). By 1910, numerous aircraft 
manufacturers were already in business. Sixteen years after the Wright Brothers flight, 
the first scheduled air transportation service was launched in Germany in 1919 (Chang, 
1998). However, during this period the development of aircraft engines was mainly 
driven by speed competitions and trials rather than human transportation. 
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World War I& II further drove the development of aircraft capabilities, and caused 
increased attention to be paid to expand their function. It was because military victory 
depended on faster speed and extensive damage when belligerent states conducting 
offensive military operations In WWI, aircraft were initially used for reconnaissance; 
later their combat and bombing role became important in the war (Chang, 1998). 
Especially in WW II, in order to control the air supremacy, squadrons of fighters of 
belligerent states frequently fought each other or dropped bombs on the trenches when 
they could not find enemy fighters to shoot at. Consequently, the aircraft manufacturers 
were motivated to develop more advanced fighters to achieve military need, such as 
B-17, B-24, etc. During the last few years of the war, pure jets were developed in the 
end (Kuang Fu publishing, 1988). 
Although in WW II, jet engines did not contribute greatly toward overall success on 
either side, in the aftermath of World War II, the use and evolution of jet engines not 
only accelerated aircraft speed, but also stimulated a boom in civil aviation. The 
increased reliability of aircraft stimulated a rapid rise in passenger travel from the 
1940s, while cargo transportation grew significantly owing to the development of the 
large freighter Boeing 747 in the 1960s (Doganis, 2002). Flying thus became a 
convenient and rapid means of mass transportation, which simultaneously created a 
global village. In 1976, an even more advanced technology, supersonic aircraft in the 
form of Concorde, entered the service market (Kuang Fu publishing, 1988), marking a 
new chapter of aviation. With the growing air traffic in recent years, aircraft 
manufacturers are competing to develop new aircraft to satisfy more and more air travel 
demand, including A380, supersonic transport aircraft (SSTs), Boeing 7e7 etc. In 
particular, the idea of SSTs is to fly as fast as Concorde, but be able to carry more 
passengers and consume less fuel and moreover, satisfy strict environmental 
requirements (Muir and Thomas, 2003). 
Doganis (2002) expressed that: "In the last. fifty years technological innovation in air 
transport has far outstripped that in any other transport mode. " Particularly in civil 
aviation, compared to the era of the piston engine, turbo-prop aircraft have significantly 
improved productivity, while the arrival of turbo jets has dramatically increased speed 
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and reliability. Statistics from 1960 to the early 1980s show that the introduction of jet 
engines helped to reduce the rate of fatal accidents per 1 million landings from around 
50 to 2. In 2000, a new safety figure revealed that big jet hull loss accident figures from 
1991 to 2000 showed a reduction in the loss rate from 1.5 to 1 per million flights; a 33.3 
percent drop in the hull loss accident in a decade, which is quite impressive (Learmount, 
2001). 
2.1.2 The Growing Traffic and Airline Safety 
Although the technological developments in aviation were beneficial in aircraft safety 
improvement, the increasing size and capacity of aircraft and the speed with which new, 
larger aircraft were introduced, created two main problems for airlines, according to the 
analysis of Doganis (2002). One is the strong downward trend on load factor, and the 
other is the problem of financing the new capital investment. However, paradoxically, 
for the last fifty years, the airline industry has been characterised by continued and 
rapid growth in demand for its services, given the problems. 
The rate of growth of air traffic seems to follow closely developments in the world's 
gross domestic product (GDP), and there would be no slowing down according to the 
air traffic forecasters3 (Doganis, 2001). Although air travel growth varied in different 
regions, strong growth was evident in the worldwide demand for air travel in the last 
decade (IATA, 2001). In this new decade, Doganis (2001a) and Boeing (2001) also 
predict that world air traffic measured in Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPKs) will 
grow around 5 percent annually within the next 10 and 20 years respectively. Before 
September 11th, over the 20-year forecast period, 2001 to 2020, the market is predicted 
to be worth $3.1 trillion (Boeing, 2001). 
3 For example, in the 1990s both short-term, like IATA (1998), and long-term forecasts, such as Airbus 
(1995), agree with the fact that international traffic would increase steadily world-wide at around 5.5 
percent per annum until the year 2000, and remain at 5 percent per annum well into the twenty first 
century. This should culminate in the world international scheduled passenger traffic rising to a 
forecasted 789 million by the year 2010 (Watkins, 1997). 
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With the growing traffic of air travel in the long-term, the demand for safety services is 
simultaneously rising. It is because speed and safety are the airline industry's coin of 
value, each a mutually dependent value that is worthless without the other. Becker 
(1992) revealed, "Public awareness of airline safety issues is likely to increase in the 
1990s. The growth will in part be simply a function of an increased number of 
passengers and frequency of travel. " In addition, it is found at least 30 percent of air 
travellers use perceptions of an airline's safety record as a basis for deciding which 
airline to choose; at least 85 percent of respondents would pay more for increased 
airline safety procedures. Fifty-five percent of respondents have a clear idea of what 
safety information is important and what details they want before choosing an airline 
(Becker, 1992). The perception towards airline safety remains an important issue for 
the public and the media over these years (Taylor and Hsu, 2001b). In particular, when 
passengers consider air travel is unsafe, they will choose other modes of transportation 
or rather stop travelling. Taking September 11th, the terrorist attack in the US in 2001 
for example, although not the fault of the airlines involved4, the strong impact on the 
airline industry caused a decline in air traffic flow to a large degree and consequently 
shook the air transport business to the cores. Also the Gulf war in 1991 had a similar 
effect but to a lesser degree. 
After September 11`h, the forecast of future demand had to be reproduced as a result. 
IATA (2002) is forecasting in its new interim five-year forecast that the global airline 
industry will recover in 2003 led by traffic on Europe-Middle East, transatlantic and 
transpacific routes. Traffic demand might return as predicted in the long-term according 
to the relationship with GDP. Given the homogeneous nature of the airline product 
(Doganis, 2002), no matter what the result will be, the demand for safety and obligation 
of providing safety services to ensure passenger safety is still a prerequisite of airline 
business. 
4 Although the argument between security and safety remains controversial, the measure of the former 
is for safety purposes without a doubt, which makes it necessary to include in the context of safety 
services. 
5 Global international passenger traffic in October 2001, the month after the September 11`h attacks, fell 
23.5% (IATA statistics, 2003). In addition, airlines, like Sabena, Swissair, and Canada 3000 were 
closed down; some others were caved by capital injections from their government, such as Air New 
Zealand, LOT, etc. By the end of 2001, the airline industry was in turmoil (Doganis, 2002) 
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2.1.3 The Regulatory Environment 
The roots of today's aviation safety programmes extend back to the early days of 
commercial aviation following World War I (Wells, 1991). In 1919 Paris convention 
accepted that states have sovereign rights in the air space above their territory, and 
directed the government intervention in air transport. Since then, the airline industry 
subsequently expanded and the regulatory environment was required for improvement. 
Accordingly, a framework of international regulation has gradually evolved in response 
to the technical, economic and political developments in air transport in the period 
1919-1949 (Doganis, 2002). 
Prior to World War II, international aviation issues were mainly agreed by bilateral 
agreements between governments. The "Chicago Convention", signed in 1944, formed 
the basis for international standards and recommended practices, and aimed to improve 
all aspects of civil aviation world-wide through the providing the framework for the 
orderly and safety development of international air transport (Berendsen, 2000; 
Doganis, 2002). In 1944, International Aviation Transport Association (IATA) evolved 
as a result of the Chicago Convention. The IATA's members are airlines, the parties 
working with the results of agreements on a day-to-day basis (Berendsen, 2000). In 
1947, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), based in Montreal, Canada, 
became the world authority. ICAO's standards are incorporated into the programmes of 
the authorities, like UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), etc. The members of ICAO 
are governments who signed the Chicago Convention (The function of ICAO will be 
introduced in next section). 
The sanction of IATA and ICAO together with bilateral agreements and inter-airline 
pooling agreement created a highly regulated operating environment till the 1970s. 
Broadly speaking, the regulatory environment contains two kinds of regulations. One is 
those which are economic in nature and concerned with regulating the business and 
commercial aspects of air transport; the other is regarding technical standards and 
regulations, which cover every aspect of airline activity and aim to achieve very high 
levels of safety in airline operations (Doganis, 2002). Yet in 1979 and the following two 
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decades, the gradual liberalisation of the economic regulations consequently affects 
international air services. In the next sections, the non-economic regulation 
environment will be outlined as well as the repercussions of the economic regulations 
on airline safety. 
2.1.3.1 The current regulatory environment of non-economic regulation 
There have been many other international aviation organisations formed to provide 
effective solutions for airline safety since World War II. In Figure 2-2, Berendsen (2000) 
portrayed the structure of current regulatory environment in safety. It can be 
circumscribed by Doganis' (2002) non-economic regulations which deal with airlines, 
such as flight operations (aircraft airworthiness, performance, etc), engineering and 
maintenance, personnel training and qualification, as well as the third parties, such as 
airport and air traffic. 
As shown in Figure 2-2, ICAO is situated at the top. The underpinning philosophy of 
ICAO is to have aviation safety directly supervised by national civil aviation 
authorities, who adapt the ICAO framework within their countries and assist the 
development of practical aspects of the implementation of the Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) issued by ICAO. For example, CAA in the UK has 
powers to cover aviation in the United Kingdom, while the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) acts in a similar role in the US. Besides, although FAA is a 
national civil aviation organisation, it can span much of the aviation transport chain. 
For example, FAA had launched its own "safety oversight" procedures to inspect and 
monitor if safety regulations are adequately implemented in certain countries. If the 
airworthiness standards are deemed as inadequate, aircraft from such countries will not 
be allowed to fly into the US. 
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Figure 2-2 Current Regulatory Environment 
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In addition to national regulators, Berendsen (2000) explained that the need for 
harmonisation has resulted in the formation of several supra-national organisations. 
One of the most successful examples within Europe is the Joint Aviation Authorities 
(JAA). JAA produces Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JARs). The aim of JAA is to 
foster the harmonisation of aviation safety across its member States, by implementing 
these common regulations and their joint application. Recently, the JAA has worked 
closely with the FAA in an attempt to achieve some degree of standardisation between 
JARs and Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), with the intention of harmonising 
regulations globally. 
It is worth noting that it is up to each state to decide whether it wishes to adopt each 
JAR by incorporating it into its own legislation, i. e. JARs are not mandatory, which 
arguably result in the shortfall of JAA. As such, the need for the European Aviation 
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Safety Agency (EASA) seems to be apparent and has been considered to establish since 
2002. From 28 September 2003, EASA, with mandatory power, has become 
operational for certification of aircraft, engines, parts and appliances. It aims to help to 
maintain a high level of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation. 
In addition, EUROCONTROL is another successful supranational organisation which 
provides regional upper airspace ATC services within Europe, and harmonises ATC 
services across its member States (Berendsen, 2000). 
There are other groups called Professional Organisations in Figure 2-2. Normally they 
are independent, non-profit making international organisations offering international 
aviation safety resources. For instance, the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) is known 
internationally for providing timely, practical and objective information to its members 
and everyone concerned with the safety of flight. Its independence provides the 
aviation industry with a neutral forum to meet and identify safety concerns, determine 
solutions and implement ideas and actions to improve safety on a non-competitive 
basis7. 
2.1.3.2 The impact of economic regulation on airline safety 
The consequence of globalisation, privatisation & deregulation 
Traditionally, governments are concerned with many aviation issues. These include 
ownership of airlines, regulation of domestic routes and fares, limits to foreign 
ownership, etc. and most notably with the safety of air transport. 
With the increasing demand and expansion of networks, globalisation and privatisation 
encourages nations to adjust to the regulatory environment. Since liberalisation has 
been adopted by the US in 1978, followed by key European countries and European 
6 Reference from EASA website: http: //www. easa. eu. int 
7 Reference from FSF website: http: //www. flightsafety. orR 
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Union after the mid-80s (Doganis, 2002; Chang, 2002), deregulation is becoming a 
worldwide trend and frees airlines to pursue strategies that offer air travellers greater 
value. Many countries have removed restraints within their national boundaries and 
revised rules of allowable foreign investment, like the US (Chang, 2002). As a result, 
airlines are free to choose where to fly, what services to provide and how much to 
charge. Passengers benefit from the offers regarding lower prices and more convenient 
flight times (Boeing, 2001). 
While airlines now have flexibility to pursue strategies that meet the needs of the next 
century's global community, it also comes with the responsibility of ensuring that each 
operation is safe. A series of questions such as: Have the risks increased as a 
consequence of economic deregulation? Has the deregulated market raised financial 
pressures on existing companies causing a reduction in their safety standards? Both 
need to be answered. 
Research has been carried out to find the relationship between deregulation and safety 
performance after deregulation occurred in 1978 in the US. The conclusion reached 
after a 1987 conference at Northwestern University was that "subject to conditions, 
safety performance does not appear overall to have been impaired by deregulation" 
(Moses and Savage, 1990; Dannatt, 2000). Morrison and Winston (1988) support the 
conclusion that the secular improvement in safety has not been interrupted by 
deregulation because they found a reduction in insurance expense association with 
deregulation. Wells (1991) also states "Deregulation is not directly related to aviation 
safety, however some industry observers are concerned about its unintended negative 
impact. " Some studies generally conclude that while air transport safety has become 
safer after economic deregulation in 1978, it might have been safer still in the absence 
of deregulation (Barnett and Higgins, 1989; Barnett and Wang, 1998; Savage, 1999). 
Although most research results reveal the non-negative aspects stemming from 
deregulation, there are still some concerns. Rose (1992) argued that improvements in 
airline safety do not appear to have slowed appreciably since deregulation.... 
Nevertheless, the possibility that regulatory effects may operate with long lags, through 
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such mechanisms as reduced maintenance or increased aircraft age, suggests that 
scrutiny of aggregate safety performance over the next few years is essential. So 
Dannatt (2000) pointed out that an important variable likely to have influenced the 
safety outcome was the effect of the safety regulator, and regulation's effect on safety is 
likely to be the outcome of chosen policies, changes taking place in the industry and the 
segments of the industry to which they are applied. 
However, in terms of safety issues, regulatory authorities have been criticised for being 
untimely and unresponsive, and existing frameworks, with local and regional structures, 
do not have the flexibility to adapt to a dynamic, changing market place and 
environment (Berendsen, 2000). From a 1985 safety review, a task force reported that 
the area in most need of improvement was that of timeliness in identifying and 
responding to safety issues (FAA, 1997a). In addition, the cost-cutting strategies, profit 
concerns, the effect of mergers and alliance between airlines, etc., resulting from the 
competitive environment might also cause airline mission and structure to change. As a 
result, some regulators have taken action to ensure that appropriate skill levels are 
maintained, like UK CAA. Aside from that, regulations and safety action should not be 
perceived as a burden by the airlines. It is also of importance to harmonise the 
regulation throughout the industry while maintaining adequate scope for competition. 
2.2 Airline Safety Management System 
2.2.1 Flight Safety Risk 
The airline business is a high risk business (Smith, 1996; Doganis, 2002). The airline 
industry's risk encompasses factors such as operation efficiency, industry fundamentals, 
competitive position, evaluation of management, financial flexibility, etc. Table 2-1 
lists the business risk profile in the airline business. Due to the geographical range and 
complexity of "real-time" operations, the nature of the risk profile in the airline industry 
is far wider than most other businesses. 
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Table 2-1 Airline Industry Business Risk Profile 
Type Risks 
Technical Accidents 
Increasing system sophistication 
Economic Financial exposure (currency, interest, insurance) 
Loss of vital systems or information 
Impact on value of brand 
Commercial Destructive competition 
Loss of key markets 
Denial of access to key markets 
Impact of legislation or regulation 
Political Terrorism or hijack 
Requirement to operate uneconomic services 
Strikes 
Human Loss of key personnel 
Error or incompetence 
Personal injuries health and safety risk 
Operational Inadequate monitoring of control systems 
Lack of control over suppliers 
Noise 
Pollution 
Environmental Congestion 
Natural disasters 
Source: Compiled from Smith (1996) and Sadgrove (1996) 
Within the business risk listed above, risks regarding flight safety, whether technical or 
operational types, often attract lots of attention by the public, because these are most 
commonly associated with threat to life and limb. The consequences are accidents or 
incidents (see appendix A for the ICAO definitions of accident and incident). 
Figure 2-3 presents the yearly number of accidents and fatality accident rate from 1950s 
to 2003, which reveals two trends since 1990: one is the decreasing number of accidents 
and the other is the flat accident fatality rate8 in fatal aviation accidents`' according to 
aircraft accident statistics (Aviation Safety Network, 2003). The former is decreasing 
owing to the industry having invested heavily in developing advanced technology to 
increase aircraft reliability and productivity. However, it's almost impossible to 
8 Accident Fatality Rate: average percentage of occupants involved in fatal airliner accidents that did 
not survive the accidents. 
19 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical. -t nal'. ws 
achieve zero accident rate even with the advanced technology because other factors, 
like human factors1() and environmental factors, can still cause incidents and fatal 
accidents. If taking a closer look at the fatality rate in fatal accidents, it shows that in 
average 70 percent occupants didn't survive in the fatal accidents, and the trend seems 
to grow upward since 2000. The observation demonstrates that the consequences of 
fatal accidents may become more and more massive given the advanced aircraft 
capability and productivity. The dramatic nature of aircraft accident not only always 
attracts the media and grabs the headlines, frequently resulting in enormous media 
coverage'', but also has become a matter of great public interest and concern, 
sometimes resulting in more serious business risk. 
Figure 2-3 Annual No. of Accidents vs. Fatality Rate 
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9 Accidents are classified into fatal event and non-fatal event. For fatal event, any circumstance where 
one or more passengers die during the flight from causes that are directly related to a civilian airline 
flight. The fatal event may be due to an accident or due to a deliberate act by another passenger, a 
crew member, or by one or more persons not on the aircraft. These events include sabotage, 
hijacking, or military action and exclude cases where the only passenger deaths were to hijackers, 
saboteurs, or stowaways. 
io Muir and Thomas (2003) state that when discussing passenger safety in very large transport aircraft 
(VLTA), also pointed out that VLTA will increase passenger capacity and flight duration, but 
emergency evacuation in the event of a survivable crash poses a challenge for aircraft manufacturers 
and authorities. 
tt For example, data reveal that from 1978 to 1994, the New York Times disproportionately reported 
fatal events involving jet aircraft and fatal events in the U. S. or involving US carriers (Curtis, 1997). 
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The impact of aircraft crashes with the associated loss of life is important for the public, 
who have the power of veto for a particular airline. Not only do crashes cause loss of 
human life, they also damage the viability of an airline. The aviation industry tends to 
measure the accident rate according to the rate of fatal accidents per 1 million landings. 
However, the perceived accident rate of the public, the media and the investment parties 
is the number of accidents per month or per year. Consequently, an increase in the 
perceived accident rate may result in many airlines suffering financially as the public 
refuse to patronise airlines perceived as less safe. These risks can have a serious 
commercial impact on the business of certain airlines, and at worst can cause their 
demise (Taylor and Hsu, 2001b). 
Accidents like the ValuJet crash in Florida Everglades and loss of the TWA B747 off 
Long Island (NTSB, 1997) represent the most tragic risk faced by the airline business. 
The airlines managed to remain in business but paid a very high price. In other cases, 
airlines such as that of Air Florida, which failed to emerge from bankruptcy in late 
1980s in the aftermath of a B737 crash in 1982 (NTSB, 1983), were not fortunate 
enough to survive (Smith, 1996; ATI). This is the most serious business risk resulting 
from flight safety risk. 
2.2.2 The Impact of Accidents on Airline Safety Performance 
No matter how severe an accident is, the airline performance in terms of company 
reputation, airline operation, fiscal problems, safety commitment, etc. will be affected 
to some degree. Figure 2-4 was developed in order to identify the influence of accident 
on airline performance by demonstrating the sequence of causes, event, effects, and 
influenced performance following an accident. 
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Broadly speaking, three main aspects are identified which contains the operation 
performance- crisis management, safety performance, and the financial performance- 
costs of accidents. The scale of the impact stems from the effects of an accident. The 
result of Hsu and Taylor's work (1999,2001b) shows that with the growth of 
globalisation and integration, airlines face new problems in the matter of accident; most 
importantly, lack of planning, training, and preparation will contribute towards greater 
financial loss. It leads to the conclusions that the most important influence of accidents 
on airline performance is the safety performance, and the suggestions for airline 
operation and safety improvements. 
Figure 2-4 The Impact of Accident of Airline Performance 
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2.2.2.1 Safety improvement and management 
One of the problems in the aftermath of accidents is the failure of safety commitment. 
What are these safety deficiencies and how to improve them in order to prevent 
accidents from recurring are issues that airlines are eager to know. Meanwhile, 
following an accident, the public and the media are always desperate to know who 
should be blamed, who should take the responsibility and who should make the 
improvements. 
Figure 2-5 shows "The Safety Trinity", demonstrated in the ICAO Accident Prevention 
Manual. These are the bases of all activities in aviation safety and also the main causes 
of an aircraft accident. 
Figure 2-5 The Safety Trinity 
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Source: ICAO Accident Prevention Manual 
Tracing back the causes of accidents in the early years of aviation, the causes of 
accidents were mostly associated with catastrophic structural failures (Machine) or 
adverse weather conditions (Environment). Investigators tended to focus on the 
technical aspects of the mishap under investigation because the reliability of aircraft 
systems was not always guaranteed. There were, therefore, very good reasons for 
investigators choosing that approach at the time. Consequently airlines were led to 
focus on the technical approach to safety (Taylor and Hsu, 2001 a). 
When commercial jets became common transport in the seventies, technology reached 
a level of maturity. Accidents caused by hardware failures appeared to steadily decline 
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as a result. The attention then moved to the role of human crew (Man) as a result of a 
number of high-profile accidents (see Figure 2-6). It became apparent that accidents 
were occurring where the primary cause of the accident could not be associated with a 
mechanical failure. It was not until then that the science of "Human Factors in 
Aviation" was truly born (Taylor and Hsu, 2001 a). Safety responsibilities are therefore 
allocated to those at the operational end: flight crews, air traffic controllers, technicians 
and others. Nevertheless, this view should be changed when the whole aviation system 
is concerned. 
Figure 2-6 Man Causes and Machine Causes 
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As Robert W. Sweginnis, a specialist in accident investigation and system safety, said, 
"Mishaps normally have both technical and management causes. Technical causes 
identify deficiencies in the operational system. Management causes identify 
deficiencies in the management system which allowed the operational deficiencies to 
exist. " (quoted from Aarons, 1998). 
Management has great leverage in affecting operational safety within a company. 
Through its attitudes and actions, management influences the attitudes and actions of 
all others in an airline. No one would deny that senior management commitment ranks 
among the top requirements, and that good communication, employee empowerment 
and a high value placed on safety are also considered to be very important. 
In addition, outside the company, regulators and countries are increasingly recognising 
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the role of management in air safety by holding the management accountable for a 
serious incident or accident (like corporate killing). Therefore, management must put 
safety into perspective, and must make rational decisions about where safety can help to 
meet the objectives of the organisation in the light of the impact of accident on safety 
performance. As such, the following sections are served to explore the safety 
management concept extracted from accident/incident and how these measures act in a 
loss control system. 
2.2.3 Definition of Safety Management 
Safety improvement and management are part of the countermeasures of a loss control 
system (accidents/incidents), which result from changed public awareness and 
expectation, regulatory changes, and the development of both civil and criminal 
liability. 
Since safety is a judgment of acceptability of risk, safety management should be the 
technique or practice of managing safety or controlling risk. Overall (1999) points out 
that a common definition for Safety Management is "A systematic management of 
activities to secure high standards of safety performance". Akhurst and Vivian (1997) 
also put it "Safety Management is a mechanism that could be employed to address the 
lessons by providing for effective monitoring and auditing of safety and the allocation 
of responsibility and accountability in safety critical organisations. " In other words, 
safety management simply involves giving safety the highest priority possible in a 
safety significant business. 
In the airline industry, the exact definition of safety management may vary a little in 
different airlines according to their business plans or safety aims., For instance, Bisson 
(1997) pointed out that Britannia Airways defines Safety Management as "all those 
activities which underpin the safety and worthiness of the aircraft" in accordance with 
the strategic safety aim of Britannia - to continue to be safe and reliable airline. 
Nevertheless, in the aviation industry, regulatory authorities around the world have 
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defined safety management in greater detail. The United Kingdom's Civil Aviation 
Publication (CAP) 712 defines safety management as "the systemic management of the 
risks associated with flight operations, related ground operations, and aircraft 
engineering or maintenance activities to achieve high levels of safety performance. " 
(UK CAA, 2001). 
The definition provided by UK CAA is a complex and complete explanation of safety 
management in the current aviation industry. It focuses on the risks associated with 
business, not focusing on safety but a lack of unsafe incidents/accidents. Moreover, it 
emphasises that management is systematically in association with all risks stemming 
from aircraft-related activities. Meanwhile, it contains the concept of systems for the 
management of safety. 
2.2.4 System Safety and Safety Management System 
A study of systems for the management of safety (System Safety) or Safety 
Management System (SMS) raised consideration of the three constituent parts - 
management, safety and systems. Edwards (1999) puts it "A company's Safety 
Management Systems define how the company intends to manage air safety as an 
integral part of its business management activities. A Safety Management System is 
defined as a systematic and explicit approach to managing risk, and is largely a loss 
control management system. " 
In the US, the System Safety discipline emerged on the engineering and management 
scene in 1962 with the dawning of the space transportation era. System safety principles 
emphasise the rigorous development of effective safety risk mitigation strategies based 
on comprehensive and thorough risk assessment and its management is a long-term, 
comprehensive approach that assures that systems and techniques have safety designed 
in from the outset (McIntyre, 2002). 
Canadian's civil aviation authority, Transport Canada (2001b), says it: "A safety 
management system is a businesslike approach to safety. It is a systematic, explicit and 
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comprehensive process for managing safety risks. As with all management systems, a 
safety management system provides for goal setting, planning, and measuring 
performance. " 
The United Kingdom National Air Traffic Services (NATS) began the introduction of 
formal safety management system (SMS) in 1991 (Profit, 1995), largely because of the 
increasing attention on safety matters and airspace capacity from outside groups, 
including the public, the media and Parliament. Profit (1995) states, "A safety 
management system is no more than a systematic and explicit approach to managing 
safety - just as a quality management system is a systematic and explicit approach to 
improving the quality of a product to meet the customer's requirement. " 
In CAP 712, a safety management system is defined as "an explicit element of the 
corporate management responsibility which sets out the company's safety policy and 
defines how it intends to manage safety as an integral part of its overall business. " (UK 
CAA, 2001). 
UK CAA also provides an analogy between SMS and financial management system 
of a company. 
"The features of a financial management system are well recognised. Financial targets 
are set, budgets are prepared, levels of authority are established and so on. The 
formalities associated with a financial management system include checks and 
balances. The whole system includes a monitoring element so that corrections can be 
made ifperformance falls short ofset targets. The outputs from a financial management 
system are usually felt across the company. Risks are still taken but the finance 
procedures should ensure that there are no business surprises. " 
Edwards (1999) also provides a comparison of the financial management system and 
safety management system (see Figure 2-7). The management of safety should fill a 
similar place in the organisation's management, in the same way that a financial system 
deals with the control and use of money, providing a framework for managing one of 
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the potential loss generators. In other word, the objectives of SMS are to act as a loss 
control system and to be focused on actively managing the key risks to an aircraft 
operator. 
Figure 2-7 The Comparison of Finance and Safety Management System 
Company Board Establishes 
Financial Management Management & Direction 
Safety Management 
System 
System 
Establishes Objectives 
Business plan & Targets Safety Plan 
Targets & Objectives Set Policy Targets & Objectives 
Budget Delivers the business Budget 
Accountabilities Raises and Approves Budgets Accountabilities 
Levels of Authority Allocates Resources Line Management Authority 
Procedures Management of Major Loss Procedures F T Generators Makes Business 
Checks and Balances Monitoring/ Line checks 
Internal Accoun- Internet Safety 
Audit -tants Audit Committee 
Audit Balance Audit Safety 
Findings Sheet Findin s Achievement 
Profit/ Loss Finance Case Safety Case Profit/ Loss 
Source: Edwards, 1999 
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2.2.4.1 The Components of a safety management system 
The commitment, organisation and assurance of continuing safe operations are 
achieved through a SMS. As such, a Safety Management System must be top 
management led and is a systematic approach to managing all aspects of safety in the 
business using a structured approach. Profit (1995) describes that in an organisation, 
the policies, principles, accountabilities, directives and procedures constitute SMS (see 
Figure 2-8). The safety management actions required by the policies and principles are 
implemented by directives, as shown by the bubble diagram within the figure. 
Directives and their associated procedures can be grouped under the broad headings of 
policy issues, incident investigation, safety cases and safety auditing as shown. The 
total picture in Figure 2-9 illustrates and rationalises the components of a typical safety 
management system in the aviation industry. 
Figure 2-8 The Components of a SMS 
Policy 
The foundation 
Principle I 
What is required 
Accountabilities 
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Directives 
Action 
Safte Internal Account- Safety 
Investigations abilities groups manual 
Major 
Investigation Incident Policy 
Imestigaiion IssuES Organisational 
Direedves 
change 
Safety Safety 
Case Auditing 
Unit safety Facility safety Interval anal reviews 
cases cases and inspections surveys 
System safet 
case 
Source: Profit, 1995 
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2.2.4.2 The characteristics of a safety management system 
Researchers and organisations (Edwards 1999; Overall 1999; GAIN 2000; and CAP 
712) have provided definitions of the basic characteristics (prerequisites) of SMS. 
Common characteristics are: 
1. Comprehensive corporate approach to managing safety 
2. Effective organisation for delivering safety 
3. Robust systems for assuring safety 
The top management of the organisation is responsible for establishing the 
comprehensive corporate approach to safety, but it will fall to the Chief Executive to 
ensure that there is an effective organisational structure below Board level to deliver 
safety. Meanwhile it is the management's responsibility to make sure that the system is 
robust enough to provide safety assurance. 
In reality, these features cannot be presented without the practice of the components of 
a SMS. As mentioned in the previous section, the main components of a SMS are Policy, 
Principles, Accountabilities and Directives, which appear sequentially but work 
interactively. Policy and Principles define the corporate approach and the Board has the 
corporate approach shown in the statements. This approach is embedded in the 
structure of an organisation and everyone is assigned his or her accountabilities. 
Eventually, the structured approach is implemented by Directives, and aims to create a 
robust system to ensure safety. 
In other words, the characteristics of a SMS are the prospects of how the components 
work and demonstrate. Therefore, a model is constructed by combining the main 
components and characteristics of a SMS (see Figure 2-9). This model presents a more 
explicit interaction between these three sequential characteristics of a SMS and other 
elements in the proceeding periods. 
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Figure 2-9 The Interaction of Characteristics and Components of a SMS 
Characteristics 
Comprehensive 
corporate 
approach to 
safety 
Effective 
organisation 
for 
delivering 
safety 
1 
Components 
Define Policy + Principles 
Safety policy statement 
Assign 
Accountabilities 
Organisational structure 
Robust Practice 
systems Directives 
for assuring 
safety Instructions 
Source: compiled from various authors 
1. Policy and principles: corporate approach to safety 
Corporate approach to safety is about the involvement of Board/Top management to 
show leadership and commitment to safety by clear policy objectives and safety 
improvement targets. The "Place" allowing the Board to show leadership and 
commitment to safety is "safety policy statements". 
In other words, the Board defines and details safety objectives and intentions for safety 
standards. These generic ideas are reflected in safety policy statements, which enable 
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management to demonstrate the fundamental approach to managing safety that is to be 
adopted in the organisation. As such, the policy statement is a vital starting point. 
Safety management principles contemplate the policy statements 
In the policy statements, safety management principles, decided by the Board to be 
applied within the organisation, are fundamental requirements that define the scope of 
the SMS. "What is required and what is achievable" are key questions of the safety 
objectives in order to provide a framework for processes to identify safety 
shortcomings so that remedial action can be taken (Profit, 1995). 
In addition, a safety improvement programme, approved by the Board is an important 
and powerful way of keeping the Board's attention on safety. It forces the Board to 
review the safety standards and the development of a SMS with regulatory minima. As 
such, a company's safety statement should include the following: 
 Safety objectives 
 Arrangements for the achievement of safety objectives 
 Flight safety principles 
 Health principles 
 Quality principles 
 Corporate and safety standards 
2 Effective organisation for delivering safety versus accountabilities 
Edwards (1999) pointed out seven key areas for effective aviation organisations to 
deliver safety. 
  Committee/structure for overseeing safety management 
  Management review mechanism 
  Clarity of line management responsibilities 
  Coherent cascade of accountabilities for safety 
  Role ofAccountable Manager (CEO) and a SMS custodian 
  Change management process in place 
  Effective company and training requirements 
32 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
In accordance with these key points, Overall (1999) presented a relative organisational 
structure (see Figure 2-10). The consideration of safety is systematically designed into 
the management structure, the committee and business of planning, and operation for 
an effective organisation. The objective is to ensure that everyone involved in a 
safety-significant role is left with no doubt as to his or her individual accountabilities 
for safety. The committee is, in the meantime, allowed to oversee safety management 
and the management can review mechanisms. 
Figure 2-10 The Suggested Organisational Structure 
Board 
Chief Executive 
(Accountable Manager) 
SMS Project Steering 
Group/ 
Review Committee 
Board Safety Policy 
Committee 
Safety Review 
Committee 
SMS Custodian 
(Safety Manager) 
j SMS Project team 
Engineering II Flight Operation II Ground Operation 
Source: Overall, 1999 
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The coherent cascade of accountabilities for safety is from Board level down through 
the management structure. Each safety accountability, within a job specification, 
requires certain knowledge, skills and experience. The organisation needs to ensure that 
everyone understands his or her individual and collective responsibilities and 
accountabilities. 
The Board safety policy committee should have inputs from all the senior fleet 
managers and other senior managers of the departments. However, the executive 
responsibility for safety management rests with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
The CEO is the Accountable Manager and is the link between the Board and the 
executive. GAIN (2000) defines the Accountable Manager as the person acceptable to 
the country's regulatory authority who has corporate authority for ensuring that all 
operations and maintenance activities can be financed and carried out to the standard 
required by the Authority, and any additional requirements defined by the operator. 
An airline's resources are controlled by its headquarter and how the resources are 
allocated has a direct impact on the company's safety management programme. Some 
regulators have mandated the appointment of an independent safety expert directly 
reporting to the CEO/Accountable Manager of the airline. There are two reasons for 
this. One is to enable the organisation's head to allocate necessary resources on safety 
and the other is to provide a Custodian of the SMS when any safety project is planned. 
In FAR part 121 (1996), the expert is named the Director of Safety while in JAR-OPS 1 
(1998), it is called Accident Prevention Advisor who could be the Quality Manager of 
the organisation. The exact placement of the safety manager function can vary from 
airline to airline, but the critical elements of access to top management should be 
maintained because safety reports can then be assured of the proper levels of 
assessment and implementation. 
To ensure the safety manager retains a clear and objective view of the safety of the 
operation, ideally he/she should have no operational responsibilities, but the incumbent 
should certainly have considerable operational management experience and the 
technical background necessary to understand the engineered systems that support the 
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operation (Profit, 1995). The role of a safety manager is responsibility for the 
development and maintenance of an effective SMS, promotion safety management, 
reporting shortcomings and monitoring remedial actions. 
Generally speaking, operational effectiveness will not be obtained without the adoption 
of a rigorous approach to identifying accountability for safety, which is exercised 
through an organisation's hierarchical structure of management committees and 
meetings, and its consultative arrangements with its workforce. 
3. Robust systems for assuring safety by practising directives 
The previous corporate approach and organisational structure have helped to build a 
basic framework in which to deliver safety. In addition, safety directives, shown in 
Figure 2-8, offer the practices to complete the objectives mentioned and assure safety 
for a robust system. 
Safety directives are instructions or procedures for implementing the SMS after 
developing the policies, principles and accountabilities suitable for the organisations. 
According to his experiences, Profit (1995) indicates Directives which include: 
1. Incident investigation: internal investigation and major investigation. 
2. Safety auditing: internal surveys and external review and inspection. 
3. Safety cases: unit safety case, system safety case and facility safety case. 
4. Policy issues: accountabilities, safety groups, safety manual and 
organisational change. 
No sequence exists for these four directives as long as they are kept to the minimum 
essential to implement the SMS. Before the important managerial issue in SMS-risk 
management is introduced, there is a need to see the link between quality and safety 
management. 
35 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
2.2.5 Linking Quality with Safety12 
Understanding and recognising quality in the spectrum of civil aviation is important. 
From the customer point of view, quality has influence on travel demand and market 
share. For both regulators and carriers, the performance of carriers is of concern. 
Knowing the information and position can help to enhance the quality of carriers, 
especially when the outcomes of a specific aspect of quality, such as air safety, are 
engaging people's curiosity. 
In 1987, after carrying out a study for more than 5 years, Dumas discovered that quality 
programmes and safety programmes have the same components, i. e. successful safety 
programmes and successful quality programmes are based on the same solid 
foundations (Dumas, 1987). This accounted for the first contribution relating to the 
integration of quality with safety (Herrero et al., 2002). Using this idea, Manzella (1997) 
affirmed that SMS and quality management system are in need of integrating together. 
Figure 2-11 shows that quality and safety principles are essentially the same. 
Accordingly, based on the ICAO recommended practice (Annex 6 part! ), JAR-OPS 
states that an operator shall establish an accident prevention and flight safety 
programme, which may be integrated with the quality system, including programmes to 
achieve and maintain risk awareness by all persons involved in operations. They 
instruct the operator to design and run a "quality system" with its "quality assurance 
programme" to demonstrate regulatory compliance. In addition, the ISO 9000 
international standards also help to implement quality systems. It offers some useful 
advice that procedures should be documented only where a lack of documentation may 
detract from quality. Yet it is worth noting that the decision as to whether or not it does 
detract from quality (or safety) is a crucial one and thus one that should only be taken by 
a person or committee fully competent to make such a decision. 
12 Please refer to Appendix C for the academic background of quality and safety. 
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Figure 2- 11 The Principles and Relationship of Quality and Safety 
SAFETY vs. QUALITY 
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involvement team 
Empowerment 
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control 
All accidents are preventable All non-conformances are preventable 
Source: Manzella, 1997 
In terms of organisational structure, FAA (GAIN, 2000) suggested that the Flight Safety 
Officer has a similar position to Quality Manager. When the management functions of 
safety and quality are the same, these two positions can be combined in one, as some 
airlines do. Also CAP 712 (UKCAA, 2001) indicated that in most small and medium 
sized companies it is expected that the Flight Safety and Quality tasks will have many 
common points and there can be no objection to the combination of the roles in one staff 
member. 
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2.3 Risk Management 
2.3.1 Definition of Risk and Risk Management 
There are various definitions of "Risk" (Profits, 1995; Janic, 2000; Transport Canada, 
2001 a) and they are all worded in slightly different ways. Yet the underlying concept 
remains the same: a chance causing injury or loss. This concept implies that risk may 
involve objectively or subjectively known or assumed exposure probabilities in relation 
to space, people and time-dependency. And the degree of risk will be based on the 
likelihood that damage or harm will result from the hazard13 together with the severity 
of the consequences. As Paries (1996) states "A risk is the product of a given 
probability and a given amount of damage". 
Civil aviation is an activity where four types of risks are present (Janic, 2000). 
Identified by Sage and White (1980), these four risks are as follows: 
+ Real risk to an individual, which may be determined on the basis of future 
circumstances as they develop; 
4- Statistical risk, which maybe determined by the available data on the incidents 
and accidents in question; 
+ Predicted risk, which may be predicted analytically from the models structured 
and relevant historical studies; 
Perceived risk, which may intuitively be felt and thus perceived by individuals. 
To the airline industry, the occurrence of an incident/accident constitutes a known 
statistical risk when flying has its inherent real risk. To manage risk involves the 
prediction of risk by anticipating and making changes in equipment when the risk is 
perceived: As such, risk management is a technique to manage all these four risks in 
this industry. 
13 A hazard can become a risk because of people, procedures, aircraft and equipment, and acts of nature 
(GAIN, 2000). It is an event that has the potential to result in damage or injury. 
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Organisational risk management 
Risk management relies upon the premise that the likelihood of an event happening can 
be reduced. In the aviation industry, risk management is defined by aviation authorities 
and organisations as: 
The identification, analysis and economic elimination, and/or control to an 
acceptable level, of those risks that can threaten the assets or earning capacity of 
a commercial airline (GAIN, 2000). 
The process of identifying risks, assessing their implications, deciding on a 
course of action and evaluation the results. In civil aviation, the term is 
frequently used in the context of decision-making about how to handle 
situations which affect aviation safety (Transport Canada, 2001a). 
Modern airlines face a formidable range of risks, ranging from strategic changes in the 
commercial environment, through to the adverse commercial impact of accidents and 
public relations disasters. Management of risk is, therefore, the essence of safety 
management. Knowing the risks enables resources to be more efficiently allocated to 
the concerns, and assessed on the basis of severity and frequency so that effort can be 
put into the areas of greatest risk and of significant safety concerns. 
Risk management activities and the failure to manage risk involve the expenditure of 
resources (FSF, 1999a), whether for the airlines or society. In terms of the former, 
Taylor and Hsu (1999,2001a) have identified the impact of accident on airlines' 
financial performance and safety improvement activities. It is a truism that effective 
organisations actively attempt to manage those risks which potentially impact upon 
organisational survivability. That is why Janie (2000) points out that a practical 
problem in air transport is how to manage risk and safety. However, the difficult task for 
management is to determine which risks carry the most potent dangers (Fischoff, 1994; 
Hood et al, 1992). 
Therefore, a thorough and systematic risk management process should be made 
associated with resources targeted accordingly, in order to make the best risk allocation. 
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2.3.2 Risk Management Process in Safety Management System 
As risk is manageable, it is termed risk management. Global : Aviation Information 
Network (GAIN)(2000) depicts the system approach to risk management is known as 
system safety, implying that the process of risk management, which is used throughout 
industry and commerce, involving identifying work activities and hazards and 
estimating, evaluating and controlling the associated risk, is the just tool used to 
achieve a SMS. International Federation of Airworthiness (IFA)(1998) used to suggest 
a safety loop, which is a cycle of activities including hazard identification, risk 
assessment, risk control and recovery, and feedback in order to implement SMS (see 
Figure 2-12). 
Figure 2-12 Safety Loop 
1. Identify the 
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the performance 
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organisational 
learning 
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Management 
System 
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3. Put in place 
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control risks (or to 
recover if things go 
wrong) 
Source: IFA, 1998 
In aviation operations, not all of risks can be eliminated; some risks can he accepted and 
some can be reduced to an acceptable level. Figure 2-12 demonstrates the sequential 
procedures to a robust SMS are the processes by which risk can be identified, measured, 
evaluated and controlled so that the highest standards of safety can he achieved. The 
whole process follows a logical pattern. The first step is to identify the hazards. The 
second step is to assess the risk stemming from hazardous activities and determine 
whether the organisations are prepared to accept the risk. The third step is to find and 
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identify the defences that can control the risk. The fourth step is to examine whether 
risks are appropriately managed and use the feedback information to evaluate 
organisational changes. 
In other words, risk management is SMS in the making. It is effective risk management 
that contribute to the robust SMS. Profit's (1995) model, previously presented in Figure 
2-8 (page 29) which shows a robust SMS can be achieved by maintaining safety levels 
(eliminating risks) through the directives and procedures (practices), provides a 
discussion base for the following sections, which will explore these four steps 
describing in Figure 2-12 in detail and investigate current risk measures used in the 
airline industry. 
2.3.2.1 Hazard identification 
Hazard identification is a systematic examination of potentially hazardous activities to 
establish safe, effective procedures and practices. There are many ways to identify 
hazards, which might be obvious or latent in operations. The most important thing is 
that hazard identification should be undertaken on a frequent basis depending on the 
complexity of operations and associated risks. The following are some useful methods 
of identifying hazards: 
1. Incidentlaccident investigation 
Incident/accident investigations help to find out the causes of mishaps or serious 
occurrences. This is also classified as one of the most important identification processes 
for hazards. As such, this section aims to firstly introduce how accidents are analysed in 
order to identify the accident causes and then illustrate the role of incident investigation 
on hazard identification. 
Analytical methods for accident investigation 
An accident is always deemed as a failure of risk management and is a brutal eruption 
into damage management (Panes, 1996). As such, accident investigation has a clear 
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role within the safety process. Accident investigation is the appropriate tool to uncover 
unanticipated failures in technology or rare, bizarre events. A proper accident 
investigation can reveal how specific behaviours, including errors and error 
management, can generate an unstable or catastrophic state of affairs (Ho, 1996; Hsu, 
1999). 
Ferry (1988) distinguishes over 20 types of accident analysis approaches, including: 
" Events sequencing 
" Known precedent 
" All cause/multiple cause 
" Codes, standards, and regulations (CSR's) 
" The four M's of man, machine, media, management 
" Re-enactment 
" Reconstruction 
" Simulation 
" Epidemiological 
" Hazard analysis documentation 
" Inferential conclusions 
" Programme evaluation review technique (PERT) 
" Critical path method (CPM) 
" Failure mode and effect analysis (FEMA) 
" Technique for human error rate prediction (THERP) 
" Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
" Change analysis 
" Management oversight review (TOR) 
". Scenario modelling 
" Preliminary hazard analysis 
Two most common accident analytical approaches are "Event Sequencing" and "All 
cause/multiple cause". The former is to select the cause initiating the sequence of 
events that lead to an accident. The latter is to identify the primary cause which is most 
responsible for the accident. 
Importance of incidents 
Although the analytical tools of an accident are many, and experts can use them 
successfully to trace the causation, accidents are too rare to provide enough data for 
research. Therefore, an incident investigation is called. According to the Heinrich 
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Pyramid (sec Figure 2-13), for every major accident in a given endeavour, there will be 
3-5 less significant accidents and 7-10 incidents but there will be at least several 
hundred unreported occurrences (the exact numbers may vary in different airlines). 
Figure 2-13 The Heinrich Pyramid 
NTS 
UNREPORTED 
OCCURRENCES 
Source: Adapted from Hart, 1999 
Apart from the reason that incidents outnumber accidents, so they provide more data for 
analysis and investigation, there are another two reasons to investigate and study 
incidents. Firstly, incidents reveal similar hazards as accidents, but they are not as 
severe as accidents and they will not result in serious adverse legal or financial 
consequences. Secondly, more information is available from the people involved (Ho, 
1996). 
Safety investigation seeks to identify causes of the incident and recommend the 
necessary remedial action to reduce the risk of recurrence. For a complex system like 
the airline industry, it needs to conduct a more formal and detailed investigation using 
an investigation team from a higher formation in the organisation with specific 
investigation or technical experience. 
2 Incident reporting systems 
In 1947, the pioneering work of Fitts and Jones in developing the "Critical Incident 
Technique" helped to establish the value of the investigation of incidents. Interviews 
and written surveys were used to examine errors made by crewmembers in utilising 
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cockpit instruments (Nagel, 1988). Their research systematically showed the 
significance of poor human engineering in incident generation and accident causation. 
Lauber also stated the importance of incident and an incident databases which he 
described "... is a veritable gold mine of information waiting to be tapped" (quoted from 
Ho, 1996). Clearly, this shows that the incident investigation is important but the source 
of incident database - incident reporting systems are even more important to develop. 
National reporting systems 
ICAO Annex 13 recommends to its member States the provisions about the incidents 
reporting system: 
1. The requirement to establish incident reporting systems 
2. A requirement for the investigation of serious incident. 
Some countries have set up their own national reporting systems, for example, ASRS 
(Aviation Safety Reporting System) (U. S. ), MORs (Mandatory Occurrence 
Reports)(U. K. ), EUCARE (European Confidential Aviation Safety Reporting System) 
(Germany), CAIR (Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting Network) (Australia), and 
SECURITAS (The Confidential Transportation Safety Reporting System Program) 
(Canada), etc. The quality of their databases is attributed to the cooperation and 
provision of airlines, and the information provided by airlines is attributed to the 
established reporting system in their companies. 
Reporting systems of airlines 
The existence and health of a reporting system in a company can create access to top 
management and ensure that safety deficiencies are recorded. Reporting systems, such 
as BASIS (British Airways Safety Information System) and ASAP (Aviation Safety 
Action Partnership) 14, are created for airline operation with two major goals: to identify 
safety concern and to provide methods of corrective action. 
14 BASIS: Created by British Airways. Gather, categorise and analyse safety information including 
incident reports and digital data using modular system. 
ASAP: A joint project between the Allied Pilots Association, the FAA and the American Airlines. 
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Take BASIS 15 for example. It is used by over 100 organisations for safety management. 
BASIS was developed by safety professionals to answer such questions as "How safe 
are we? ", "Where should we put our limited resources to become even safer? " The 
modules used contain: 
1. Air Safety System 
This module is used to process flight crew generated reports of any safety-related 
incident. This was the original BASIS module and provides analysis in an 
exceptionally easy-to-use format. 
2. Auditing System 
The BASIS Audit module has been designed to store and analyse details of JAR Ops 
(Flight Operations, Engineering, and Ground Operations) and Health and Safety audits. 
3. Cabin Safety Reporting 
Safety incidents in the cabin are now starting to receive the attention they deserve. 
Violent, abusive and/or unsafe behaviour by passengers are among the issues that the 
aviation industry is trying to better understand and ultimately address. 
4. Ground Found Occurrence Reporting 
Aircraft maintenance plays a vital role in ensuring if aircraft are airworthy for services. 
It is therefore essential that reports raised by ground mechanics related to aircraft safety 
are taken seriously then stored and analysed in a similar way to air safety reports (ASRs) 
generated by flight crew. This module was developed to collect and analyse such 
maintenance reports. 
5. Ground Handling Reporting 
There is an increased awareness of Ground Handling events within the aviation 
industry and this, together with the financial cost of damage and the operational 
disruption caused by delays, has made Ground Handling Reporting a key element of an 
organisation's safety management programme. 
6. Human Factors Reporting 
In safety management the ultimate tool would enable the Flight Safety Managers to 
know all the causal factors behind their next incident before the investigator has a 
reason to write a report. 
is Sources are from GAIN (2000) & BASIS website: http: //www. winbasis. com/ 
45 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
7. Maintenance Error Investigation 
Before an organisation can hope to tackle maintenance error it must first identify what 
maintenance errors are occurring and more importantly why; i. e. what were the 
contributory factors? This module uses information derived from an interview process 
known as MEDA (Maintenance Error Decision Aid) which was jointly developed by 
Boeing and a number of airlines including British Airways. 
8. Safety Information Exchange 
Users extract and send their data quarterly to the BASIS team. The data is de-identified 
at source and merged into one global database which is then distributed to those users 
who have contributed data. The merged database is sent out every quarter and contains 
incidents occurring during the preceding 12 months. 
Factors affecting implementation 
To obtain a high degree of incoming reports, the most important characteristics for a 
good reporting system should contain three characteristics including Confidentiality, 
Anonymity and Feedback (Ho, 1996; Bacchi et al, 1997). Confidentiality is the number 
one guideline that must be strictly obeyed in any working place. Confidentiality means 
the reporter's name will only be known by those authorised by the system. Keeping the 
reporter's identity from being disclosed or discussed by the third party should also 
receive higher priority than the reported case itself. 
It is also important to inform the reporter as each stage proceeds and assure the reporter 
that his/her work is highly appreciated. Trust in the system must be encouraged by 
direct and indirect feedback to the aviation community. Reporters must be allowed to 
see the value in their programme participation through feedback, which can foster their 
willingness to continue reporting their experiences, i. e. feedback must demonstrate 
results and value of contributing. 
Meanwhile, during the implementation of a voluntary reporting system, a reporter's 
trust is the main key to the success of any reporting systems. Bacchi et al (1997) point to 
some issues such as programme publicity and the availability of the reporting forms, 
saying that cannot be underestimated although publishing the reports is a good way to 
enhance the exchange of information. For example, the forms should be designed as 
postage-paid and should be available to all potential users. Additionally, the provision 
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of a structured guide would enhance the quality of the reports' information and prevent 
returned reports being incomplete. 
To sum up, if everyone in the company is able to discuss the incidents frankly without 
fear of punishment, and have access to the reporting system with confidence, similar 
incidents might not occur and future accidents can be avoided. Anonymity should be 
the last resort. Freedom from job loss is the key. This is the major aim in developing 
incident reporting systems. 
3. Safety audit 
During the 1950s and 60s, safety professionals created a different measure to assess 
safety effectiveness - the audit, when problems with accident measures became obvious 
(Petersen, 1998). The theory behind the audit is: Accidents are either unforeseeable (the 
true accident) or unforeseen (oversight). If firms can dictate what actions to take in 
order to prevent accidents in advance, it can then measure how well these 
predetermined actions are executed. As such, the prime objectives of any safety 
auditing are to determine safety standards and enhance safety, according to Hamilton 
(1998). 
There are various types of audit, such as checklist; yes-no type audit; quantified audits; 
and audits that end with scores or points awarded, etc., just like quality management 
systems eliminate risks as a matter of routine by objectively examining all aspects of a 
unit's activities that impinge on quality. Auditing means the checking of compliance 
with working practices against procedures and standards. It is one of the tools used to 
check the quality of safety programmes and identify any hazardous situations. 
Safety auditing can be also fulfilled by internal safety surveys, and external review and 
inspection because an honest and critical self-audit is one of the most powerful tools 
that management can employ to measure flight safety margins (FSF, 1999b). The 
methodology of self-audit is used by senior 'airline management to identify 
administrative, operational and maintenance processes and related training that might 
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present safety problems. The results are used to focus management attention on areas 
that require remedying to prevent incidents and accidents. Most of important of all, 
Arbon et al, (1990) argue that audits have confirmed that organisations which have 
deliberately fostered an attitude of mutual respect between various categories of 
employees enjoy a higher level of morale, and operational reliability and maintenance 
standards. 
2.3.2.2 Risk assessment 
After identifying the hazards, the next step in the process is to critically assess and rank 
risks. Since a general conception of risk is the chance, in quantitative terms, of a 
defined hazard occurring, it therefore combines a probabilistic measure of the 
occurrence of the primary events with a measure of the consequence of those events 
(Warner, 1992), i. e. two considerations are in need: the likelihood of the hazard and the 
severity of the consequences. These are reflected in the hazard analysis techniques 
introduced below. 
Hazard (risk) analysis 
Hazard analysis is the application of methods to identify hazards and associated risk 
(UKCAA, 2001). It is based on prediction, and the accuracy of the results is dependent 
on the correct identification of all significant potential hazards, and on the accuracy of 
the data analysed (Profit, 1995). This enables defences (risk control) to be developed 
and contingency plans to be produced and implemented. There are various techniques 
to perform risk analysis. The following are some tools frequently used in the airline 
industry (See Appendix D for the details): 
1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
2. Hazard Mode and Effect Analysis (HMEA) 
3. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
4. Event Tree Analysis 
5. Flight Operation Risk Assessment (FORAS) 
6. Risk Analysis Matrix (RAM) 
7. Risk specific safety index products - performance indicators 
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2.3.2.3 Risk control/ recovery 
The essence of this stage is to develop and implement appropriate measures to prevent 
occurrence (risk control) or to recover if things go wrong (risk recovery). As long as 
defences can be identified, risks are under control. 
Identify the defences 
The objective of the hazard identification is to provide the organisation with a 
technique for early identification of the risks to which it is exposed. Risk management 
requires that once hazards are identified and their risks are ranked, the defences, which 
may exist as suitable physical or procedural controls to prevent an unplanned release of 
the hazards should be identified. Therefore, introducing the identification of control is 
to reduce the severity and likelihood of a hazard, to levels of "as low as reasonably 
practical" (ALARP). This is obtained by using methodologies for the removal, 
reduction, or control of the hazards or the threats that could release them. 
Table 2-2 demonstrates some risk control programmes existing in airline operations to 
prevent the top two accident causes: CFIT (Controlled Flight into Terrain), ALA 
(Approaching and Landing Accident). These programmes are diagnostic tools designed 
for remedial actions. 
Take CFIT for example. It is described by the Flight Safety Foundation as "When an 
airworthy aircraft, under the control of the flight crew is flown unintentionally into 
terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no prior awareness by the crew. " It can happen 
at anytime during the flight but most often occurs when an aircraft is preparing to land. 
CFIT has been a large focus for several years but still remains a large killer in aviation. 
Studies have shown that the industry could prevent more than 80 percent of total 
aviation fatalities by eliminating CFIT and approach/landing accidents (Cooper, 1996). 
Several recommendations have been made to ICAO to help control this problem. 
Among the suggestions is that of implementing Ground Position Warning System 
(GPWS). First developed in the early 1970s, the GPWS concept was one aspect helping 
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to slim down the number of CFIT accidents and it began appearing in large aeroplanes 
by 1973. ICAO mandated GPWS in the 1970s and today more than 95 percent of the 
world's airline fleet have them installed. Furthermore, the NTSB has encouraged the 
use of Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) which some of the 
major US carriers have begun using on a voluntary basis (Air Safety Week, 2001). 
Meanwhile, the use of Flight Data is of significant importance. It not only increases 
safety by looking for and addressing weakness in operation, but also helps management 
to make sound decisions and monitors the effectiveness of those decisions. Flight 
Operation Quality Assurance (FOQA) data provides a precise record of flight 
parameters and crew actions. It is a routine downloading and systematic analysis of 
aircraft parameters that were recorded during flight either by the crash-protected 
recorder or the Quick Access Recorder (QAR). 
Table 2-2 Risk Control Tools for Top Accident Causes 
m 
1. CFIT 
(Controlled Flight 
Into "Terrain) 
2. ALA 
(Approaching and 
Landing Accident) 
FOQA (Flight Operation Quality Assurance) 
TAWS (Terrain Avoidance Warning Systems) 
GPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity 
Warning Systems) 
PWS (Ground Position Warning System) 
............... VISAW (Minimum Safety Altitude Warning) 
and Landing Accident Reduction 
in ii ii 1" I)I OR (l)itital I liý'Iit 
)ata Recorder) 
AA said, by the end of March 
005, the total US fleet will be 
: trofittcd with lA\VS (EGI \V' ). 
otne airluic< in the IS 
nplcmcnt u mi i %olunt; uv hasis 
Ireadý 
TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) 
QAR (Quick Access Recorder) Valuable diagnostic took 
3. Others Providing information tivni 
normal flights 
Precision-like_approaches 
Services difficulty report 
Source: compiled f om AIR SAI=L 11' WE 1-, K. 200 1 and carious journals 
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Holtom (1999) stated from a Flight Operation perspective, a FOQA programme could 
identify the following: 
" Non-compliance and divergence from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
" Inadequate SOPs and inadequate published procedures 
" Ineffective training and briefing, and inadequate handling or command skills 
" Fuel inefficiencies and environmental unfriendliness 
The ultimate aim of FOQA is to identify these operational shortfalls so that risk 
prevention strategies can be conducted and safety significance events can be avoided in 
the future. 
2.3.2.4 Feedback & organisational learning 
Effective feedback is an important construct if organisations decide to prevent incidents 
and accidents. There are two main tasks in this stage according to Figure 2-8 (page 29) 
and Figure 2-12 (page 40): 
Thoroughly document the process and its results (Safety case) 
, k' Feedback information on performance to enable organisational learning 
1. Safety case development 
The concept of Safety Cases has been adopted in several industries, such as nuclear, 
chemical, rail, air transport and so on as a means to demonstrate safe operation. More 
specifically, the safety case is a systematic and structured demonstration by an 
organisation to provide assurance, through comprehensive evidence and argument, that 
the aircraft operator has an adequately safe operation. It aims to identify the hazards 
faced by a company and how to establish the potential for harm from those hazards 
through risk assessment. In practice, the safety case is a documented description of the 
major hazards that the aircraft operator faces and the means employed to control those 
hazards (Profit, 1995; Edwards, -1999). The organisation will have identified and 
assessed the major hazards and safety risk and be able to demonstrate that they can 
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manage them to levels which are as low as reasonably practicable (Edwards, I 999a). 
The essential feature is that safety case should identify potential weaknesses in the 
process and then identify the measures in place to mitigate or control the risks and 
explain how the risks are managed. Only when the procedures are documented can it 
help to prevent accidents/incidents from occurring. For example, Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) are a set of procedures that provide operators with step by step 
guidance for their task. Standardisation ensures the best method of operation and makes 
sure employees behave in a consistent and predictable way (See Appendix E for 
detailed explanation of documentation). 
2. Organisational learning and change 
After having identified the hazards, assessed and controlled the risks, and documented 
the safety case, the next step is to manage the learning through feedback information. 
Effective feedback is important within the context of inter-organisational learning 
(Smith, 1999). Stacey (1993) also claims that the whole issue of feedback is central to 
the systems approach to learning. It therefore shows the need to discuss organisational 
learning. 
Marquardt and Reynolds (1993) state: "Learning organisations teach their employees 
the critical thinking process for understanding what it does and why does it. These 
individuals help the organisation itself to learn from mistakes as well as success. " This 
notion clearly explains that organisational learning is affected by a group rather than 
individuals working alone. 
"Learning" means the adjustment of coping mechanisms based on a new understanding 
of the world. According to Shrivastava (1983), learning is a framework of knowledge 
development, utilisation of knowledge in understanding the cause and effective 
relationships, and perspective on knowledge and expertise. Organisational learning also 
includes working and dealing with practical and experiential learning, and innovation 
diffusion as well as the transfer of that experiential learning. To be effective, 
organisational learning should involve a change in the core beliefs, knowledge and 
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assumptions held by both management and operators, which also leads to effective and 
systematic changes to the operation of the organisation. 
Changes might be trivial, minor or major. All of them have to be managed in order to 
maintain control of their activities. The range of organisational change is from the 
whole business, down to local departmental changes. Any major organisational change 
should be accompanied by a. formal analysis and evaluation of its safety management 
implications. The value of safety should be learned and viewed as a core function value 
of the organisation and as such, as a value that will accrue to the benefit of the airline, 
its employees and its customer base. 
Nevertheless, Choularton (2001) points out that achieving a level of learning which 
addresses the root causes of disasters, is difficult. Recent research shows us that while 
effective learning about hazards is a common assumption of such attempts, 
organisations can be very resistant to learning the full lessons from the past 
accidents/incidents and mistakes (Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000). Smith (1999) has 
suggested a number of barriers to learning, as summarised in Figure 2-14. Many 
barriers listed are consequent on the fundamental problems associated with 
communication and core belief. It is because organisations may ignore the human 
aspects of causality which are central to crisis incubation and the learning process. 
Figure 2-14 Barriers to Organisational Learning 
Barriers to Organisational Learning 
Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions 
Lack of corporate responsibility 
Incrementalist approach (failure to deal with emergency) 
Reconstruction and projection 
Focus on a single-loop learning 
Peripheral inquiry and decoy phenomenon 
Centrality of expertise, denial & the disregard of outsiders 
Ineffective communication & information difficulties 
Cognitive narrowing and fixation (reductionist) 
Maladaption, threat minimization and environmental shits 
Source: Smith, 1999 
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Human reliability 
Hammer (1972) states "A popular misconception is that by eliminating failure a product 
will be safe. A product may be made safer by eliminating or minimising failure, but 
there are other causes of accident... mishaps often occur where there is no failure. " The 
importance of Hammer's work lies in the fact that he recognised there are other causes 
of accidents: dangerous characteristics of the product, human action, extraordinary 
environmental factors, or combinations of these (McIntyre, 2000). To err is human. 
Human errors now account for 80 percent of aircraft accidents (IATA, 1975; IFA, 1998). 
Yet many of these accidents could have been avoided if the basic concept of human 
factors had been observed. As such, the main aviation safety authorities around the 
world (such as FAA, Transport Canada, JAA) have undertaken a series of initiatives, 
including the consideration of Human Factors in Operations, Certification and 
Maintenance. Some may focus on research, publication of guidance material and the 
promotion of Human Factors Programmes without changing the regulatory framework, 
while others decided to enhance their regulations by embedding human factors 
concepts within them. It is suggested that the cooperation and efforts of regulation 
systems should certainly provide more effective controls for the human element and 
reliability of airline safety services (JAA). As such, there is a need to have an in-depth 
investigation to probe into the relationship between human aspect and SMS. 
2.4 Human Contribution 
2.4.1 Human Factors versus Risk 
A Greek myth that has been adapted to tell of the first man-made aviation disaster is the 
story of Icarus flying. It is said that in order to escape from Crete, Dxdalus, who was 
imprisoned by King Minos, built wings of feathers and wax for himself and his son, 
Icarus. Warning Icarus not to fly too close to the sun, the two took to flight. 
Nevertheless, Icarus did not listen to what his father said and flew towards the sun. As a 
result, the wax melted16 and Icarus plummeted to his death. 
54 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
This story told about the cause of an accident- human factor- failure to follow SOPs or 
principles, which not only made the journey at risk but also resulted in the horrible 
consequence (causal factors). From the modem investigation point of view, in addition 
to causal factors, what are the "contributing factors" to the accidents? i. e. why Icarus 
failed to follow SOPs? Maybe he knew "the higher you fly, the colder it is", so he 
decided to ignore what his father told him- the wax would melt; or maybe he just simply 
did not trust his father and disregarded his teaching. As such, the study of human factors 
starts from investigating causal factors of accident/incidents towards exploring the 
contributing factors of dangerous activities for improvement. 
No human activities can be carried out without risk, particularly in a high-risk industry 
such as the aviation business, which "people" design, build, operate, maintain, and 
manage. The failures of people involved in the daily routine of operations are often the 
symptoms of deeper deficiencies at the foundations of the system. Grose (1987) states 
that from a risk management point of view, an inability to absorb the consequences of 
unsafe acts and omissions is ultimately considered to be a symptomatic failure of the 
overall risk management system. 
Therefore, understanding human factors in aviation has become the subject of 
increasing attention ever since it was highlighted at the IATA's 1975 Operation 
Symposium in Istanbul, Turkey. Later, ICAO acknowledged human error research as 
the most relevant opportunity to increase safety. In 1989, in order to reflect the results 
of research as to the human factors in flight operations of that time, ICAO stated that: 
"The expansion of Human Factors awareness presents the international aviation 
community with the single most significant opportunity to make aviation both safer and 
more efficient. " 
16 As a matter of fact, the higher you fly, the colder it is. Therefore, the ending of this story should be 
corrected and replacing "the wax melted" to "the wax cracked and fell apart because of the low 
temperature". Another possible cause, provided by the aircraft accident investigator - Frank Taylor, 
was that Icarus got high enough to reach "coffin corner" and consequently lost control without 
having suffered any structural failure at all. After all there had been no opportunity to do any flight 
testing! 
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An accident can ultimately be deemed to derive from a system which is inadequately 
specified or designed, or which has insufficient defences-in-depth (ICAO, 1994). This 
notion means human factors not only play an important role in causing 
incidents/accidents (insufficient system or design), but also in preventing them (as long 
as defences are identified). 
`Human factors' is a strange and possible ungrammatical name for a discipline or study. 
Nevertheless, it has come to be used to encompass all of those considerations that affect 
man at work (Green et al, 1996). Thus, human factors involve gathering information 
about human abilities, limitations, and other characteristics and applying it to tools, 
machines, systems, and environments. In aviation, human factors is studied for a better 
understanding of how humans can be integrated with the technology and working 
environment with most safely and efficiently approach. In the Human Factors Guide for 
Aviation Maintenance published by FAA (1995), Human Factors is defined as: 
"Human Factors refers to the study of human capabilities and limitations in the workplace. 
Human Factors include, but are not limited to, such attributes as human physiology, 
psychology, workplace design, environmental conditions, human-machine interface, and 
interaction of humans, the equipment they use, the written and verbal procedures and rules 
they follow, and the environmental conditions of any system. " 
To best illustrate the concept of human factors, a SHELL model (shown in Figure 2-15 
a, b) is adopted. The SHELL model was first developed by Professor Elwyn Edwards in 
1970s. Since then, this model has been widely applied to the field of aviation human 
factors and has become a valuable tool in aviation safety. Hawkins (1993) modified this 
model by summarising the main concerns of human factors, subsequently adopted by 
ICAO. 
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Figure 2-15 The SHELL Model 
(a) (b) 
cH 
cL o 
cI 
Source: Taylor, 1999 Source: Hawkins, 1993 
These two figures in fact have slightly different focal point although they have the same 
elements. There are four main components in the SHELL model: Software, Hardware, 
Environment and Liveware. Each element symbolises different feature as followings: 
S= Software (the non-physical aspects of the workplace, such as documentation and 
computer) 
H= Hardware (equipment and machinery, such as the layout of the aeroplane) 
E= Environment (the workplace and general surroundings, such as weather) 
L= Liveware (human element, i. e. other people working as team members) 
The SHELL concept recognises the importance of people, equipments and environment, 
software and their interactions with each other. The difference between the Hawkins 
and Edwards models is the interfaces produced between each element; the former 
shows four interfaces while the latter presents three more interactions between these 
elements. The following are the interfaces demonstrated in both models. 
Liveware- Liveware: 
This interface concerns the interaction of human beings. It emphasises that human work 
needs to be recognised as a team-based activity; otherwise this work will not function 
well. As such, communication, leadership, shared situational awareness and so on are 
emphasised to avoid the misunderstanding. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is 
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designed to accomplish this goal. 
Liveware- Hardware: 
This interface concerns about the man-machine system. It is mostly dealt with by the 
science of Ergonomics. For example, different socket in the aircraft design to prevent 
from any mismatch and potential hazards. This interface has been the focus of most 
Human Factor attention in the past. 
Liveware- Software: 
This interface encompasses the non-physical aspects of the system, such as procedures, 
manuals, quick reference handbook, computer programmes, etc. Aircraft engineering 
has now attracted lots of concerns because of its heavy reliance on manuals, computers 
and paperwork. Procedures are ambiguous or badly written or translation causes 
misunderstanding and even cost incident or accidents at the worst. 
Liveware- Environment: 
This interface represents a very important interface, because of the ways in which tasks 
and situations can combine with human limitations to create unsafe acts and quality 
lapses. 
The following three interfaces were showed in the Edwards model in addition to the 
previous four. 
Software- Hardware 
This interface is concerned when considering the non-physical aspects-machine of the 
working place. For example, procedures are designed that are not compatible with the 
instrument or electronic database (manual) on board requires too complicated computer 
operation to obtain the information. 
Software- Environment 
This interface concerns with the non-physical aspects of the working place 
-environment system. For instance, the ground handling procedures or 
loading 
procedures cannot be carried out in the rain and darkness. 
58 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
Hardware- Environment 
This interface deals with the machine-environment system, as aviation is developed 
based on adapting the environment to match human requirements. For example, 
instruments or lights cannot be seen in bright sunlight from some angles or similar 
background. To solve this problem, Cranfield University is now conducting a research 
regarding this interface. Dr. Tony Head from Human Factor Group was leading a 
project studying glider conspicuity trails (Head, 2003). 
Taylor (1999) indicates that Edwards' model can best illustrate all the interactions 
between these elements when viewing the whole aviation system, while Hawkins' 
model failed to draw the attention to all of the interfaces. This is because an essential 
part of Hawkins' model is on the interfaces between the Liveware and other 
components, i. e. his concept recognised the importance of human elements, which have 
important interactions with the people, equipments and environment. In other words, 
Liveware is the heart of the model. The SHELL model revealed a very important tool 
for air safety, as "Human Factors" has been developed progressively to enhance 
aviation safety, by promoting the understanding of predictable human limitations and 
its applications in an attempt to manage human error. 
2.4.2 Human Error 
Hollnagel (1993) reveals that the estimated involvement of human error in the 
breakdown of hazardous technologies increased fourfold between the 1960s and the 
1990s, from minima of around 20 percent to maxima of more than 80 percent. Statistics 
present an estimate of human error in different industries (see Table 2-3), showing that 
human performance (problems) dominates the risks in hazardous industries; the 
variability of percentage of failures may come from the type and access of reporting 
system. However, especially in the aviation industry, it is now widely recognised that 
80 percent of all aviation accidents are the result of human error (IATA, 1975). 
Therefore, the obvious danger is, as Professor James Reason says, "Challenge is either 
you manage human error or human error will manage you! " (IFA, 1998) This notion 
implies the involvement of greater cost and greater danger. 
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Table 2-3 Estimates of Human Error in Different Industries 
Industry Percentage of all failures 
Jet transport 65-85 
Air traffic control 90 
Maritime vessels 80-85 
Chemical industry 80-90 
Nuclear power plants (US) 70 
Road transportation 85 
Source: IFA, 1998 
2.4.2.1 Cost of human error 
In a significant part of accidents, maintenance error is one of the main causes, which is 
accountable for up to 25 percent of all aviation accidents resulting from human error 
(JAA, IFA, 1998). Maintenance is a highly error-provoking activity, regardless of who 
is doing the job. Statistically, there are 600,000 removable parts in an aircraft so there 
are many chances for error. The commonest error type is leaving out necessary steps 
during installation. Incorrect installation accounts for 60 percent of maintenance error. 
Goglia (2000) even announced the fact that "the actual experience in the US was: in the 
last 5 years FAR operators had suffered 14 hull losses, 7 of which were attributable to 
maintenance or engineering failures. That is 50 percent of the total. " According to GE's 
(General Electric) estimation, maintenance error is around 20-30 percent of in-flight 
shutdown (IFSD) and costs $500,000 each time (IFA, 1998). Other data presented by 
Boeing indicates that it costs around $10-20,000 or more per hour of maintenance 
related delay, and $50,000 or more for each flight cancellation (Boeing, 2001). For 
airlines this figure is greatly exceeded. Between 1988 and 1991, a US airline with a 
fleet of more than 300, encountered 203 recorded maintenance mishaps, which resulted 
in 13,299 out-of-services hours, and cost $16.5m in repairs, excluding lost revenue, 
which is likely to amount to many more millions of dollars (IFA, 1998). 
Perrow (1984) mentions that we are facing the growing complexity of the system in our 
60 
Chapter 2 Literature Review & Empirical Analysis 
technological environment. In the aviation industry, accidents have many causes of 
failures arising from different levels of causes. As such, a basic knowledge of Human 
Factors is a crucial part in aircraft maintenance, operation and other department 
expertise. to improve safety through understanding of human error, it may be useful to 
address errors as symptoms (contributing factors) rather than causes of accidents 
(causal factors). In addition, there is a need to predict where errors might occur and to 
prevent them from happening and causing any financial costs. Error can be managed 
systematically and cost-effectively. This is central to error management. 
2.4.2.2 Error Management (EM) 
Major accidents inquiries (e. g. Three Miles Island, Challenger, King's Cross, Herald of 
Free Enterprise, Piper Alpha, Clapham, Exxon Valdez, Kegworth, etc. ) indicate that the 
human causes of major accidents are distributed very widely, both within the system as 
a whole and often over years prior to the actual event (Reason, 1995b). The ICAO 
Human Factors Manual states: 
"Although human failure is the predominant factor contributing to aviation accidents 
and incidents, it has never been clear what aspects of human capabilities and 
limitations should - or could - be addressed by training. On the other hand, it has been 
Equally clear for some years that Human Factors education and training within the 
aviation system could be improved. " 
Indeed, as human error is frequently a precursor to failures of risk management systems, 
a thorough understanding of error management is required in order for such measures to 
be improved and made effective. 
Wiener (1995) points out that error management (EM) can be viewed as involving the 
tasks of Error avoidance, Error detection and Error recovery. In addition, there are three 
essential facts of EM: (1) Human fallibility unchangeable, (2) Everything we do is 
vulnerable and (3) Key activities are interconnected. It reflects the spirit of EM- you 
cannot change the human condition, but you can change the conditions under which 
people work. Moreover, in an operational context, errors are caught in time and do not 
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produce damaging consequences. Counter-measures to error should not just look at 
avoiding errors, but to make them visible and trap them before they produce hazardous 
consequences. This is the essence of error management. 
Over the last 20 years, behavioural scientists have learned a great deal more about the 
varieties of human error, their mental origins and the factors likely to promote them. It 
is increasingly clear that "bottom-up" analyses, starting with the investigation of human 
error (Rasmussen, 1985; Reason, 1990), ultimately reach the same conclusions as the 
"top-down" approach adopted in recent disaster investigations - namely that human 
error must be viewed in context and that risk-reducing defences will necessarily be 
multi-faceted if they are to match the complexity of the operational context and tasks 
(Johnston, 1996). 
Previous research has been focused on finding human factors that link to pilot-error 
accidents through accident investigation. The traditional aspects of human factors 
(errors) address communication, stress, and ergonomics, such as: 
+ Improvements in engine, aircraft system, flight deck design and passenger cabin 
design are made to reduce the accident rate and increase efficiency 
(manufacturer side). 
+ Analyses of aircraft accidents reveal that only 30 percent of crew related 
accidents resulted from technical skill failures on the part of individual. Instead, 
they show that between 60-70 percent of crew related accidents are caused by 
team management breakdown. This has led to Crew Resource Management 
techniques being developed and applied on the flight-deck. Thus, CRM is 
intended to facilitate teamwork and communication between crew members to 
reduce the incidence of errors (Helmreich, 1997; Sales et al., 1999). 
Human Reliability analysis 
Much of the effort of human reliability analysis is dedicated to reducing the 
uncertainty about human performance by producing or obtaining a more precise 
estimate of numbers used, i. e. refines the probabilities for the defined events 
(Hollnagel, 1993). 
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Gradually it became clear that erroneous actions during maintenance shared the same 
importance as erroneous actions of design and system operation. The rationale and 
basic principles of comprehensive error management in terms of engineering and 
maintenance is developed and named HERO (Human Error Reduction Operation). It is 
an "operation" because it can take many forms. There is no infallible way. Different 
mixes of techniques and practices suit different organisations. The important thing is 
that HERO should be based on sound error management principles. Comprehension 
and the judged relevance of this kind of training material has been trailed successfully 
in a number of aircraft maintenance organisations (British Airways Engineering, 
Singapore Airlines Engineering Company, Cathay Pacific, etc) (IFA, 1998). 
The following are some measures that are effective to achieve HERO. 
+ The Qantas Human Error & Accident Reduction (HEAR) Programme 
One of the most successful HF programmes is HEAR, developed by Qantas in 1995 for 
maintenance engineers following a series of repeated incidents. The programme was 
organised and delivered by a group of frontline engineers with strong management 
support: a "shop floor" approach. Error-Reducing Conditions (ERCs) are focused on to 
achieve the aim. 
+ Team Resource Management - Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) 
The term MRM was originally used as a parallel to CRM (Crew Resource Management) 
but has evolved somewhat over the years as it has been appreciated that CRM concepts 
could not all be related directly to the maintenance engineering context. An example is 
Continental Airlines, who has established a CRM-type of course for their engineers. 
They are claiming marked declines in ground-damage incidents and dispatch delays as 
a result. 
+ Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) 
Developed by Boeing, MEDA is a maintenance error investigation tool, for 
investigating maintenance lapses. It has been developed as a project to provide 
maintenance organisations with a standardised process for analysing contributing 
factors or errors and developing possible corrective action. 
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"The Error Iceberg" is used to explain where MEDA should be applied (see Figure 
2-16). The basic idea behind MEDA is "Errors are seldom random". Errors originate in 
a workplace or system. As such, the investigation occurs at two levels. 
1. Line investigation: MEDA begins with a paper-based investigation that gives line 
engineers a standardised way of identifying the causes of lapses and of preventing 
their recurrence. 
2. Organisational trend analysis: MEDA then provides the means for examining past 
lapses using a computer-based trend analysis. MEDA is designed to provide a 
common language to increase communication between maintainers, regulators and 
manufacturers. 
MEDA is a tool that provides front-line engineers with a principled means of detecting 
and removing error-provoking factors. It is a complete and wide-ranging process with a 
paper-based investigation at its core. By 2000,104 carriers globally have received 
MEDA training from Boeing. It is the most widely used Human Factors based 
maintenance error investigation tool in aircraft maintenance today (Chapman, 2000). In 
the USA, about 33 percent of airlines use MEDA, about 33 percent are thinking about it, 
and about 33 percent have decided not to use it due to concerns about vulnerability to 
regulatory action and litigation, particularly in the US. Many Canadian airlines are 
using the MEDA process, as are several UK airlines (UKCAA, 2000). (See Appendix 
F for other MEDA-like approaches) 
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Figure 2-16 The Error Iceberg 
Operationally 
Significant Events 
Present level of 
investigation (if any) 
Where MEDA shoul start 
(IFSD's Delays, Cancellations) 
Events without operational significance Where MEDA 
Source: Chapman, 2000 
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To sum up, although all organisations operating hazardous technologies use various 
forms of EM, the main purpose of error management is rather pragmatically to enable 
specific system changes to be made in response to specific unwanted occurrences as 
well as an effort to improve the system design. With human factors awareness training, 
everyone in the organisation is given the tools to make the organisation an improved 
working environment. 
2.5 A Retroactive Approach to Safety 
Accident investigation and incident reporting system 
Human imperfection remains a fact of life. Learning the relevant lessons for prevention 
is the primary reasons why aviation accidents are formally investigated and in such 
painstaking detail. Accident investigation, therefore, has an apparent role within the 
safety process. It is the appropriate tool to uncover unanticipated failures in technology 
or rare, bizarre events. Hollnagel (1993) indicated that in order to prevent accidents 
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from happening it is necessary to take a closer look at the accidents that have happened, 
to see if something can be learned from them. Maurino (2001) also points out that the 
most widely used tool to document operational human performance and define 
remedial strategies is the investigation of accidents. 
A proper accident investigation can reveal how specific behaviours, including errors 
and error management, can generate an unstable or catastrophic state of affairs. Serious 
or fatal accidents often serve as the catalyst for improving the safety system. Such 
events can make either a temporary or a permanent change for a company to manage its 
safety. 
However, there are limits to the lessons available through this process because 
investigation always serves purposes other than accident prevention. To identify the 
type and frequency of errors, or discover any training deficiencies, is possible but this is 
only the tip of the iceberg. Reason (1995) argues that most accident investigations tend 
to stop when answers are found to the proximal cause, responsibility and prevention 
questions. Consequently it usually takes a long and expensive public inquiry to identify 
the underlying organisational failure types. Should accident investigation restrict itself 
to mere retroactive analysis, its only contribution in terms of human error would be 
increased industry database, the usefulness of which remains dubious. (Maurino, 2001) 
Incident reporting systems are better than accident investigation for understanding 
system and operational human performance. Incidents are more significant markers 
than accidents because they identify and signal weaknesses within the overall system 
before it breaks down. Their value lies in pinpointing the concern. Nevertheless, there 
are limits to the value of this information. The main limitations are: Incidents are 
self-reported so the process and mechanism underlying an error may not reflect reality 
and it therefore captures the external manifestations of errors only. Heimreich and 
Merritt'7 describe incident reporting thus: the incident is like a broken bone that sends 
to the doctor. The doctor sets the bone, but rarely considers the root causes- weak 
17 From httr): //www. psyiitexas. edu/DsyLhelnueic]Vlocalsol. htm (09/08/01) 
"Local Solutions for Global Problems: The need for Specificity in Addressing Human Factors 
Issues. " By Heimreich R., and Merritt A., Aerospace Crew Research Project, The University of 
Texas at Austin. 
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bones, poor diet, victim of abuse, high-risk lifestyle? Therefore, setting the bone is no 
guarantee that the patient will not present again next month with another symptom of 
the same root cause. 
Risk management tools and human factors 
Analysis of the behaviour of operational personnel in accidents and incidents has been 
the method adapted to assess the impact of human performance on safety traditionally. 
Because of the recorded negative outcomes, investigators are engaged in discovering 
the bad behaviours of operational personnel. While they examine human performance 
in safety occurrences, they enjoy the benefit of hindsight. Risks can be identified and 
managed so that they are reduced to tolerable levels. 
In the past, many improvements in safety have been reactive i. e. response to errors. 
Risk management tools are developed in order to collect the safety information and 
prevent the identified errors, such as DFDR, QAR, GPWS and CRM training. However, 
Maurino (2001) argues that DFDR and QAR providing information from normal flights 
are valuable tools but these can not yield information on the human behaviours leading 
to provide the context in which to diagnose the problems. Also, the limitation of FOQA 
data is that no information is recorded about why particular actions were taken 
(Helmreich, 2001). 
Error management developed after human factors issues were recognised and errors 
were found to be managed. Like the observation of training behaviours (e. g. flight crew 
simulator training), EM is another tool which is of help in understanding operational 
human performance. Nonetheless, training behaviours are sometimes biased towards 
safety due to only an approximation of behaviour during line operation if everything is 
done by the book. 
A retroactive approach 
Maurin (2001) stated "Looking only at data after the fact is a bit like trying to design a 
good celebration by focusing on sweeping up after the parade", which is a retroactive 
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approach to safety. Accident causes serve as contributing and primary factors to this 
approach while risk management, human factor and error management are the 
diagnostic tools. These after-fact measures are as it should be, but the difficulty now is 
that there are so few accidents that it is difficult to analyse trend and patterns. Savage 
(1999) indicated that we need another way to prevent the next accident. In order to 
uncover the mechanisms underlying the human contribution to failures and successes in 
aviation safety, we need to look beyond the visible manifestations of errors when 
remedial strategies are designed. 
It is increasingly recognised that effective organisational risk management requires the 
active support of managers at all organisational levels. Effective prevention strategies 
must focus upon the identification, removal or amelioration of systematic risk factors. It 
is suggested that the control of operational risk in the aviation system will require 
greater proactive intervention by airline management in the future. Johnston (1996) 
further proposes that proactive and systemic risk management approaches will be more 
effective in preventing accidents than ad hoc reactions to individual acts of failures, or 
reactive interventions directed to individual workers. Therefore, a proactive approach is 
in need of investigation. 
2.6 Proactive Safety 
2.6.1 What is Proactive Safety? 
The concept of proactive safety was not officially acknowledged in the aviation 
industry until the mid 1990s, when a new and effective safety approach was actively 
being sought. In contrast to a reactive approach, researchers have emphasised the 
importance of a proactive approach to safety in aviation (Maurino, 1996; Johnston, 
1996; Merritt and Heimreich, 1996; Savage, 1999; McFadden and Towell, 1999). 
Merritt and Heimreich (1996) concur that "With regard to safety, it is important to be 
proactive, rather than waiting for incidents and then reacting in a band-aid fashion. To 
this end, periodic safety audits can identify weaknesses in the system. " The "band-aid" 
application progresses safety through human factors knowledge in the aftermath of 
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damage. It has fought a consistent battle against latent systemic failures and has 
progressed towards improving system safety, but in a limited way. Therefore, 
identifying and eliminating latent system failures to achieve safety is not a new problem, 
but is a crucial one, and one in need of a solution (Merritt and Heimreich, 1996). 
Aviation is an industry where people need to interact closely with technology to achieve 
the production goals. In particular, the introduction of advanced technology has added 
the challenge to the air transport industry because technology is widely used as a means 
to improve safety, but it is used without cultural consideration. The cultural 
transformation of these two airlines- British Airways (BA) and Scandinavian Airlines 
System (SAS)(See Appendix G) have presented a new dimension for aviation 
professional to investigate, which is that the prospective changes in the company are the 
way to bring about organisational change (Ho, 1996) and a proactive approach to safety. 
The only way of proactive management being present in every working place is through 
the organisational and cultural level of company. Cultural transformation can decrease 
the latent failure and active errors and prevent incidents and accidents from occurring. 
Therefore, following sections will firstly introduce the two dimensions underlying the 
proactive safety - organisational and cultural aspects in 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 respectively, 
followed by demonstrating the proactive programmes in section 2.6.4, such as LOSA 
(Line Operation Safety Audit), to show the importance to detect the latent human error. 
2.6.2 Organisational Accident 
The airline industry represents a complex system of multiple interactions that is highly 
sensitive to the physical environment and the passage of time. Since organisational 
structures have adapted procedural methods since 1970s, collective system failures 
have naturally followed. The causes of accidents have turned out to be more 
complicated than a single causal reason. Lauber (1996) points out that human factors 
studies have changed accident investigation from fault finding only, to an opportunity 
to find system or organisational problems. The term "organisational accident" 
gradually emerged and describes how accidents can occur or management initiatives 
can fail because the organisation was not well prepared or not well suited to the 
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initiative. Reason's model (1990) provides a theoretical framework of accident 
causation to illustrate a more profound understanding of organisational accident. 
The Swiss Cheese Diagram (see Figure 2-17) shows how accidents are the consequence 
of a series of failures in a system, which, as shown in the figure, include fallible 
decisions, line management deficiencies, precursors of unsafe acts, unsafe acts and 
inadequate defences. Each slice of cheese symbolises a condition of a company, and the 
holes on the slides of cheese are the breaches of each condition. Whenever these 
features happen to combine, there is the possibility of the occurrence of an accident. 
Reason (1990) also notes "In considering the human contribution to system disasters, it 
is important to distinguish two types of error: Active errors, whose effects are felt 
almost immediately, and latent errors's whose adverse consequences may lie dormant 
within the system for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with 
others to breach the system's defences. " 
Figure 2-17 Reason's Organisational Accident Model 
Latent defects ýl 
active failures Accident 
defences 
Latent 
DECISION ý ine management 
deficiencies 
Lw 
Fallible 
Source: Rcýised torn Reason, 1990 
is Reason replaced the term "latent errors" gra(luaIIv as "latent conditions" in his subsequent study. 
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This well-known cheese model is redrawn as Figure 2-18 to better illustrate where and 
how active errors and latent failures occur. It shows the various levels of a system and 
their possible involvement in contributing to an accident or incident. By using systemic 
analysis, the relative importance of each level in preventing a major accident can be 
manifested. Traditionally, acts (a person's behaviour) and conditions (the physical work 
environment) represent immediate accident causes. These have been viewed as unsafe 
acts and conditions. As Figure 2-18 shows, all accidents result from a combination of 
specific situations that consist of individual actions and workplace conditions. Two 
causal pathways are identified in this model: an active failure pathway running from the 
organisation via the workplace conditions to the actions of an individual or team, and a 
latent failure pathway that runs directly from the organisation processes to the defences. 
Figure 2-18 A Model of Organisational Accident Causation 
Defences 
Organisation Workplace Person/team Outcome 
Management Error and Errors 
H 
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and organisational produce violations 
process conditions ýj ý/ 
Latent failure pathway 
º AF: Active failures 
"""""'* Latent failures Source: Adapted from Reason, 1995 
As mentioned previously, with the advance of technology and the reliability of aircraft, 
modem aircraft accidents are generally not the result of mechanical failures, but are 
mainly due to human factors. However, traditionally in the airline industry human 
performance has been considered as separate from the context or system within which it 
takes place, such as "pilot-error", "controller-error", or "maintenance-error". It is not 
adequate to describe the complex ways in which accidents happen because this ignores 
the component of the decision-making process (the management) i. e. the airline 
industry's multi-level human involvement. Beaty (1995) puts it, "Modem aircraft 
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accidents result from collective mistakes rather than individual errors". Moreover, 
Edkins (1998) points out that "Aircraft accidents have a positive correlation with latent 
failures, arising from the broad management functions of an organisation". Latent 
failures are decisions or actions originating within management that have damaging 
consequences but may lie dormant for a period of time. They combine with local 
workplace factors, and errors or violations usually committed by operational personnel. 
If system defences are breached, the result may be an accident. 
The latent condition has changed the trend in favour of finding systemic or 
organisational problems. It also illustrates the effects that management's efforts can 
have on instilling a culture where safety is an operational value. Given the unique role 
of management in culture, many cultural strategies originate with and/or require the full 
enthusiasm of management. But Merritt and Helnireich (1996) argue that before any 
action can be taken, in order to strengthen or alter the culture, there must be a clear 
perception of the existing culture. 
By definition, the commonly accepted definition of safety is "risks being minimised to 
an acceptable level". Acceptable risks are, however, reached at either an individual or 
group level. Each individual's decision will be governed to a large degree by his or her 
personality. At group level, the combination of personalities simultaneously creates a 
culture (Braithwaite and Caves, 1997). This implies the coherent relationship between 
safety and culture. Meanwhile, Maurino (1996) suggests a need to re-visit the 
conventional views on human errors. Not only must human and organisational 
behaviour be considered as inseparable from the contexts within which they take place, 
but also prevention endeavours must build upon proaction rather than reaction. As such, 
following sections aim to explore the cultural dimension and its importance in airline 
safety together with the proactive approaches to safety and its correlation with culture 
dimension within the airline industry. 
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2.6.3 Culture and Safety 
2.6.3.1 The concept of culture 
Culture is defined as the ideas, customs, and art of a society (Collins, 1995). Gradually 
the concept of "culture" has become widely used in the field of social science, in which 
multiple meanings of the term are available. Among them, two main models can be 
found. According to Rohner (1984), 
"There are those who view culture as being behaviour; the regularly occurring, organised 
modes of behaviour in technological, economic, religious, political, familial and other 
institutional domains within a population. In contrast to the various "behavioural" 
models of culture are a group of theorists who hold that culture is a symbol system, an 
ideational system, a rule system, a cognitive system, or in short, a system of meanings in 
the heads of multiple individuals within a population. " 
Whether culture is seen as being behaviour, or a shared meaning system with certain 
observable behavioural consequences, a more exact understanding is required for the 
present study. 
Consistent with the view of Hofstede (1980), who defines culture as "the software of 
the mind", Merritt and Heimreich (1996) provide the following definition of culture: 
"Culture can be defined as the values, beliefs, rituals, symbols and behaviours that we 
share with others that help define us a group, especially in relation to other groups. 
Culture gives us cues and clues on how to behave in normal and novel situations, 
thereby making the world less uncertain and more predictable for us. " 
They also postulate that culture encompasses two components: Surface structure and 
Deep structure. The former is constructed. with observable behaviours, while the latter 
provides the logic guiding the behaviours. 
The definitions of culture reveal the fact that cultures are specific to a defined group of 
people. Therefore, Hofstede (1994) argues that culture should include layers of national 
culture, regional/linguistic/religious culture, gender culture, generation culture, social 
class culture and organisational culture, since people are usually part of a number of 
groups. 
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In keeping with this theme, Heimreich and Wilhelm (1997) identify and discuss three 
intersecting cultures that surround every flight crew; national, professional and 
organisational cultures. Heimreich (1999) points out that many professions such as 
aviation have strong-cultures and develop their own norms and values along with 
recognisable physical characteristics such as uniforms or badges. His research reveals 
that professional culture can contribute to aviation's splendid safety record, but the 
"macho" attitude of invulnerability can lead to risk-taking, failure to rely on fellow 
crew members, and error. 
Morley (1999) also identifies a similar stratification of culture which includes layers of 
national culture, industry culture, organisational culture and organisational safety 
culture. Industry culture is included to reflect the norms, attitudes and values in 
association with an industry and to illustrate the fact that different industries may have 
their own set of systems of meaning to distinguish them from others. 
C- 
Summarising from these researchers' work, three main and distinct levels of culture are 
found: national, organisational and safety culture. These are presented in Figure 2-19 
and will be discussed in the following sections. 
Figure 2-19 Layers of Culture 
National Culture 
Indust Culture 
Professional Culture 
Organisational Cultur 
Safety Culture 
Source: compiled from Heimreich and Wilhelm 1997; Morley, 1999 
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2.6.3.2 National culture 
National culture is undoubtedly an important influence in aviation (Johnston, 1993; 
Maurino, 1994; Merritt and Heimreich, 1996). One of the most influential individuals 
in this field of culture variation is Geert Hofstede (1980), who conducted a 
questionnaire study across IBM, a large multi-national corporation. The questionnaire 
data was collected from 80,000 IBM employees in 66 countries across seven 
occupations. Four dimensions of national culture were identified: 
Dimension 1: Power Distance 
This is the extent to which differences in power among people are expected and desired, 
i. e. the unequal distribution and exercise of power which is expected and accepted in a 
culture. Countries high on power distance (e. g. China) demonstrate dependence of 
subordinates on their superiors. Leaders are expected to be autocratic and decisive, and 
subordinates are unlikely to approach their superiors. In countries low on power 
distance (e. g. Australia), superiors are likely to consult with their subordinates. 
Dimension 2: Uncertainty Avoidance 
This is the degree to which members of a culture feel uncomfortable with risk or 
unknown situations. Members in a high uncertainty-avoidance culture (e. g. Japan) tend 
to be intolerant of unstructured or unpredictable situations. On the other hand, cultures 
that have low uncertainty avoidance (e. g. Denmark) are likely to value stability and 
rules in their daily lives, and accept and encourage dissenting views. 
Dimension 3: Individualism-Collectivism 
This relates to the extent to which members of society value individual achievement 
over group membership and goals. In a highly individual culture (e. g. the US), people 
are expected to act according to their own interests, while a collective culture values 
loyalty to and harmony with the group, so that people tend to act according to the 
interest of the group (e. g. Singapore, Taiwan). 
Dimension 4: Masculinity-Femininity 
This is the extent to which differences in gender roles are valued. In a high masculine 
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culture, members place a high value on assertiveness and toughness in males and 
tenderness in females (e. g. Japan). In a high feminine culture, members value a welfare 
society and both genders are allowed to display feminine traits (e. g. Sweden). 
However, Merritt (1997) found all four dimensions, apart from Masculinity-Femininity, 
when replicating Hofstede's survey by using commercial pilots as respondents. As a 
result, Merritt suggests that this dimension can be absent because aviation is already a 
financially rewarding profession and has, therefore, little concern for masculine traits 
such as "the opportunity for high earning". 
Heimreich (1999) notes that Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance are two 
related dimensions of national culture having particular relevance for aviation. He also 
suggested a third dimension, labelled Rules and Order, which is similar to Hofstede's 
concept of Uncertainty Avoidance. Members in a high Rule and Order culture believe 
rules should not be broken and written procedures are needed for all situations (e. g. 
most Asian countries). Those low on this attitude show lower concern for rules and 
written procedures (the US, European countries). 
2.6.3.3 Organisational culture 
The concept and essence of culture has been linked increasingly with the study of 
organisations. With the recognition of the symbolic aspects of organised settings have 
come calls for a cultural perspective on organisations (Turner, 1971; Whorton and 
Worthley, 1981; Smircich, 1983). Similar to national culture, organisational culture 
provides a behavioural referent for members of an organisation by defining what the 
organisation does, and does not, represent. An organisation's culture reflects its attitude 
and policies about human error, and the openness and trust between employees and 
management. 
The characteristics of organisational culture 
Although organisational culture is a complex concept (Guldenmund, 2000), a number 
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of researchers have tried to define and describe the characteristics of organisational 
culture (e. g. Schein, 1992; Robbins, 1992; Hampden-Turner, 1994). For example, 
Hampden-Turner argues that corporate culture is describable, measurable if necessary 
and, within limits, alterable. He describes the characteristics of corporate culture as 
follows: 
1. Individuals make up a culture: Culture comes from within people. They use 
the culture to reinforce ideas, feelings and information which are consistent 
with their beliefs. 
2. Cultures can be rewarders of excellence: Culture is a source of motivation. It 
creates an environment for bringing out the potential of all its members and a 
system for rewarding defined tasks. 
3. Culture is a set of affirmations: No group, corporation, tribe or nation can 
start from nothing. Culture proves that. 
4. Culture affirmations tend to fulfil themselves: Cultures create results and 
consequences, no matter whether for good or for bad. 
5. Cultures make sense and has coherent points of view: One cannot 
understand a corporate culture without seeing that its actions logically follow 
from its beliefs. Culture can be studied. 
6. Cultures provide members with continuity and identity: Only if beliefs are 
shared, affirmed, fulfil themselves and retain distinctive meanings over time, 
despite changing environments, can a corporation retain its sense of identity 
and continuity. 
7. Cultures are patterns: A culture is no particular thing or object, but a pattern 
which appears both through time and across the organisation. So cultures are 
structured from repeating events. 
8. Cultures are about communications: Culture can produce solidarity. It is 
most important to grasp that many cultures facilitate communication, sharing 
of experience and information. They can make their members strongly 
supportive of each other. 
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Guldenmund (2000) summarises and lists the organisational characteristics from 
previous researchers and literature review as follows: 
1. It is a construct: When operationalising a construct, it is generally assumed 
that there are several variables that co-vary or fit together to form a unified 
whole. 
2. It is relatively stable: Researchers have found a period of stability of at least 
five years for organisational culture. 
3. It has multiple dimensionality: Dimensions are always composites, 
comprised of several variables. 
4. It is something shared by (groups o) people: Culture is something that is 
mutual and reciprocal. It is a synergistic aggregate composed of several parts. 
The characteristics are the base for assuming multiple cultures within a large 
organisation, in that such an organisation can be divided into divisions, 
departments, units, etc, that will have developed their own culture. 
5. It consists of various aspects: This means that several different cultures can 
be distinguished within an organisation (e. g. safety culture, service culture, 
etc). 
6. It constitutes practices: Culture is perceived as 'having multiple layers. At 
each level, culture has particular manifestations which can be studied 
separately. 
7. It is functional: Culture is functional in the sense that it supplies a frame of 
reference for behaviour. 
Although there is some disagreement with numbers 1 and 3 between researchers, 
overall, organisational culture is a relatively stable, multi-dimensional, holistic 
construct shared by (groups of) organisational members, which supplies a frame of 
reference and which gives meaning to and/or is typically revealed in certain practices 
(Guldenmund, 2000). It is not suggested that a 'single organisational culture is needed 
universally. Successful airlines can be characterised by different cultures and 
operational styles, just as many different personality types can make good airline pilots, 
cabin crew, ground staff and so on. 
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Organisational culture and safety 
Organisations are complex entities and safety is just one aspect of their function. 
Naturally, different organisations demonstrate different abilities to manage risk and to 
realise the long-term benefits of the effective management of safety. The difference in 
the ability of organisations to manage their affairs with respect to safety has led to a 
wide-ranging treatment within the literature of the characteristics of organisations. 
The relevance of organisational characteristics to safety is obvious in the previous 
section when discussing the characteristics of organisational culture. Since 
organisational culture is a multi-dimensional construct and consists of various aspects, 
the link between organisational culture and safety is therefore clear; Korean Air is a 
good example". As Hayward (1997) indicates, organisational culture has the potential 
to have a very significant direct impact on the safety performance of organisations. 
Merritt and Helmreich (1996) also note that it is organisational culture which ultimately 
shapes workers' perceptions of safety, the relative importance placed on safety, and 
members' activities regarding safety. 
Figure 2-20 portrays schematically the concept of the organisation-culture relationship. 
Culture is imported into the organisation through its membership. Its presence is 
believed to be revealed in the patterns of attitudes and actions of individual organisation 
members (Smircich, 1983). This figure also embodies the concepts of Merritt and 
Helmreich (1996): 
"An integrated organisational culture can be characterised by sub-group 
cooperation, a strong corporate identity ... 
high employee morale, all of which 
create a positive impact on service and safety. " 
15 Take Korean Airlines (KAL) for example. Since 1995 and 1993, Delta Air Lines and Air Canada had 
code-share agreements with KAL respectively. Unfortunately, KAL had suffered 10 serious 
accidents from 1990 to 1998. By anyone's standard, those numbers represent the symptoms of a 
system in trouble. Following the crash of a Boeing MD-11 freighter in China in April, 1999, Delta 
Air Lines and Air Canada immediately suspended its code-share on KAL flights pending a thorough 
review of the Korean carrier's operations. Because both of them would not like to take the risk of 
being perceived as in the same image as KAL. In November 1999 the Korean government imposed a 
ban on KAL launching new international flights following a spate of serious accidents that led to the 
suspension of a number of airline alliance agreements. It raises the question: When KAL's 
code-share partner Delta Air Lines completed its independent safety audit, would KAL really ignore 
things that clash with traditional ways? In 1999, KAL underwent a safety audit, but KAL's reluctant 
acknowledgment of a leaked internal safety report in 1999 revealed its fundamental safety culture 
had not been changed at all following the series of accidents (Hsu, 1999; Lee, 2000). 
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Figure 2-20 Organisation and Subcultures 
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Various types of organisation 
Westrum (1993,1995) provides a view regarding the basic organisation communication 
styles so that an aviation organisation can learn from the styles of management of its 
employees. He examines three patterns of information used by aviation organisations: 
pathological, bureaucratic, and generative (see Table 2-4). This concept has been 
adapted widely in the aviation world. 
These categories reflect the communication patterns between employees and upper 
management and support employees after problems are reported. The "pathological" 
style is a highly conflicted organisation. "bureaucratic" organisations process 
information as a routine job and fail to handle changes. A"generative" style can help to 
create a highly reliable organisation. 
Different types of organisation will foster different corporate cultures. Ideally, the 
generative types of organisation are favoured and encouraged because the generative 
culture can help and support employees in learning from mistakes, rather than 
apportioning blame and taking punitive action. 
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'Fable 2-4 Basic Organisation Communication Styles 
Pathological Bureaucratic 
Information is personal power Information is routine 
Responsibility is shirked ponsibility is 
partmented 
(Messengers are shot 
Bridging is discouraged 
Failure is punished or covered 
ew ideas are actively 
Messengers are listened to 
if they arrive 
Bridging is tolerated 
isation is just and fair 
ideas present problems 
Generative 
formation is seen as 
key source 
Responsibility is shared 
Messengers are trained 
idging is rewarded 
ilure leads to inquiry or 
ew ideas are welcome 
Source: Westrum, 1995 
2.6.3.4 Safety culture 
As presented previously, the characteristics of organisational culture can affect the way 
in which an organisation manages risk. Adams and Ingersoll (1989) comment that at the 
organisational level of analysis it may often be more appropriate to discuss culture in 
terms of subcultures. Hence, combined with the fact that different types of 
organisations demonstrate different safety records, the concept of organisational culture 
to the management of risk has led to a significant amount of discussion within the 
management and literature of the safety culture concept. 
In particular, safety culture was discussed to a large degree following the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident (1986). The Chernobyl accident was identified as being caused by the 
organisations responsible for the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, which lacked a 
"safety culture" and resulted in an inability to remedy design weaknesses despite these 
being known about before the accident. The human errors and violations of procedures 
were interpreted as evidence of a poor safety culture. 
In the airline industry however, it is not easy to measure how good a good safety culture 
is or how had is a had safety culture. If examining the definition of safety culture, there 
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are various kinds of interpretation and explanations. Table 2-5 lists some definitions of 
safety culture. Although there is much discussion around the concept, there is little 
common understanding of what constitutes an exact definition of safety culture 
(McDonald and Ryan, 1992). Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that they contain 
similar underlying elements of a safety culture: beliefs, attitudes, norms, and values. 
Some definitions also encompass the tangible manifestations of culture: priorities, 
behaviours and practices. Yet the most important of all, as indicated by Hayward (1997), 
is that the establishment of an appropriate safety culture is the recognition that human 
error is unavoidable and that it is the responsibility of a mature organisation to 
effectively manage that error. 
Table 2-5 Definitions of Safety Culture 
Researchers Definition 
Cox and Cox (1991) Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and 
................................. 
values that employees share related to safety. 
.......................... 
Pidgeon (1991) The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and 
technical practices that are concerned with minimising the 
exposure of employees, managers, customs and members of 
the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious. 
Geller (1994) Everyone feels responsible for safety and pursues it on a daily 
basis in a total safety culture. 
Lee (1996) The safety culture of an organisation is the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to and the style and proficiency of an 
organisation's health and safety management. 
Merritt and A safety culture is more than a group of individuals 
Heimreich enacting a set of safety guidelines. It is a group of people 
(1996) guided in their behaviour by their joint belief in the 
importance of safety, and their shared understanding that 
every member willingly upholds the group's satctv norms and 
will support other members to that common cud. 
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2.6.4 Contemporary Safety Programmes with Proactive Concepts in the 
Airline Industry 
Abeyratne (1998) points out that regulation of a high tech industry such as aviation 
must move towards a proactive rather than a reactive approach to safety. Now there is a 
consensus among the international aviation community that human factors must 
progress beyond the "knob and dials" approach of ergonomics, beyond training and 
beyond the post-mortem application of human factors knowledge in accident 
investigation. A good safety programme would most likely have identified safety 
hazards within the training and checking systems, and resolved deficient aviation safety 
defences in order to evaluate and improve the integrity of safety defences, as well as the 
safety measures before an accident or incident. Efforts have already been made in this 
field recently and some programmes were developed as a result. Within the modern 
airline industry, there are five programmes with proactive concepts to help to assess the 
airline's safety. They are: (1) British Airways MESH Programme (Reason, 1994), (2) 
Boeing's Safety Programme Model (Boeing), (3) BASI-INDICATE Programme 
(Edkins, 1998), (4) PERS (FAA, 1997b), and (5) LOSA (Line Operation Audit). In 
particular, MESH and PERS are applied in engineering maintenance aspects (see 
Appendix H for the introduction of these programmes in details). 
2.6.4.1 Managing Engineering Safety Health (MESH) 
Objectives 
Managing Engineering Safety Health (MESH) is a programme created for British 
Airways Engineering Company in 1992 by a team lead by Professor James Reason 
from the University of Manchester. It is a set of diagnostic instruments for making 
visible, within a particular engineering location, the situational and organisational 
factors most likely to contribute to human factors problems (Reason, 1994; Mäurino et 
al, 1995). 
Designed to assess the safety climate of an organisation, the measures of MESH give an 
indication of the system's state of safety (and quality), both at the local workplace level 
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and in general. It is a system of measuring a number of local and organisational factors 
and the interplay between them. The local factor assessments are made at weekly 
intervals by a randomly selected proportion of the workplace in each of a variety of 
workplaces (i. e. operational hangars, majors overhaul hangars, workshops, etc. ). The 
organisational factors are assessed at three-monthly intervals by technical management 
in each location because these are the people best placed to judge the impact of 
"upstream" organisational factors upon the reliability of their various workplaces 
(Reason, 1995a). 
Advantages 
Reason (1995a) suggests that by identifying factors in need of improvement and 
tracking the changes over time, MESH enables the maintenance of adequate safety 
health, comparable to a long-term fitness programme, in which the focus of remedial 
efforts switches from dimension to dimension as previously salient factors improve and 
new ones come into prominence. The advantages of MESH can be thus summarised as 
follows: 
  Staffs are all involved in safety. 
  Managers can prioritise remedial actions and check upon their impact. 
  Direct safety resources where they are most needed. 
  Encourage better communications between management and staff. 
Limitations 
Although the first impression of MESH appears to be that it is easy, the implementation 
of this tool may lead to some difficulties. Caution must be expressed when interpreting 
the implied meaning of results when employing a single rating scale method of 
investigation. Due to personal tendencies, some people tend to use only the extreme of 
the scale, while others tend to use only the middle area. In addition, the MESH users 
have no access to any overview of the global structure and the items to be rated are 
displayed on separate rating pages. 
Meanwhile, the factors rated in MESH have very general meanings and can be 
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interpreted and rated according to different interpretations. Consequently, the results 
obtained by MESH are not sufficiently detailed for suggesting proper corrective 
actions. 
MESH has never been applied by low capacity operators, and would be beyond the 
resources of smaller operators. Although it has also been implemented by Singapore 
Airlines Engineering Company, this programme is not adopted widely by other airlines 
and has not achieved the significant improvements in safety performance that were 
originally expected. A number of improvements and modifications are currently being 
made as a result. 
2.6.4.2 The Boeing Safety Programme 
Quoted from CASA (1998), the Boeing Safety Programme is a comprehensive 
programme designed not only to introduce the reason for having effective safety 
programmes, but also to introduce the tools for running them. The programme is 
presented by Boeing as a two-day training course and is useful for ramp, maintenance 
and flight operations. 
Approaching from an organisational standpoint, it covers management's involvement 
and support for the programme through the development of integrated mission and 
policy statements. The model describes how safety functions can be linked within an 
operation in different ways. 
The safety process begins with some of the traditional safety programme elements 
including information gathering, investigation, evaluation, and change. The 
programme also includes sections on the products of a safety programme, including 
newsletters, bulletins and other forms of communication within the organisation, and 
resources available to the Safety Officer/Manager. The section on resources identifies 
some organisations that are dedicated to safety, various training institutions that offer 
safety related training. 
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The Boeing manual provides many useful checklists. It also gives anecdotal coverage 
of incidents to show how pre-emptive actions could have prevented the occurrences. 
However, it was developed for larger airline operations and much of it would probably 
be superfluous to the smaller passenger-carrying operator (CASA, 1998). 
2.6.4.3 Identifying Needed Defences in the Civil Aviation Transport 
Environment (INDICATE) 
Obiectives 
INDICATE is a safety programme that has been developed in consultation with the 
Australian regional airline industry for proactive purposes. The name is based on the 
underlying purpose of the programme which is to identify and resolve deficient aviation 
safety defences (Edkins, 1998). It provides a formal communication channel for aircraft 
operators to regulations, policies and standards to the Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation (BASI) in Australia. It is also known as BASI-INDICATE. 
According to Edkins (1998), safety defences are barriers or safeguards put in place to 
protect a system from both human and technical failure. He presents a modified version 
(Figure 2-21) of Reason's model of organisational accident causation (see Figure 2-18, 
page 71). Edkins argues that each of the organisation, workplace and person/team 
components of Reason's model is difficult to identify before an accident because latent 
failures are usually unforeseeable, workplace factors are dynamic, and errors or 
violations are unpredictable. This model implies that the integrity of safety defences 
can be more accurately determined as they are more tangible and thus more measurable 
components within a system. The INDICATE programme has therefore been designed 
to regularly evaluate airline safety defences so that the potential risk of an accident can 
be minimised. 
Evaluation criteria 
There are many potential measures of airline safety performance, including the absolute 
number of fatal and non-fatal accidents; fatal and total accidents per million departures; 
passenger fatalities per million passengers or per million miles, etc. Regardless of 
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which measure is used, it is important that it is examined regularly if a safety 
management programme is to be effective in improving safety performance. 
Nevertheless, accidents are so rare in airline operations that they cannot be used as a 
statistically reliable index of safety performance. 
Figure 2-21 Proactive Defence Evaluation Model 
Defences 
Organisation Workplace Person/team 
Management Error and 
decision and violation 
10 
Errors and 
10 organisational producing violations 
process 10 conditions 10 
Difficult to identify pre accidents 
Engineered safety devices 
Policy, standards, controls 
Procedures, Introductions, 
supervision 
Trainin briefin drills 
Personal protective 
equipment 
CCIDENT 
R 1f 
Proactively identifiable 
Source: Edkins, 1998 
As such, the INDICATE programme was evaluated based upon the following five 
safety performance criteria (Edkins, 1998; BASI, 1998). These criteria were: 
1. Airline safety culture 
2. Airline staff risk perception of aviation safety hazards 
3. Staff willingness to report safety hazards 
4. Action taken on identified safety hazards 
5. Staff comments about safety management 
A trail with an Australian regional airline revealed that there was a clear difference 
between two experimental groups, and the programme had had a positive influence on 
the airline's safety performance. 
Benefits 
In Australia, it is a legal requirement to report air safety incidents via an Aviation 
Safety Incident Report (ASIR). However, there is a recognised problem of 
under-reporting, which in part stems from a lack of awareness about what should be 
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reported despite this mandatory requirement. 
The programme provides a simple and structured process to encourage staff to report 
safety hazards and deficiencies within their work area. The safety information database 
and software allows management to address all safety-related concerns. Furthermore, 
senior management regularly meet with safety staff to determine what to do about 
identified hazards. It is clear that consistent communication of safety-related 
information within an organisation is crucial for improving staff attitudes towards 
safety. 
Edkins (1998) explains that the results of the INDICATE trial suggest that measuring 
safety culture provides a useful method for monitoring changes in company safety 
performance and may assist in identifying elements of a safety management 
programme that require improvement, such as a hazard reporting system. 
Most importantly of all, the evaluation of the INDICATE programme illustrates that the 
greatest source of variance is not necessarily aircraft equipment or the category of 
operation, but the real cost from the safety culture of organisations within the aviation 
system. The benefits from implementing such initiatives will ultimately help to 
improve operational safety and, in some cases, reduce operating costs. 
2.6.4.4 Proactive Error Reduction System (PERS) 
Objectives 
The PERS programme is funded by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of 
Aviation Medicine and devised by Dr. Colin Drury at the University at Buffalo (UB), 
the State University of New York (IFA, 1998). The FAA-funded project began in 1989 
following a Congressional hearing prompted by an incident in which 18 feet of roof 
pulled away from an Aloha Airline jet as it was flying over the Pacific Ocean. A flight 
attendant was sucked from the plane and 61 passengers were injured. 
For years, Drury and his co-workers have analysed errors by airline workers in detail. 
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They are using this knowledge to build practical tools that allow users to arrive quickly 
at solutions to errors made by airline workers. PERS is an error management system 
which can be used by non-experts in human factors because it is based on a 
human-factors approach to solving errors. The idea behind this is that one should not 
just determine the immediate cause of the error, but examine all the things that lead up 
to it. As such, this programme, as shown in Figure 2-22, is structured to use the 
repeating patterns found in incident data in order to help airlines move from the 
recognition of human factors as an issue to practical human factors solutions. 
Safety I 
Audit 
Error 
assessment 
(e. g. MESH) 
Figure 2-22 The PERS Structure 
Critical 
incidents 
Potential Known 
)roblems problems Error 
Hazard patterns 
ng 
Criteria 
selection 
Similar 
solutions 
Advantages 
Solutions Database 
Select 
1 
solutions 
report 
(e. g. MEDA) 
Error control 
management 
Source: FAA, 1997 b 
There are four distinct functions within the programme: 
1. A comprehensive error management system which can combine many existing 
data collection and analysis systems (e. g. MESH, MEDA). In other words, it 
facilitates the importing of data from other systems such as other audits and 
MESH, and links databases of maintenance errors with databases of known 
solutions. 
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2. PERS facilitates the identification of error-prone situations by using 
- error audit of specific tasks 
- error assessment like MESH. 
3. PERS supports error management strategies, identifying situations for 
design/procedure changes. 
4. PERS facilitates error reporting by employing 
- error reporting modules like MEDA (an error-reporting system with interfaces 
to MEDA) 
- critical incident reporting modules. 
PERS provides a way for airline personnel to analyse an error or potential error, to 
discover why it occurred, and then to see how they might go about changing systems, 
equipment or work patterns to prevent future errors. PERS not only tells airline workers 
what to do if an error occurs, but it also tells them what to do even if what have occurred 
are not actual errors, but error-prone situations. 
2.6.4.5 Line Operation SafetyAudit (LOSA) 
Objectives 
LOSA was developed by the team of Professor R. Heimreich at the University of Texas, 
USA. Under LOSA, flaws in human performance and prevalence of error are taken for 
granted and the objective becomes improving the context within which human perform. 
LOSA ultimately aims to introduce a buffer zone or time delay between an error and the 
point at which its consequences become a threat to safety. The better the buffer or the 
longer the time delay, the stronger the tolerance of the operational context to the 
negative consequences of human error (Maurino, 2001). 
LOSA are programmes that use expert observers to collect data about crew behaviours 
and situational factors on normal flights. Observations generate a narrative of the flight 
classified by phase, and these are conducted under strict no jeopardy conditions, which 
mean that no crew are at risk for observed actions. Observers code observed threats to 
safety and how they are addressed, errors and their management, and specific 
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behaviours that have been associated with accidents and incidents. If explained by 
using Figure 2-21 in INDICATE programme, it is the errors of person/team that LOSA 
would like to collect. 
The critical difference between a LOSA flight and a line check is LOSA's guarantee of 
anonymity for the crew. Data are entered into a de-identified database and no crew 
actions are reported to management or the regulatory agency. In LOSA, error is 
classified as deviation from organisational or crew exceptions or intentions. Errors 
committed by the flight crew are described and coded along with actions taken to deal 
with the consequences of the errors. Table 2-6 lists the various errors and remedial 
strategies employed in LOSA. 
Advantages of LOSA 
Data from LOSA provides a picture of system operations that can guide organisational 
strategy in safety, operations, and training. Heimreich (2001) points out that a particular 
strength of LOSA is that it captures exemplary as well as deficient performance, which 
provides airlines with the areas in which they excel as well as those in need of 
improvement and used as models for training. As such, data collected in LOSA are 
proactive and can be used immediately to prevent adverse events. 
The other strength is that a database is being developed that allows organisations to 
compare their results with other airlines. Such comparisons help in interpreting the 
significance of the number of procedural and decision errors observed and the 
effectiveness of threat and error counter-measures. The data allow management to 
prioritise safety initiatives and training departments can use the information to develop 
targeted training. 
Meanwhile, the informative aspect of LOSA data is the ability to link threat recognition 
and error management with the specific behavioural markers that from the core of CRM. 
Using LOSA, a model incorporating the Swiss Cheese model has been developed 
(Heimreich, 1999). It recognises both overt and latent threats, and how they fit into the 
management of error and undesired states. 
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Table 2- 6 Various Error Types and Remedial Strategies 
Varieties of error Remedial strategies 
Crew intending to follow a procedure but doing it Suggests poor workload 
Procedural 
incorrectly. Include the usual classification of slips, management or may be a 
lapses and mistakes such as incorrect data entries or reflection of inadequate 
errors flying the wrong headings. pioeedwe;. 
Intention is correct but the execution flawed. 
' These involved failures in the transfer of information, onuIninications errors may ( 
Communication including mis-statements, misunderstandings and reflect a need for more focus 
errors omissions. Examples include incorrect read back to on CRM, especially 
ATC or communicating wrong course to the other pilot. interpersonal communication 
issues. 
When crews choose to follow a course of action that It suggests a need for further 
unnecessarily increases risk to the flight in a situation CRM concentration on expert 
not governed by formal procedures, this action is decision-makine and risk Decision errors 
classified as a decision error. E. g., crews may choose assessment. 
not to deviate around bad weather on their flight path, 
resulting in an encounter with turbulence. 
This classification is applied to situations where a cre%ý a need to tighten 
member lacks the knowledge or stick-and-rudder skill standards for qualification and 
Proficiency necessary to perform a task. E. g., like extreme evaluation. 
errors manoeuvres on approach, choosing to fly into adverse 
weather. A number of observed proficiency errors 
involve lack of knowledge of flight deck automation. 
When crews obviously and intentionally violate 
Intentional company or regulatory requirements. 
Failing to abort 
an unstable approach as required by company 
non-compliance 
procedures would fit into this classification. 
E. g., omitting required briefing or checklist 
Source: , Adapted th)nl I iclmreich, 1999 
These markers emerge very clearly in observer ratings of the actions taken by effective 
crews. Those who deal proactively with threat and error exhibit the following 
behaviours: 
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o active captain leadership 
Q briefing known threats 
o asking questions, speaking up 
Q decisions making and reviewed 
o operational plans clearly communicated 
Q preparing/planning for threats 
Q distributing workload and tasks 
o vigilance through monitoring and challenging 
Although the challenge for the implementation of analysis of normal operations is to 
overcome the obstacles presented by a blame-oriented industry, LOSA has been 
appreciated by various airlines which are willing to make the investment in conducting 
the necessary observations and analyses. In addition, the value of LOSA has also been 
recognised by ICAO and has gained support to conduct a "LOSA Week" to promote 
this programme to interested countries. 
2.7 The Proactive vs. Retroactive Approaches to Safety 
In the twentieth century, the value of accident investigations in identifying causes and 
initiating corrective action to prevent future errors has been greatly appreciated because 
the knowledge acquired through accident investigations has paved the way for 
improvements in air travel. However, the use of after-the-fact measures as a trigger to 
initiate safety efforts has been a very reactive approach to airline safety. 
Studies have shown that most safety systems. are reactive (Johnson 1994; Earnest, 
1997). Johnson (1994) reveals the result of a survey, in which 83 percent of respondents 
indicated that "safety programmes are reactive, isolated within organisations and 
preoccupied with quick fixes and putting out fires. " Earnest (1997) listed nine select 
criteria that can help to determine whether a safety culture is primarily proactive or 
reactive. Although these comparisons are focused in the areas of safety and health, 
some of them can be adopted and expanded the view on the airline industry. These 
characteristics are therefore detailed in the following paragraphs and listed in Table 2-7. 
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1. Incident/Accidents investigation: 
In a retroactive system, the process of incident investigation tends to follow the 
"Domino theory" (Heinrich, Petersen & Roos, 1980), which typically focuses on a 
concept: identify the unsafe act, remove the hazard and prevent the recurrence (See 
Appendix I). As such, incident/accident investigators focus solely on accident 
symptoms rather than root causes in the organisation, which may become the source of 
future accidents. 
In a proactive system, the occurrence of incidents/accidents has been recognised to be a 
system problem, as with Reason's model, which traces the causes of accidents back to 
the management system, and contains active failures and latent failures. To detect the 
latent condition and put in place defence against it is beyond the single-cause concept to 
take proactive steps to change the system. 
2. Safety performance evaluation and measures 
In a retroactive system, Earnest (1997) stated that safety evaluation is based on the 
absence of injury, so the management tends to rely on after-fact-measures to provide 
guidance and assume that safety is achieved. With a system that judges safety 
performance based solely on the absence of incidents/accidents, it may be wrongly 
assumed that the company is doing the right things as long as there is no occurrence of 
injuries. 
With a proactive safety system, evaluation is based on the improvement of safety 
systems, and includes the function of management. Safety is evaluated and monitored 
in the long term in order to enable strategic planning. 
3. Safety practice and performance 
Within a retroactive safety system, safety practices are developed in response to 
accidents/incidents, just like a band-aid applications (Merritt A. and Heimreich, 1996). 
For example, GPWS or EGPWS are designed to prevent CFIT, because CFIT has been 
the major cause of aircraft accidents in the last decade. There are also other risk 
management tools which are designed for different causes. 
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By contrast, there are clear written safety practices in a proactive safety system, which 
have been developed based on a thorough evaluation of hazards in order to implement 
safety defences before incidents/accidents occur. Not only risk management tools are 
used to prevent identified risks (hazards), but also the latent conditions and safeguards 
that can be identified by using tools like MESH or INDICATE. 
4. Safety goal and vision 
One of the obvious differences between retroactive and proactive approaches to safety 
is the goal for safety. In the former, safety goals are based only on the reduction of 
injury or incident/accident at an organisational level. In the latter, attention is placed on 
the strategies for achieving these goals at both departmental and organisational levels, 
or even at group level. There are also periodic reviews and different milestone 
expectations from the management in order to ensure that the goals are achieved, and to 
reward employees. Safety goals are aligned with management plans to prevent 
recurrence, which results in substantial changes. 
5. Safety programme and training 
In a retroactive safety system, programmes and training go little beyond the mandated 
regulation (Earnest, 1997) due to cost consideration. Take EGPWS for example; 
although it is a fact that this equipment can effectively prevent CFIT from occurring, 
not all airlines are willing to install EGPWS unless it is a regulatory requirement. 
Training is another example, which is in some airlines, cabin crew training takes two 
months and in others it takes three months. 
Conversely, in order to ensure the best programmes and performance, a proactive safety 
system needs to go beyond a purely mandatory level. Safety should have a higher 
priority than cost. The quality of safety programmes reflects how important the 
management think it is, and the willingness for the management to allocate resources. 
6. Employee recognition and attitudes 
To improve the safety system, employees must understand the structure, content and 
goals of the system, as well as how it functions. They should also understand how 
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performance is evaluated in the system. This concept is not fostered in a retroactive 
system, so employees just adopt the attitude that "good safety perf'ormance is zero 
accidents. " Since safety culture is weak, safety improvement just ends up with related 
personnel being re-trained in the aftermath of incidents or accidents. 
Recognition in a proactive safety system is based on improving system safety, which 
helps to ensure the continuous improvement in the long-tenn.. A strong safety culture is 
fostered in both the company and its safety system. As such, safety health is 
consequently achieved. 
Table 2-7 Comparison of Different Characteristics in the 
Proactive and Retroactive systems 
Retroactive 
Incidents/accidents 
investigation 
Focused on causal factors and 
unsafe acts, active failures (e. g. 
Domino theory) 
Safety performance 
measure and 
evaluation 
Safety practice and 
performance 
After-the-fact performance: 
measure, evaluation based on 
the absence of injuries, and 
mistakes in the short-term 
Tends to respond to 
incident/accident and injury 
avoidance, a band-aid solution 
Proactive 
F-OCJSe(: or f [)U c 1LJses and 
latent mistakes in management 
(e q REO1snn's model) 
on the 
improvement of safety system 
and long-term strategies 
Identifies safety defences before 
any latent cui tli'iO rls 
are forme(! 
Based solely on eliminate errors 
Aligned with company qoA and 
Safety goal and 
and accident reduction 
have no conflict with production 
vision goals 
Safety programme Only meets regulatory minimal Beyond regulatory requirements 
and training requirement on a voluntary basis 
Safety recognition Good safety performance is zero Emphasised on continuous 
and attitudes accidents - short term improvement in the long tern) 
Source: Adapted fruni Farnest (1997) 
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Research Methodologies 
"Science came into existence through the opposite belief. 
It is the same with mathematics, which would certainly not 
have come into existence if one had known from the beginning that 
there was in nature no exactly straight line, 
no real circle, no absolute magnitude. " 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
3.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the concept of an airline safety management system (SMS) has been 
investigated (Research objective 1). The literature and practical industry programmes 
demonstrate that both retroactive and proactive approaches to safety are used within 
airline SMS. The difference between retroactive and proactive safety management is 
in the treatment of the contributing causes of accidents and their underlying factors to 
prevent accidents from occurring again. In particular, the cultural and organisational 
dimensions have been illustrated as two main components in the proactive approach 
to safety (Research objective 2). 
However, it is evident from the preceding chapter that the components of a proactive 
approach to safety are an important but as yet, relatively undefined task in the airline 
industry. Therefore, the industry needs a model to conceptualise the `safety 
mechanism' in proactive safety management (Research objective 3), which contains 
the cultural and organisational consideration, identified in Chapter 2, and 
organisationally influential factors (Research objective 4). Chapter 2 has completed 
the study to meet the research objective One & Two. According to the findings, 
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Chapter 3 follows to present the research methods to solve the found problem in order 
to achieve research objective Three, Four and Five ultimately. As such, the 
investigation requires a fully explored method. 
This chapter introduces the methodologies used in this thesis, which are exploratory in 
focus and qualitative and quantitative in nature. It aims to establish a framework for 
the study of proactive approach to safety and for the evolution of airline safety 
management system by the development of a `safety mechanism model'. Interviews 
were firstly undertaken to gain the empirical knowledge and experiences necessary to 
develop a safety mechanism for proactive safety management with the combined 
findings from the literature review. The safety mechanism model, as well as the 
influential factors, is subsequently developed. Meanwhile, the use of a retrospective 
case study and the safety survey aim to provide the reader with an appreciation of the 
safety mechanism model in relation to how the safety mechanism has been tested, and 
how the organisational factors affect the airline safety management system. 
For the purpose of better illustrating the methodologies mentioned in this chapter, 
Figure 3-1 demonstrates the structure of methodologies adopted in the thesis. 
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Figure 3-1 The Structure of Used Research Methods 
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3.1 Interviews 
The method chosen for this part of the study is a scrics Of, ctni ýtrurtuicd qualitative 
interviews conducted to include various airline safety people. The use of 
semi-structured interviews meant that the topics discussed were grounded on Chapter 
2 but were flexible enough to incorporate other issues brought by the participants. In 
this way, the interviews were designed to build upon literature review and empirical 
findings in the previous part of this study. Following sections will present the details 
of how the airlines and interviewees are selected as well as the interview format. 
3.1.1 The Selection of Airlines 
In order to gain a varied perspective on how safety is managed, five safety managers 
in different airlines were interviewed19, based upon the airline's willingness, size, 
scope and nationality, and the author's time plan and convenience. The diversity in the 
size and nationality of airlines was thought to be critical to ensure that a variety of 
organisational and safety cultures, and safety management practices were presented 
through the interviews. A detailed description of the companies is presented in Table 
3-1. 
Table 3-1 The Profile of Selected : airlines 
1 
A BCDE 
Nationality Western Eastern Eastern Western jEastern 
Size Large Medium Medium Medium ( Small 
International International International International Domestic 
Service Regional Regional Regional ' Regional 
Domestic Domestic Domestic 
Fleet I >100 1100>, <50 1100>, <50 50> i 20> 
Note: All of them run passenger, charter, and cargo services. 
io Two civil aviation authorities were interviewed as well (one western, one eastern). The ('AA 
provided a view from the regulatory angle. Although these opinions were not included in their 
entirety in the interview results, they played an important part as a reference vv hen completing the 
interviews with airlines, and when summarisini the final re, ult, of this research. 
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3.1.2 The Selection of Interviewees 
As the set of interviews was intended to provide a broad view of the safety activities 
within the airline industries, interviewees were approached on primary criteria. People 
were sought who were felt to have sufficient experience and knowledge to be able to 
provide an overview of his or her airline, as well as the airline industry as a whole. In 
this way, the opportunity sample therefore consisted of people who are in charge of a 
safety department or mostly related to safety activities of the organisation. Their titles 
are varied according to the different companies, such as Safety Manager, Director of 
Safety or Safety, and Security VP. 
3.1.3 Interview Format 
A number of topic areas were identified from the previous analyses as being critical to 
the management of safety system and these formed the basis of the interview format. 
The topics were not only focused on proactive safety management or organisational 
safety culture as more practical discussions were sought (semi-structured). As reactive 
safety practices and proactive safety culture are inextricably linked, the topics that 
formed the basis for the discussions ranged from the more tangible and easily 
describable safety management practices to the less easily quantified issues of safety 
culture. They included: 
+ Safety management system 
+ Risk management programme 
+ Safety audit 
+ Organisational structure 
+ Culture and safety 
+ The role of regulator 
+ Improvement 
+ Others 
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Interview followed a semi-structured format. The detailed questions can be found in 
Appendix J. Each interview lasted from one to one and half hours approximately. The 
majority of the interviews were conducted in the interviewee's place of business. 
Where this was not possible, the interview was conducted by telephone. Given the 
requirement from the participants, the names of airlines are omitted for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
The findings from these interviews, combined with the results of literature review, 
were then used to develop a safety mechanism model of how a proactive safety 
approach develops and evolves within the airline industry. The interview findings are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
It should also be kept in mind that the interviews were semi-structured in format and 
therefore these formed only the basis of the interviews. In addition, although 
interviewees were willing to take part in the interviews, there might be some inherent 
difficulties in obtaining complete information from the interviewees due to the 
policies of individual companies. 
3.2 Model Development 
3.2.1 Purpose of the Model 
As discussed in previous chapter, a proactive approach to safety is called for to 
improve airline safety management system. This calls stem largely from the 
shortcomings in existing retroactive safety programmes, which focus on the 
identification of the accident causes and the human factors which are thought to 
constitute effective safety management. Some programmes have been designed to 
help to maintain safety proactively as introduced previously but few of them have had 
significant success. Therefore, apart from the method of interview which provides the 
existing knowledge of what is thought to contribute to an effective proactive safety (a 
safety mechanism), what is further required is a model which builds upon the safety 
mechanism by adding an increased knowledge of the organisational factors which 
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serve to influence a proactive safety mechanism, and which will serve to be the 
predictors20 of the performance of airline safety management system. 
The model focuses on the hypothesised organisational factors which impact upon the 
development of a safety mechanism. Many such factors have been identified from the 
analyses in the chapter of literature review and will be identified in the interview. 
Building upon the results of this work, a hypothesised model of the development of a 
proactive safety mechanism will be presented. 
In short, the purpose of the model is to provide a greater understanding of the 
complex and potentially important concept of a proactive safety mechanism and its 
influential factors for the airline industry. In addition to this, this model intends to: 
 Identify the layers which contribute to the development of a proactive safety 
mechanism 
 Identify the factors which exert an influence on the safety mechanism 
 Identify the organisational factors which are the predictors of the safety 
mechanism and safety performance 
In this way, the relationship between airline safety management system and safety 
mechanism and safety performance should become clear. 
20 In statistical term, `Predictor' means a possible factor (input) to forecast the consequence of 
something (output). For example, in Multiple Regression procedures, it will estimate a linear 
equation of the form: 
Y=a+b, *Xi+b2*X2+... +bP*Xp 
In this equation, the regression coefficients (or B coefficients) represent the contributions of each 
independent variable (Xs) to the prediction of the dependent variable (Y). Therefore, Xs are the 
predictors of Y. 
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To this end, four general hypotheses will be explored and tested. The term hypothesis 
as used here should be understood in the broad sense of the word as these are intended 
to outline the aims and objectives of this part of study. These statements should be 
considered to be propositions, made from known facts, which form the basis for this 
investigation, rather than hypotheses in the statistical sense, which will be tested and 
either accepted or rejected. The outcomes of the investigations with respect to these 
hypotheses will be discussed in order to summarise the results of the investigations 
which formed the substances of this thesis. 
3.3 How to Test the Model 
Two methods have been used to test the model. One is a retrospective case study and 
the other is the use of a safety survey. 
3.3.1 A Retroactive Case Study 
The use of an "organisational accident" to demonstrate the failure of socio-technical 
systems is a technique employed extensively by Reason in developing and making a 
case for the Resident Pathogen Model. Working backwards from the accident site 
provides what Reason (1995b) calls a pathogen trail. This case study approach is 
based on Reason's concept, but it will focus mainly on the commercial airline industry. 
The use of the after-the-fact approach is not gifted with the spirit of "proactive" 
concept. However, at this stage, by dissecting the pathogen trail, the bottom-up 
metaphor helps to illustrate how the model explains the safety mechanism, which 
develops under the various factors identified in next chapter. 
Selection Criteria 
This case, the crash of Air Ontario Flight 1363, was selected in accordance with the 
following criteria: 
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Firstly the case must be informative, i. e. sufficient and available information is 
required. In the case of accident, formal accident investigation reports can help to 
provide a sufficiently lengthy pathogen trail to facilitate the analysis. Usually the 
more severe cases are the accidents/incidents, as the better known they are, the more 
they are subject to intense scrutiny. The case of Air Ontario is well qualified to serve 
as a subject for informative discussion in this section. However, it is worth noting that 
this does not mean that only serious or severe accidents/incidents are suitable to 
illustrate the model. 
By using the case study, it aims to provide a useful illustration of the myriad forces, 
which conspire to define a system's safety mechanism. Given the complexity of the 
case, it is hoped that the case study will serve to provide the reader with a greater 
appreciation of the explanatory power of the model in relation to the way in which the 
safety mechanism developed, and how the safety management system has evolved. 
3.3.2 Safety Survey 
What is required next is an in-depth examination of the structure underlying the model. 
As such, the following methodology will use quantitative studies aimed at looking 
more closely at the relationships between the forces hypothesised to be at work under 
the domains of the model. 
The study was conducted using a three-stage process of, questionnaire development, 
questionnaire piloting and questionnaire distribution. In other words, the survey was 
developed based on the safety mechanism model. The pilot questionnaire allowed the 
instrument to be tested and modified to suit the target audience for the final 
distribution. 
3.3.2.1 Stage 1: Questionnaire development 
1. The concept of a safety survey 
The term "survey" means to make a detailed investigation of the behaviour, opinions, 
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etc, of a group of people (Collins, 1995). There are three types of survey, based on the 
degree of their structure or formality (Hague, 1993). These are structured, 
semi-structured and unstructured surveys. 
In structured surveys, the wording and sequence of most of the questions are fixed and 
are identical for each respondent, with each question having predefined answers. This 
ensures that any differences between responses are attributable to individual 
differences and not to variations in the survey. 
The semi-structured survey has a mixture of questions with predefined answers, as 
well as those where the respondents are free to answer anything that he/she wishes. 
The advantages of this type of survey are the greater flexibility that they offer, and the 
opportunity of finding out more in-depth reasons for certain answers. 
With unstructured surveys there are no pre-specified questions. Usually a checklist of 
questions is used to assist the respondents in describing their experiences, opinions 
and attitudes. 
A perception survey, or called a culture or climate survey, is used to measure/assess 
the respondents' concept or behaviour. Bailey and Petersen (1989) suggest that a 
perception survey is a better measure of safety performance and a much better 
predictor of safety result, as it can identify the strengths and weaknesses of elements 
of a safety system. In other words, a safety survey is essentially used to review the 
extent of satisfaction with aviation operations, and to diagnose any problems that may 
be apparent or suspected. By assessing safety attitudes, the real safety level of an 
organisation can be determined. 
Interviews and questionnaires are usually used in safety surveys to determine whether 
a particular facility or operation presents the risk of hazards. The former includes 
telephone or face-to-face interviews, while the latter are self-reported questionnaires, 
which may contain "positive and negative measurement" or "attitude scaling" types of 
questions, also called Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCQ). 
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Formation and use of the safety survey - Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCO) 
The safety survey has gradually increased in use since the 1980s. Some researchers 
(see examples in the next paragraph) claim that measuring safety climate can indicate 
the changes in organisational safety behaviour and would therefore be useful for 
evaluating safety programmes. They also argue that any effort to improve safety 
should be perceived as such by employees, and that the only way to measure this is by 
using a safety climate questionnaire (SCQ). SCQ is a structured survey, in which most 
of the questions have predefined answers and there is little latitude for a respondent to 
stray beyond them. However, it does have the advantages of a structured survey 
mentioned in previous section. 
J 
For example, Zohar (1980), who was the first to develop a safety climate survey, used 
it to establish the high agreement in employees' perceptions regarding the safety 
climate in their company. The level of this climate is correlated with safety 
programme effectiveness, as judged by safety inspectors. Zohar found eight safety 
climate dimensions in the resulting responses, they are (1) Importance of safety 
training, (2) Management attitudes toward safety, (3) Effects of safe conduct on 
promotion, (4) Level of risk at work place, (5) Effects of work place on safety, (6) 
Status of safety officer, (7) Effects of safe conduct on social status, and (8) Status of 
safety committee. Brown and Holmes (1986) found three dimensions by having 
Zohar's model validated on American sample. These three retaining factors were: (1) 
Employee perception of how concerned management is with their well-being, (2) 
Employee perception of how active management is in responding to this concern, (3) 
Employee physical risk perception. Dedobbeleer et al. (1990) studied the relationships 
between safety climate and organisational factors prevalent in most safety 
programmes. They also attempted to validate Brown and Holmes's three factors, but 
only found two factors, one of which measured Management's commitment to safety 
in terms of management's safety attitudes and practices; the other factor labelled 
Workers'involvement in safety.. 
In 1990s, increased efforts were made in the discussion of the measurement of safety 
climate and its subsequent applications. Safety climate scales have been developed 
107 
Chapter 3 Research Methodologies 
primarily on the basis of attitude items (e. g. Niskanen, 1994), or based exclusively 
upon safety-related perceptions, with both attitudinal and perception items (e. g. 
Williamson et al., 1997). 
Meanwhile, several questionnaires have been developed in an attempt to determine 
the key factors that comprise safety climate. Flin et al. (2000) and Guldenmund (2000) 
identified twenty-seven such studies. By 2000, over thirty studies using safety climate 
questionnaires have been published (Guldenmund, 2000). It is worth noting that there 
is no explicit distinction or discussion between safety culture and safety climate 
within these studies, and safety climate is generally taken to comprise a summary of 
employee perceptions of a range of safety issues. As such, whether safety culture and 
safety climate are the same or they have not been sufficiently defined to identify the 
deficiencies will be further investigated in the model. 
2. Design of the questionnaire 
Budworth (1996) refers to measuring safety climate as taking the "safety temperature" 
of an organisation. As such, potential uses for a safety climate questionnaire include: 
measuring employee perceptions of management commitment to safety, detecting 
areas for safety that require improvement, identifying trends in an organisation's 
safety performance and establishing benchmarks for safety climate, emerging from 
research on organisations. 
According to the characteristics of the safety mechanism model, the concept of the 
safety climate survey will be adapted for questionnaire development in this research 
as a reference point. In order to obtain an individual's self-assessment of the 
conditions hypothesised in the model, a questionnaire was developed to reflect 
concerns at each layer identified in safety mechanism. The main objectives of this 
safety mechanism survey are to provide an assessment of the concerns affecting the 
safety mechanism; to verify its influential factors, and to validate the hypothesised 
factor structure in the safety mechanism. 
In accordance with the hypothesised organisational factors, this questionnaire is 
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designed to consist of two parts - internal factors and external factors. These items 
deal with the concerns of individuals both in the internal and external environment. 
They were intended to examine the degree to which the individual felt part of their 
organisations or considered organisational concerns when making choices at work. 
A statement was constructed for each item (potential concern) so that participants 
could be asked to rate the extent to which these aspects of their working environment 
were considered when making choices at work. The response format consisted of a six 
point scale which ranged from "Strongly disagree" (1) to "Strongly agree" (6), plus 
"N/A" (7). 
Therefore, these two sections of the questionnaire sought to verify the salience of 
various concerns which were identified as being relevant to the development of a 
safety mechanism by assessing the frequency with which each was considered in 
making day-to-day choices at work. 
3. Method of interpreting the questionnaire 
In order to determine the underlying dimensions of the organisational safety 
mechanism, a principal component of factor analysis, followed by a varimax rotation 
was performed on the questionnaire to interpreting the results. 
Factor Analysis 
Many statistical methods are used to study the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables. Factor analysis is different. It is used to discover the patterns of 
relationship between many dependent variables, with the goal of discovering 
something about the nature of the independent variables that affect them, even though 
those independent variables are not measured directly. The inferred independent 
variables are called factors. 
In other words, factor analysis is a form of multivariate analysis which is based on the 
assumption that human behaviour is rarely attributable simply to one cause or 
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influence, and that underlying factors, components or elements can be identified and 
used to explain complex human behaviour. As such, the purpose of this technique is to 
identify these underlying factors in terms of their common underlying dimensions. 
Principal Components Factors Analysis 
As factor analysis is a technique which is able to reduce a system of many scaled 
measurements (or variables) down to a small number of factors, it is accordingly a 
method of data reduction. By analysing a set of attitude data using this technique, it 
may be possible to gain a more coherent comprehension of the human behaviour 
being examined. In factor analysis, the factors are not directly observed; rather, they 
are defined by a group of variables or items that are components of the abstract 
factors. 
As mentioned above, factor analysis is often applied to many attitudinal items in a 
survey, so it is commonly used on Likert scales with at least five categories. A typical 
factor analysis suggests answers to four major questions (Darlington, 2002)21: 
1. How many different factors are needed to explain the pattern of relationships 
among these variables? 
2. What is the nature of those factors? 
3. How well do the hypothesised factors explain the observed data? 
4. How much purely random or unique variance does each observed variable 
include? 
21 Darlington, R. B., Factor Analysis. 
http: //comp9. psych. cornell. edu/Darlington/factor. htm, 2002. 
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Steps in conducting a factor analysis 
There are four basic steps in factor analysis: 
1. Data collection and generation of the correlation matrix 
2. Extraction of initial factor solution 
3. Rotation and interpretation 
4. Construction of scales or factor scores to use in further analyses 
This questionnaire study is going to follow these main steps to conduct the analysis. 
The results are detailed in Chapter 4. 
4. Target sample for study 
The target sample selected for the present study is airline safety managers world-wide, 
including Africa, Asia and Pacific, Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Europe, and North America. The rationale behind this decision included several 
factors to do with the nature of the required data. 
Firstly, a cross-airline approach was taken in order to ensure diversity in the sample; a 
general population survey provided a means of this diversity without having to 
approach multiple airlines. Secondly, the information which was sought from the 
survey was general in nature. The present study dealt with the factors which 
influenced an individual's actions, which may affect safety on a daily basis, 
necessitating a relatively in-depth knowledge of the industry. Therefore, the general 
population, i. e. airline safety managers world-wide, was deemed to be the most 
readily available target audience which could provide the diversity and knowledge 
required for the study. The method and means of acquiring this sample will be 
discussed. 
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There are around 2000 commercial airlines in the world, including scheduled, charter, 
cargo, and helicopter airlines (ATI, 2001)22. However, 80 percent of the revenue of the 
total airline industry was generated by only 20 percent of these in the year 2000. As 
such, the initial idea was to find out the most profitable top 400 (2000x20 percent) 
airlines in the world. Steps taken were as follows: 
1. Airline Business (September, 2001), listed the top 200 passenger airlines, 
ranked in terms of RPK (Revenue Passenger Kilometre) in 2000. 
2. Air Transport World (July, 2001), showed the most powerful airlines by 
region. 
Table 3-2 Samples and Regions of Questionnaire Administration 
Region Africa Asia Latin Europe Middle North Total 
& Pacific America & East America Source 
Caribbean 
Airline 
Business 
Sept 20011 13 48 22 65 13 39 200 
I op 200 in terms 
ul ItI'K) 
Air 
Transport 
World 7 39 1 42 3 33 125 
July 2001 
(World traffic 
Statistic 2000) 
Total 20 87 23 107 16 72 325 
22 Air Transport Intelligence (ATI), Online Database. 
http: //www. rati. coni 
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Table 3-2 shows the results of these findings. By putting the results of these two 
databases, these are the top 325 airlines in terms of RPKs and traffic in 2000 (a full 
list in alphabetical order is shown in Appendix K), and the breakdown result for each 
region. As there was no available database to search for the remaining 75 airlines to 
make the sample total 400, it was decided to use these 325 airlines as the distribution 
sample. 
Addresses and contact details for the safety managers of the targeted airlines were 
obtained from the ATI database. In cases where the names of safety people were 
unavailable, the name of the recipient of the survey package was replaced by a generic 
title of "Safety Manager". 
3.3.2.2 Stage 2: Questionnaire piloting 
A pilot study was conducted in order to identify any specific problems with the 
questionnaire in terms of understanding the questionnaire items, understanding of the 
questionnaire instructions, or other problems with the data obtained (such as 
possibility of restriction of range or response bias). 
Due to the restraints of geography and time, plus the fact that the factor analysis 
requires a large sample to conduct the analysis, it was decided that the pilot survey 
would not entail the standard procedure of carrying out a mailshot to members of the 
target population. Instead the nearest and most convenient persons were chosen as 
respondents for the pilot test. The questionnaire was completed and criticised by eight 
individuals who possessed skills and experiences in aviation, by personal hand-in or 
by email. These respondents worked at a management level in different airlines, 
which is one of the limitations of the targeted sample. 
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3.3.2.3 Stage 3: Distribution procedure 
The questionnaire, printed in the style of an A4 booklet, was sent by post in a sealed 
envelope to the representative (Safety Manager) at each participating company. Each 
survey package was contained in an envelope which bore the name of the University 
and a label which identified the package as the Safety Research Study. Included 
within the survey package was a questionnaire, along with a covering letter from the 
author and a freepost envelope. The covering letter was printed on the School of 
Engineering letterhead, and was hand addressed and signed by the researcher. It 
explained the purpose of this research and ensured the confidentiality and anonymity 
of all responses. The pre-addressed freepost envelope enabled the direct return of the 
completed information to the author. Both the questionnaire and covering letter are 
available at Appendix L. 
3.4 Summary 
With respect to fulfilling the main objectives of this research, an interview study will 
be conducted followed the findings of literature review in order to develop the safety 
mechanism model. The case study and questionnaire study are followed to plan and 
implement with the aim of testing the hypotheses of the safety mechanism model. 
With respect to the hypothesis, the results of the factor analytic study will be 
presented, which will serve to group the myriad variables identified within the model 
into a number of factors. As such, the hypothesised factor structure in the safety 
mechanism can be identified as well as a framework for understanding the factors 
which underlie the development of a safety mechanism across regions. The following 
chapter will present the result of these studies. 
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Interview Findings and 
Model Development 
"Many of the ills of organisations stem from imposing an inappropriate 
structure on a particular culture, or from expecting a particular culture 
to thrive in an appropriate climate. Vines don't grow where the sunshine 
doesn't fall in the right proportions with the rain. " 
C. B Handy, 1985 
4.1 Interview Findings 
Aligning with the interview format described in Chapter 3, the findings of the 
interviews are discussed as follows. For the purpose of this discussion, these findings 
have been collapsed across airlines and organised according to the topics discussed 
during the interview. 
4.1.1 Safety Management System 
The purpose of this section of the interviews was to obtain an idea of how safety is 
managed within different airlines and how the safety management system is 
conducted. All of the airlines interviewed use the term "Safety Management System" 
(SMS) to describe their system of safety management. 
Although the structure of a SMS might not be the same in every airline, all 
interviewees agreed that SMS should be an integrated system, including risk 
management tools, associated support, training and communication systems, which 
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involves all the departments in the company. According to the interviewees, the 
components of a SMS should cover the following: 
 Clear policy and objectives 
 Top management commitment 
 Identification of safety risks 
 Safety performance evaluation: performance indicators of safety to result in 
enhanced operational and maintenance performance 
A well established safety culture 
 Feedback to ensure continuous improvement 
One airline employee interviewed portrayed the airline's concept of a safety 
management system, which is similar to the diagram presented by Britannia Airways 
(see Figure 4-1). Members from Policy Committee and Quality Assurance (different 
names are used in different airlines) involved with advising on flight safety. The 
managers of these groups freely discuss and communicate inter-departmental safety 
concerns. The flight safety committee directly report to the president (CEO). The 
direct access to the top president was also emphasised by other airline interviewees 
(see next section 4.1.2). 
Meanwhile, both interviewees from western airlines emphasised that a SMS should be 
built as a proactive system, which can anticipate potential safety problems, ensuring 
they are addressed before an incident or accident occurs. 
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Figure 4-1 Airline Safety Management System 
CEO 
................................ .................................. ................................. .................................. tiplit: $: äfe... öti..... 
~ngr er. jg:::: FjighE:: :::. qi.::. lj Planning Finance 
äfey... Crew.... . 
Quality Assurance Group* 
Engineering Flight safety audit 
Audit Cockpit crew 
Cabin crew 
Line Checks 
g Personnel 
Policy Committee Group 
Engineering Training Chief pilot Cabin service Operation 
Source: Adapted from Sharples, 1996 
* Note: Within Quality Assurance Group, training audits should be included and applied 
to cockpit and cabin crew on a regular basis. 
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4.1.2 Organisational Structure 
Some attention needs to be paid to the issue of the safety manager's position within 
the organisational structure. With traditional organisational safety approaches, the 
safety officer, who is independent of the operational departments, reports on the 
company's safety performance to the chief executive in order to make the final 
decisions about safety improvement and investment. All the safety managers in the 
interviewed airlines have direct access to the top managers and relative independence 
compared with other departments in their airlines. 
4.1.3 Risk Management and Risk Programmes 
The purpose of this section is to explore one of the values of a SMS - risk assessment 
and evaluation, in the airline industry. 
All the five airlines involved in the interviews were using some form of risk 
assessment procedures and tools. Some were highly formalised (large and medium 
size), some were less so (small size). The management of the risk assessment process 
is often termed "risk management"23. One interviewee put the aim of risk 
management well: "Our aim is to find a technique that helps us to manage risk, 
without having conflicts with our financial goals and fitting in the decision-making 
processes. More importantly we want to find a technique that enables us to spot a 
hazard before it had manifested itself. " 
One interviewee called the process "hazard management" and provided the following 
definition of hazard management: "Hazard Management is kind of the risk based 
management approach basically. The techniques used in hazard management are 
identifying hazards by risk-control measures to prevent the occurrence of hazards. " 
23 The concept of risk management has been discussed in Chapter 2 from the academic point of view, 
which shows that a robust SMS can be achieved by practising safety directives and initiatives. 
These processes constitute quality and risk management. 
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The value of risk management or hazard management is the processes/ procedures to 
spot the hazards and then reduce/ eliminate them. The success of this system largely 
depends on the quality of safety information gathering process that fit in the system. 
As such, in some airlines in the industry, the quality manager replaces the safety 
manager in charge of the safety function. Yet this view is not totally agreed by 
interviewees. One interviewee noted: "Safety has always been considered implicit in 
the quality management; accordingly, many companies regard their quality policy as 
their safety policy too. It is really a misunderstanding. " For example, ISO 9000 will 
provide a process that assures consistent application, however, standards may be good 
or bad! 
The following are the detailed results of discussions with interviewees regarding risk 
management. Under the safety management system, a common technique is to use 
varying techniques to identify risk and then to apply controls to manage the hazard. 
This process is assisted by determining a level of severity based on the product of the 
seriousness of an event against the frequency of such an event happening. Hazard can 
then be managed to the level of "As low as reasonably practical" (ALARP). Figure 
4-2 outlines the common risk assessment framework and concepts24 in the interviewed 
airlines. 
24 Please refer to Chapter 2 for the description of various risk programmes and analyses. 
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Figure 4-2 The Common Framework of Risk Assessment 
in the Interviewed Airlines 
Airline safety management system 
" Policies and principles, manuals, accountabilities, training, auditing, communication 
Accidents/Incidents investigation: 
" Investigate structural failure 
" Identify human erroneous behaviour 
(human factors) 
1. Hazards identification 
" Incident reporting system 
" Identify process / procedural risks 
2. Risk analysis 
" Evaluate data, trend analysis 
Risk Management 
(Hazard Management) 
Feedback 3. Risk prevention and control 
" Auditing, assessment, risk programmes 
Safety performance 
of safety services 
3 
ý2 
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1. Hazard identification: 
ºý Identify all undesirable events or circumstances associated with each 
hazard which could result in harm (from accidents/incidents investigation, 
and incident reporting systems) 
+ Identify and categorise potential sources of harm, whether process or 
procedural risks 
Apart from identifying and categorising source of harm, the major aim is also to feed 
the database with data and parameters. Not only can the database be used for risk 
analysis, but also safety cases can be developed in the following stages. It is worth 
noting that in terms of flight safety data, two western airlines use BASIS to input, 
analyse and manage flight crew-related errors for their safety information database, 
from which safety cases are developed. Two eastern airlines develop their own safety 
databases similar to BASIS, due to the fact that their safety case technique is still at 
the research stage, and the software interface is unable to meet their requirements, 
although they acknowledged the value of BASIS. The other just has a simple safety 
database and no plans to develop safety cases so far. 
In terms of maintenance aspects, two airlines use MEDA for the input data; one is 
under consideration. One western airline has developed a database similar to MEDA. 
The small eastern airline uses a simple input database. 
2. Risk analysis: 
Systematically evaluate all potentially harmful events and circumstances to 
identify the degree of risk exposure 
The aim of risk analysis is to evaluate the input data and undertake a trend analysis 
(even human reliability analysis). Within the interviewed airlines, one of them uses 
Risk Analysis Matrix and FORAS. Two use FORAS and one has developed a similar 
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technique but with a different name. It was found that larger airlines tend to use 
multiple risk analyses to analyse risks due to the scope and complexity of their fleet. 
3. Risk prevention and control 
+ Develop/implement appropriate measures to prevent occurrence of 
accidents 
+ Evaluate possible harmful effects of undesirable events/circumstances 
actually occurring and define those measures necessary to limit/contain 
them and re-establish a safe operating situation 
The aim of risk control is to minimise or mitigate the risk exposure by using defences 
(process/technology). Safety policy should mandate equipment fit. There are a few 
techniques employed by the interview airlines, and some equipment is installed on a 
voluntary basis, such as EGPWS. 
Two points are noticeable here. One is that larger airlines are willing to invest in 
expensive equipment for safety, and are more willing to spend time in auditing25 (e. g. 
an internal survey). The other is that the interview airlines tend to focus on the risk 
control tools for flight safety (for instance, CRM and FOQA have been paid a great 
deal of attention and have been developed for a long time); however, western airlines 
show a greater awareness of maintenance audits than do eastern airlines. 
To sum up, the following risk programmes have been adopted by the interview 
airlines, and are also regarded as the basic requirement for current airline safety 
management operations. 
 Air Safety Reports /Incident report system 
 BASIS (or other safety information database), and confidential data 
exchange (only for BASIS users) 
 GPWS 
25 Another view on this is, Western airlines comply with a regulatory requirement, while others may 
have no regulatory requirements imposed for that. However, without the leverage will hesitate to 
commit to investment. 
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 Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS, not for the smaller airlines) 
 FOQA, or Quick Access Recorders (QAR) 
 FORAS or Risk Matrix 
 CRM 
 Human Factors (HF) and Error Reduction (particularly in maintenance) 
4.1.4 Safety Audit 
A safety audit is an important component of the safety management system. It is also 
part of the safety assessment process and risk management. As accidents are either 
unforeseeable or unforeseen, the objective of safety auditing activities is to avoid the 
latter type of accident or incident. As such, some attention needs to be paid to the 
issue of safety monitoring and audit. 
The interviewees thought that it was possible to eliminate risks as a matter of routine 
by objectively examining all aspects of a department's activities that impinge on air 
safety. This can be achieved by carrying out a safety audit and taking remedial action 
as soon as shortcomings (potential hazards) are identified. 
Safety auditing includes both an internal and external review, and inspection26. The 
purpose of the routine self-inspection is to confirm that minimum safety requirements 
are met for the purpose of the company's safety goals. The result of the safety audit 
can also be used as indicators of safety performance27. Some safety managers 
mentioned specific auditing programmes (e. g. the large western airline has several 
audits respectively for flight operation, ground operation and engineering. There is 
also a cross-department audit. The complexity of the programmes is higher than for 
the medium and small airlines). Besides, with the growth of alliance and network 
26 The external examination and inspection from the regulators will be discussed more in the section 
about the regulator's role. 
27 There are other safety performance indicators such as accident/incident rates, aircraft proximity 
hazard reports and equipment failures to show the level of risk, and the shortcomings in need of 
improvement. 
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sharing, an increased risk of cross-cultural issues also impact operation. Most of the 
safety manager mentioned that the new joint relationship aims to increase the 
competitive advantages and market share by cooperation and standardisation, which, 
nonetheless, inevitably results in significant changes and difficulties in airline 
operation, in particular with safety services. Differences in company culture and 
safety system result in problems. KAL and Delta are good examples (Please refer to 
section 2.6.2.3, footnote 15 for the case of Delta's safety review on KAL). 
One interviewee especially mentioned the value of auditing the cultural aspects of 
safety28. However, its current state of progress is to promote the non-blame and 
reporting culture (as is the case with the other four interview airlines) and evaluate the 
safety culture by distributing a safety culture survey (only one interview airline). 
There is no practical programme to support cultural auditing so far. 
4.1.5 Culture versus Safety 
The relationship between culture and safety management was one of the major 
focuses of the interviews, and Chapter 2 has showed its importance to proactive safety 
management. The culture approach was recognised by the interviewees, but as 
mentioned in the previous section, the culture approach is making slow progress, due 
to the difficulties of measuring so called "culture". 
As discussed in Chapter 2, layers of culture can be understood as overlapping 
elements. Therefore, a safety culture exists as a subset of organisational culture. Since 
the interviewees for the research were selected for their ability to manage safety, 
organisational culture was not mentioned explicitly by all interviewees, compared 
with safety culture. Below are the resulting discussions of organisational and safety 
culture respectively. 
28 Glennon (1982) reveals that organisations with poor safety culture scores had higher accident 
rates than those organisations with better safety culture scores. However, there is no further 
academic evidence to support this statement. 
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4.1.5.1 Organisational culture as a source of reliability 
Although organisational culture attracted less attention by the interviewees, the 
interview findings reveal that organisational culture is likely to be seen as a source of 
reliability to sustain the airlines and their safety culture. Reliability is conventionally 
embodied in structure and training, but seems to be up against some limits. Here 
however, it means the support that organisations can commit and the resources that 
they can allocate. That is to say, if the organisational culture places safety as a higher 
priority than production, the resource allocation within the airline will favour the 
concerns of safety over those of cost. 
It was also found that the concept of organisational culture, to the interviewees, was 
very abstract. One of the interviewees used the term "organisational climate" to 
express a concept similar to that of organisational culture. Other interviewees did not 
distinguish between organisational culture and organisational climate. Generally 
speaking, ' interviewees regarded organisational culture/climate as the culture which 
reflects the belief of employees towards mission, activities, etc that have worked well 
in the past, have been assumed to translate into behaviours and norms. 
4.1.5.2 Safety culture/climate 
Aspects of safety culture were more remarked upon by the interview airlines than 
were those of organisational culture. The premise put forth was the observations of 
interviewees, which is that a safety culture consists of a combination of safety 
practices (from SMS) and the interaction of the organisation with various aspects of 
its environment. 
The phrase "safety culture" is used very commonly in the airline industry, so no 
interviewee chose to use "safety climate". However, when asked the difference 
between'safety culture and safety' climate, four interviewees reckoned that there was a 
slight'difference between these two: 
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Moreover, all interviewees believed that how a firm responds to safety depends 
largely on its safety culture. To build a good safety culture is thus the goal of the 
interview airlines because an organisation with an appropriate safety culture would be 
more likely to implement an appropriate safety management system, and safety 
management programmes would not be effectively used if they were not supported by 
an appropriate safety culture. It therefore shows the relationship between safety 
culture and safety management system (See Figure 4-3). 
Figure 4-3 The Relationship between Safety Culture and SMS 
SMS 
(b) (a) 
Safety culture 
(a) Interviewees show how a good safety culture can implement a robust SMS 
and safety initiatives (e. g. a no-blame culture can encourage line workers to 
report errors, which can help to identify hazards) 
(b) Premise: Safety culture consists of safety practices and initiatives in the SMS. 
4.1.6 The Role of Regulator and the Relationship with Airlines 
The final area of interest is the role of regulator and its relationship with the airlines, 
because the civil aviation authority is closely involved in the development of the 
airlines. The impact of regulatory environment on airline safety has been discussed in 
Chapter 2. Below is a summary of the interviews in terms of the interviewees' 
thoughts on regulators, which also contain some opinions from the interview on 
regulators: 
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View from Interviewees- 
There are many functions provided by aviation regulators. Especially in recent 
years, the increasingly intense competition, privatisation, strategic alliances 
and new type of operation like low cost operators are taking place with the 
developments in the world's airline industry, which reflects a continuing 
growth in demand for air transport. This complexity places more stress on the 
regulators than ever before. 
For airlines, regulators, such as Civil Aviation Authorities, act as monitors and 
inspectors in terms of the safety function. The purpose of the routine 
inspection by the external regulators is to confirm that minimum safety 
requirements are met for approval purposes, both for airlines' and passengers' 
own good. Given the commercial competition between airlines, monitoring 
and inspecting airline safety is becoming more and more important, in 
particular with other issues resulting from the alliance and network sharing, 
such as the exchange of cockpit and cabin crew, the requirement for safety 
standards, the use of risk programmes and so on. The standardisation and 
improvement of global alliances' joint safety performance are therefore in 
need of regulators' close attention and inspection. 
View form regulators - 
In addition to this inspection function, regulators also act as assisters. Their 
guidance and principles are needed to help to maintain civil aviation 
operational safety risks at the level of ALARP (mentioned by the interviewees 
as well). By gathering and sharing safety information, the regulatory 
environment aims to provide' airlines with the industry's latest principles, 
information and programmes. For instance, the concept of human factors has 
been recognised as important in the drive to improve aviation safety. 
Human Factors encompasses psychology, physiology and engineering. In the 
broad array of civil aviation, Human Factors include design and operation of 
aircraft, maintenance of aircraft, provision of air traffic services, etc. As such, 
given CRM, accident investigation, design of flight instruments, human 
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limitations, maintenance errors, etc being traditionally attracted a great deal of 
attention, regulators must pay and have paid much more attention to human 
factors than before although remedy of HF is getting more about influencing 
organisational culture and value as to the individual. Some areas are in need of 
more exploration, such as organisational issues, safety management concepts, 
integrated design and learning from incident data. 
So far in this industry, with the help of various methods, techniques and tools, 
Human Factors advice has been developed to help to apply human factors in 
many areas by the trained specialists. For example, the western CAA 
interviewed has four HF specialists under its regulation group. The main areas 
of their work are: 
1. Supplying human factors input to specific tasks/projects within the 
technical divisions of regulation group; 
2. Raising awareness of human factors and initiating human factors 
training across the division appropriate to divisional needs; 
3. Fostering relationships with and/or participating in relevant groups 
outside CAA, such as JAA, and ICAO; 
4. Keeping abreast of developments within human factors and applying this 
knowledge as appropriate. 
These functions not only feature in the jobs of regulators, but also imply the 
interaction between airlines and regulators and the assistance offered by the 
regulators. 
4.1.7 Improvement and Other Comments 
The following is a summary of the interviewees' observations regarding safety 
improvements in the air transport industry and in their airlines so far: 
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 Safer aircraft designs 
 Developing and improving national and international regulations 
 Enhanced staff training 
 Integrated and intelligent systems to support first line crews 
 Human factors issues 
One airline interviewee particularly mentioned total safety management, which was a 
contribution from the study of human factors and the development of a no-blame 
culture. 
In addition, one interviewee stressed that the importance of safety control lay in a 
multi-channel feedback system, and the ability to respond effectively to events or 
hazards. 
One interviewee stated that "In the current airline industry, the misunderstanding still 
exists quite common in some airlines, such as, `More (extra) safety is costly', `quality 
assurance system is there to ensure all work is done in accordance with procedure and 
process', etc. These complacent thoughts will only lead to nowhere in safety 
improvement, particularly when there is a conflict between cost and safety. " 
Another interviewee said that "Risk management must be effective because through 
this process, risk can be identified, measured, reviewed and controlled. Nevertheless, 
it is more important that all employees truly understand what's the value of safety in 
all operations for the purpose to create a sustainable operating environment. " 
The results of interview will be used to strengthen the underpinned knowledge of the 
safety mechanism and the development of organisational factors. 
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4.2 The Safety Mechanism Model 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, what is required at this point after conducting 
the interview is to develop the safety mechanism model, building upon the existing 
knowledge of what is thought to contribute to an effective proactive safety by 
increasing the knowledge of the factors which affect a proactive safety mechanism, 
and the SMS performance, to improve the shortcomings of existing retroactive safety 
programmes. The followings will illustrate the development of the model. 
4.2.1 Overview and Hypotheses of the Model 
The framework of this model is designed at Figure 4-4. The safety mechanism is 
organised as a series of concentric circles which are intended to represent the 
relationship of each layer, which combines with organisational factors to form a safety 
mechanism model. It has both bottom-up and top-down metaphors characterising the 
safety mechanism. The former is that of throwing pebbles into a pond. If one stone is 
thrown in, ripples emanate from the point of entry and continue unchecked. Thus, 
carrying the metaphor over to the issue of a safety mechanism, with the stone thrown 
into the pond, each level of the system is relatively affected, from each individual's 
understanding of the concept, which translates to knowledge, and subsequently to 
behaviour, which eventually shapes the organisational climate. 
Taking this one step further, the organisational climate exerts an influence on 
organisational culture, which in turn affects safety climate and safety culture. Safety 
culture influences safety philosophy, and safety philosophy shapes managerial 
decision-making, which results in good or bad consequences for safety performance. 
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Figure 4-4 The Structure of Proactive Safety Mechanism Model 
Organisational 
Factors 
Organisational climate 
Organisational Culture> 
Safety climate 
Safety culture 
Safety philosophy> 
Decision-making 
U 
Safety Performance 
(of SMS) 
131 
Chapter 4 Interview Findings and Model Development 
With having each layer of the composite defined (see Hypothesis 1), this model will 
focus on the top-down metaphor of the safety mechanism, which illustrates the way in 
which climate/culture presents both opportunities and threats for safety management, 
because the climate/culture of an airline is often held as being of critical importance to' 
corporate strategic decision making. Namely, safety is ultimately a state of mind., 
(Sayce, 2001). It is supported by organisational structure and regulations, but 
fundamentally it is the matter of concept and behaviours, which influence the outcome 
of safety (see Hypothesis 2). 
The safety mechanism model is not a model of proactive safety management or 
organisational climate/culture. It is a model of the evolution of safety performance in 
the context of proactive safety management. The implication of using this model toR 
assess proactive airline safety is to identify the organisational factors which will affect 
the safety mechanism. Meanwhile, external factors are there to present the forces 
outside the airline which reflect the environmental factors (see Hypothesis 2). 
The difference between retroactive and proactive safety management is in the 
treatment of the contributing causes of accidents and their underlying factors to' 
prevent accidents from recurring. The traditional approach to studying aviation safety 
has involved analysing accident data. Research has focused on identifying factors that 
link to, for example, pilot-error accidents through systematic accident investigations. 
However, the accident rate has not been significantly improved for decades, which 
points to the need for a new approach in safety management. 
Proactive safety management moves away from pilot-error as the focus of 
understanding accident causation, to the organisational approach, which assigns 
responsibility for an accident to all systems within an organisation. The investigation 
of organisational factors, which acts as the mediator and predictor of the safety, 
mechanism and safety performance can help to establish a proactive approach to 
safety and improve safety performance (see Hypothesis 3). 
The systematic approach is designed to ensure continuous improvement by analysing 
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whether the values of an airline's climate/culture are consistent with good safety 
practices. For this purpose, management need to establish a support system so that all 
employees can use operational definitions to analyse the resulting data and to identify 
barriers to continuous improvement. 
Most important of all, chapter 2 stated that the current proactive concept and 
approaches aim to uncover the latent organisational conditions, and avoid the 
company surrounding errors or inadequate recognition, which degrade safety in the 
workplace. This research therefore aims to establish the organisational factors 
affecting the safety mechanism in order to establish the proactive approach to safety. 
Certainly it requires an understanding of the traditional aspects of human factors- 
communication, stress, and ergonomics, as well as accident investigation, incident 
investigation data. etc, which have been identified in Chapter 2. An airline's safety 
health and performance need the co-ordination of both reactive and proactive safety 
management (see Hypothesis 4). 
Hypotheses 
In keeping within the aim of this part of the research, to develop the safety mechanism 
within the proactive management, four general hypotheses will be explored and tested. 
The term hypothesis, as used here, should be understood in the broad sense of the 
word as these hypotheses are intended to outline the aims and objectives of the 
remainder of this thesis. These statements should be considered as propositions, 
developed from known facts, which formed the basis for this investigation. This is 
quite different from the hypotheses in the statistical sense that implies specific 
inferences and will be tested and either accepted or rejected. 
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Hypothesis 1: 
The safety mechanism is the composite of organisational climate/culture, 
safety climate/culture, safety philosophy, and decision-making. The definition 
of each layer will be redefined (except decision making) to suit the airline 
industry. 
Qr' This hypothesis will be tested by a literature review. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The safety mechanism model will be demonstrated as a multidimensional 
construct, which will be influenced by a complex factor-structure. Meanwhile, 
this factor structure will also reflect the current environmental factors in the 
airline industry. 
ov" This hypothesis will be tested by the use of case study and questionnaire. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The organisational factors mediate the relationship between the safety 
mechanism and safety performance, and act as predictors of safety 
performance. 
This hypothesis aims to be tested by the literature and questionnaire, which 
includes a self-rated safety performance measure. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The safety mechanism model is seen as being critical to the development of 
proactive safety management and evolution of safety performance; however, 
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the airline safety health and performance need the coordination of proactive 
and reactive safety management. 
r, r This hypothesis will be tested by the combined findings, including the 
literature review, case study and questionnaire. 
4.2.2 Layers and Their Definitions 
For the purposes of the model, six system layers have been specified. The six layers of 
the safety mechanism are: (1) organisational climate, (2) organisational culture, (3) 
safety climate, (4) safety culture, (5) safety philosophy and (6) decision-making. 
These layers will be defined in the following sections to suit the application to the 
airline industry. 
4.2.2.11 (1) Organisational climate & (2) Organisational culture 
The characteristics of organisational culture and their relationship with safety have 
been discussed in Chapter 2. However, when conducting interviews with airline safety 
managers, the term "climate" was found to be used by one interviewee, although the 
term "culture" tended to be more commonly used. According to the Collins 
Dictionary (1995), "climate" is defined as: a) typical weather conditions of area; b) a 
prevailing trend. This would seem to have a different meaning as compared with 
culture. Yet sometimes the two are used interchangeably when they are applied to 
organisational research. Identification of organisational climate and organisational 
culture is needed however because these two concepts are so global and so abstract 
that they can run the risk of becoming virtually meaningless. 
What is organisational climate and the distinction between the two 
In the 1970s and 1980s, organisational culture and climate attracted a. great deal of 
attention because they provided views for managers to overlook their business. Much 
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research was undertaken under the heading of organisational climate in the 1970s. 
Gradually, during the 1980s, the term "culture" replaced the term "climate" in this 
type of research (Guldenmund, 2000). Organisational culture is seen as a kind of 
reliability to sustain a business, as proved in the interview. Nowadays, this concept is 
referred to by the term "organisational culture", whereas the term "organisational 
climate" has come to mean more and more the overt manifestation of culture within 
the organisation. 
Nonetheless, debates on distinguishing organisational climate from organisational 
culture always exist. For example, De Cock et al. (1986) argue that organisations are 
characterised by a coherence of numerous processes. Organisational climate then is 
the perception of this coherence by all the members. On the other hand, organisational 
culture is the underlying meaning given to this coherence, which forms a pattern of 
significance and values (quoted from Guldenmund, 2000). 
Conversely, Schein (1992) conceives climate as preceding culture, i. e. climate is 
culture in the making. So climate is replaced by culture and culture then conveys a 
broader, and more profound and comprehensive meaning. Furnham and Gunter 
(1993) regard organisational climate as being an index of organisational health, but 
not a causative factor of it. What organisational climate measures may access are 
some dimensions of organisational culture within a limited range. 
Culture is part of organisational climate 
In order to have a clear construction of the safety mechanism, this research intends to 
follow the themes of De Cock et al. (1986) and Schneider (1975). In particular, the 
latter brought the distinction between descriptive attributes (perception of 
organisational practices) and affective attributes (reaction to same practices and 
procedures) for organisational climate and organisational culture respectively, given 
the difficulties of distinguishing organisational climate from culture. Therefore, 
organisational culture is seen as part of organisational climate. 
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This concept is also supported by Handy (1985). He provided an analogy to explain 
why an appropriate organisational climate is important if a management initiative 
(efforts to manage safety or some other aspects of performance) is to thrive within the 
organisation: 
"... many of the ills of organisations stem from imposing an inappropriate 
structure on a particular culture, or from expecting a particular culture to thrive 
in an appropriate climate. Vines don t grow where the sunshine doesn't fall in 
the right proportions with the rain - nor has anyone yet found a more effective 
technology for tending the vines than the human hand. " 
Using the analogy of the garden, organisational climate is just like the environment, 
which needs to be full of sunshine and rain to cultivate the flowers and plants. 
Organisational culture is like the ways of coping with the influence of the 
environment. For instance, nationally-owned airlines are literally more 
politically-orientated than privately-owned airlines in terms of organisational climate, 
i. e. nationally-owned airlines value their nations' benefits higher than the airlines 
themselves. Thus, this type of airline's organisational culture tends to be bureaucratic 
and inflexible29. 
The detailed definitions and differences between organisational climate and 
organisational culture are listed in Table 4-1. 
29 Refer to Table 2-4 (page 81) for Bureaucratic organisational culture 
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Table 4-1 Definitions of Organisational Climate and Culture 
Organisational climate 
  Describing aspects of the airline's 
state, (political, economic, 
brand-value,.. ), tend to be affected 
by external factors. 
  Perceptions of organisational 
practices, a more superficial concept 
than culture. 
  An index of airline's health, but not a 
causative factor of it. 
  Multi- dimensional 
(a number of different climates exist 
within an airline ). 
Organisational culture 
 A complex phenomenon of social 
grouping, serving as the prime medium 
for all members of an airline to interpret 
their collective identity, beliefs and 
behaviours. 
  Reactions to those same practices and 
procedures, created by all organisation 
members (internal factors), not owned 
by any group. 
  Used to be taught to the new member as 
the framework for cognitions and 
behaviours (reaction) to the problems. 
  Multi- dimensional 
(one of the important and direct impact 
is safety). 
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4.2.2.2 (3) Safety climate & (4) Safety culture 
What is safety climate? 
Contemporaneous with the derivation of safety culture from organisational culture is 
the associated term "safety climate". The concept of safety climate emerged from 
the research on organisational culture and climate. Schneider (1975) argues that a 
number of different climates exist within an organisation. Researchers began to 
measure one specific type of organisational climate - safety climate. Since then, a 
few researchers have defined safety climate (see Table 4-2). As we can see, most 
researchers aim at the same concept but differ on what this concept might encompass. 
In other words, safety climate tends to be thought of as regarding an employee's 
perception of safety, but its operation of the concept varies according to different 
companies. 
Table 4-2 Definitions of Safety Climate 
Researcher Definition 
Zohar (1980) A summary of perceptions that employees share about their 
work environments 
............ . ....................... .......... ........ ......... 
Glennon (1982) A special kind of organisational climate making employees' 
perceptions of the characteristics of their organisation and have 
a direct impact upon their behaviours to reduce or eliminate 
danger 
............................................................................................................................................................................. . . . . .. ........................................................................... 
Cooper and Philips 
.... ... .. . ... . 
Safety climate is concerned with the shared perceptions and 
(1994) beliefs that workers hold regarding safety in their work place 
... 
Cabrera et al (1997) 
........ ......................................................... .. 
Shared perceptions of organisational members about their 
working environment and about their organisational safety 
policies 
Williamson et al A summary concept describing the safety ethic 
(1997) in an organisation which is reflected in employees' belief 
about safety 
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The influence of safety climate 
Recently in safety literature, the emphasis has shifted from the individual human who 
might be responsible for incidents/accidents (single human error) towards a systemic 
or organisational approach. Defined in the previous section, organisational climate 
derives from aggregate employee perceptions and consequently, it is 
multi-dimensional and can potentially influence safety-related behaviours. Safety 
climate is then thought of as the mediating factor between organisational climate and 
safety performance by some researchers. 
Neal et al. (2000) examine the impact of organisational climate on safety climate, and 
the impact of safety climate on safety knowledge, motivation and performance of 
individuals in organisations. They found that safety climate operated as a mediating 
variable between organisational climate and safety performance, as measured by self- 
reports of compliance with safety regulations and procedures, as well as participating 
in safety activities, which were also mediated by employees' safety knowledge and 
motivation (see Figure 4-5). 
Figure 4-5 The Impact of Safety Climate 
Safety Safety 
Knowledge Compliance 
Organisational Safety 
Climate 1 -1 Climate 
f 
Safety Safety 
Motivation Participation 
Source: Neal et at., 2000 
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The relationship between safety climate and safety culture 
While perceptions are more associated with climate, attitudes are considered to be a 
part of safety culture30. The safety culture of an organisation is the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour. These 
characteristics determine the commitment, the proficiency and effectiveness of an 
organisation and in particular, its safety management. The safety culture within any 
organisation is an indicator of the state of respect for safety consciousness, the 
willingness and determination to comply with the company's policies and procedures, 
and compliance with regulatory requirements. To individual, safety culture is the 
accountability that an individual has to himself or herself; the accountability goes up 
to the line supervision and finally to the employer. 
Certain attributes are critical to a strong culture. Understanding performance 
requirements, respect for training, respect for peers and supervisors and professional 
pride are examples of positive attributes that contribute to a healthy culture. 
As such, it is found that the model provided by Neal et al. (2000) contains the 
components of safety culture 31 although Neal et al. did not specify it as such. In order 
to have a clear understanding of safety climate and safety culture within the airline 
industry, this study redefines these two concepts (see Table 4-3) and follows these 
definitions when developing the safety mechanism model. It is worth noting that one 
of the main differences between safety climate and safety culture in the airline 
industry is that the former is formed according to mandatory regulations. 2 As it, is 
governed by a minimum requirement, safety climate is supposed to pervade the whole 
airline and tends to be regulation-orientated. 
3o The definition of safety culture is listed in Table 2-5. 
3t According to the Collins Dictionary (1995): 
Attitude: the way a person thinks and behaves, opinion, frame of mind 
Behaviour: manner of behaving 
Belief: trust of confidence, faith, feeling 
Motivation: desire, incentive, drive 
32 Please refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3 for the regulatory environment. 
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Table 4-3 The Definitions of Safety Climate and Safety Culture 
Safety Culture 
  derived from the aggregate employee 
perceptions of safety 
 a series of attitudes, behaviours, and 
social and technical practices 
  governed by the minimum requirement 
from regulators (regulation-oriented) 
or other aviation authorities 
  pervading the whole airline 
  potentially influencing safety-related 
behaviours 
  established to minimise the exposure 
of employees, managers, passengers, 
and third parties to hazardous conditions 
" frequently identified as being fundamental 
to an airline's ability to manage safety- 
related aspects of operations 
  particularly technical departments are 
involved (flight operations, engineering, 
maintenance) 
A strong safety climate does not guarantee a strong safety culture, but a strong safety 
culture must mean a strong safety climate being achieved since safety culture is 
fostered by safety climate. For example, CAL suffered two serious accidents in the 
four years from 1994-1998. The whole external and internal environment, including 
regulation, equipment, safety programmes, training, etc. have been changed in order 
to improve its safety climate. However, the accident in 2002 proved that CAL's safety 
culture is still in need of improvement, although the general environment and the 
perceptions of employees towards safety have been substantially changed. 
Safety culture is defined as a series of attitudes, behaviours, and social and technical 
practices, which are established to minimise the exposure of employees, managers, 
passengers and third parties to hazardous conditions. It is frequently identified as 
being fundamental to an airline's ability to manage the safety-related aspects of its 
operations (particularly in technical departments, such as flight operations, 
maintenance, etc. ) 
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Organisations or authorities have provided a number of instructions regarding how to 
achieve a "good"33 or "strong" safety culture. ICAO (1994), for example, provided the 
following indications of a good safety culture: 
+ Senior management placing a strong emphasis on safety; 
ºý Staff having an understanding of hazards within the workplace; 
Senior management's willingness to accept criticism and an openness to 
opposing views; 
Senior management fostering a climate to encourage feedback; 
Emphasising the important of communicating relevant safety information; 
+ Promoting realistic and workable safety rules; and 
+ Ensuring that staffs are well-educated and trained so that they understand 
the consequences of unsafe acts. 
Some safety programmes try to develop a Safety Culture Index as an indicator of 
safety performance, for example the BASI-INDICATE Safety Programme, discussed 
in Chapter 2. When there is a measurement system in place, the operational deficiency 
and the room for improvement are easier to spot. As such, now culture presents both 
an opportunity and a threat to the aviation industry. 
4.2.2.3 (5) Safety philosophy and (6) Decision-making & action 
The culture of an organisation is often held to be of critical importance to corporate 
strategic decision-making (Johnson and Scholes, 1988). Nevertheless, there should 
exist a philosophy before management make decisions and employees take action. 
The term "philosophy" signifies the airline management's overall view of how they 
are going to "shape" the company and conduct the business. For employees, 
philosophy means the priorities and plans that they follow. 
33 The meaning of "good" or "bad" safety culture is sometimes very subjective because there appears 
to be no worldwide benchmarking tool or measurement to evaluate safety culture yet. As such, this 
study chooses to use "strong" or "weak" culture, instead of "good" or "bad". 
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Degani and Wiener (1994) argue that a company's philosophy is largely influenced by 
the individual philosophies of the top decision makers and company culture. Although 
most airline managers (in this study, the safety managers interviewed) cannot clearly 
state their philosophy, such a philosophy of operation does exist within airlines. They 
can be in combination with economic factors, political factors, major organisational 
change, etc. to generate policies, and can be inferred from policies and procedures to 
exercise training, punitive actions, etc. Figure 4-6 shows the three `P' (philosophy, 
policies, procedures) framework. 
Figure 4-6 The Three `P' Framework in the Airline Industry 
(action) 
Source: Degani and Wiener, 1994 
Safety philosophy is the foundation of safety culture. In other words, safety 
philosophy defines the organisation's goals. Safety climate may exist in part as a 
result of the regulation's rules, requirements, and the company's procedures and 
standards to meet them; however, if a philosophy is not extracted at CEO level, safety 
culture cannot exist. It constitutes the logic, rationale, plans and priorities towards 
safety. It is safety philosophy that drives safety culture in practice and carries out a 
continuous self-assessment. Without such a philosophy, an airline cannot ensure that 
its safety standards and performances are improving. For example, quoted from 
Wiener et al. (1991), Delta Air Lines used to produce a statement of flight deck 
automation philosophy, which acknowledged that "the purpose of automation is to 
aid the pilot in doing his or her job" and- that the 'pilot must be proficient in 
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operating their airplanes in all levels of automation... must be knowledgeable in the 
selection of the appropriate degree of automation. " Furthermore: 
"Automation should be used at the level most appropriate to enhance the 
priorities of Safety, Passenger Comfort, Public Relations, Schedule, and Economy, 
as stated in the Flight Operation Policy Manual. 
In order to achieve the above priorities, all Delta Air Lines training programmes, 
training devices, procedures, checklists, manuals,... and the day-to-day operations 
of Delta aircraft shall be in accordance with this statement of philosophy. 
There are two issues about the automation here. The first arises from the ability of the 
pilot to properly use the automation in all needs. Different technology requires 
different operating methodology. Accidents have occurred where the transitional 
issues were not fully understood. The second is that any operational definition to 
automation is understood and SOPS amended to account for this. This requires 
supports at the training level. By this statement, Delta clearly shows its safety 
philosophy on flight deck automation, given the emergent operational problem 
generated in the philosophy of operations. With the priority and referents made in the 
statement, pilots as well as other employees are provided with a better understanding 
of the safety achievement. 
The definitions of safety philosophy and decision-making, which are applied to the 
development of the safety mechanism, are described in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4 The Definitions of Safety Philosophy and Decision Making 
Safety - Logic + plan+ priority towards safety 
Philosophy   Inferred from policies and procedures 
exercise training, punitive actions 
Decision- Action 
making 
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4.2.3 Organisational Factors 
4.2.3.1 Individuals influenced by the safety mechanism model 
Before listing the factors influential in the safety mechanism model, it is necessary to 
distinguish the different roles of individuals in an airline. These roles serve to define 
the individuals influenced by the safety mechanism. The impacts of these specific 
individuals on the safety mechanism are likely to be complex and at each level, a 
number of contradictory goals are also likely to compete for resources. As such, three 
categories of people have been identified as being important to understanding the 
factors which contribute to the development of a safety mechanism. 
1. Line worker 
Individuals at this level perform the essential work of an airline. They are the 
resource used by management to achieve its objectives. Frequently they are 
described as working at the "sharp end", and include pilots, cabin crew, ramp 
personnel, ground staff, etc. 
2. Middle management 
Individuals at this level are responsible for implementing policy through the 
management of operational resources (e. g. line personnel and equipment). They 
do not set the strategic directions for the company. In the airline industry, they 
include management pilots, supervisors of ground staff, maintenance line 
managers, etc. 
3. Senior Management 
At this level, individuals are responsible for setting the strategic direction of the 
organisation by establishing policy. They do not directly manage line workers, 
who are required to report to middle management. Senior management includes 
heads of department, the vice president and board members. 
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4.2.3.2 Concerns and needs for different groups 
This section aims to identify the needs and concerns which need to be addressed, and 
which consequently influence the acts of individuals in each group, and thus influence 
the safety mechanism. 
Line workers 
Concerns and needs of line workers are thought to include: 
1. Individual safety and health 
Employees are motivated to participate in safety initiatives safely because no one 
would wish to be ill or injured at work. This should have a positive influence on 
the safety mechanism. 
2. Role of line worker towards sense of safety and security 
The main role of line worker is in delivering the standard of operation through 
adherence to procedures or SOPs. As such, line personnel are in the best position 
to spot hazards in the workplace. Vigilance of individual members is critical to 
safety in an organisation. Besides, many safety initiatives depend on a "no blame" 
culture for their success. A perceived threat to job security for speaking up on 
safety issues would erode the safety mechanism. 
3. Safety concepts, skills, knowledge and attitudes 
Donald and Cantor (1993) point to that individuals' attitudes and behaviour are 
related to the level of safety in operations. Thus, individual and collective attitudes 
might influence the development of safety mechanism positively or negatively. 
4. Decision-making style 
Employees require the training to make, contribution to safety. For example, 
incident reporting systems are used to identify the potential significance of events, 
and these not only require the knowledge, but also the co-operation : of line 
workers. The process of decision-making will exert an important influence on the 
result. 
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5. Communication channel 
In order to fully understand the corporate policy, management style, awareness of 
safety, etc., line workers need to communicate to others; to their colleagues and to 
the management, in the organisation. 
Middle management 
Concerns and needs of middle management are thought to include: 
1. Management ability 
Middle managers must be aware of all aspects potential hazards in order to 
manage safety effectively. Also, these managers are expected to encourage line 
workers to participate in safety initiatives and express the safety concerns. 
2. Role of middle management on decision-making style and process 
Senior management usually use performance indicators to judge the performance 
of middle managers so that top managers can determine how to allocate the 
resources on production and safety. When the financial success of a department is 
decided by such process, middle mangers' responsibility is to decide and provide 
safety needs while completing the job function under budget limitation. In other 
words, middle management is the level at which the organisation can be changed. 
If his/her line workers repeat deficiencies, it needs management support to fix it. 
Financial pressures can be perceived to limit management freedom to change and 
improve. 
3. Communication bridge 
Middle managers are like the bridge between line workers and top management. 
Thus they should act as the primary channel downwards to the line and upwards to 
senior management in order to deliver the correct information. 
4. Manager's leadership 
Being emphasised for long by researchers, management's leadership is important 
to the organisation. Budworth (1996) is one of them. He identified the critical 
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essence to the effectiveness of safety professional is leadership and 
communication skills. As such, managers' leadership is important to the 
development of a safety mechanism. 
Senior management 
The concerns of senior management, based upon the findings of these interviews and 
factors noted in previous chapters, are thought to be: 
1. Senior management's commitment 
Grimaldi and Simonds (1984) are some of the researchers to stress 'that the 
attitudes and behaviour of management have a profound effect on safety practice. 
In other words, the management's commitment to safety operations may influence 
safety mechanism and consequently safety performance would be affected in an 
airline. 
2. Maintain the stability in the aftermath of accidents/incidents 
Discussed in Chapter 2, risk in the aviation industry is most commonly associated 
with threats to life and limb. Air transport accidents could risk airline business'and 
at worst, might result in an airline's demise. The impact of accidents thus has a 
significant impact on an airline's long-term survival if it is not well managed. 
Therefore, it is the responsibility for senior management to maintain the stability 
of the airline. 
3. Leadership and communication capability 
Similar to the middle management, senior management needs the interpersonal 
skills and leadership to communicate with their subordinates. Meanwhile, they 
must be able to listen to the 'safety concerns of middle management and line 
workers and act upon the input of their subordinates. 
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4. The way to monitor safety performance 
Discussed in previous chapters, the use of accidents as indicators of safety 
provides an insufficient indication of the actual safety health of the system. As 
such, senior managers are expected to explore more meaningful indicators of 
safety and concentrate on organisational process and organisational goals not only 
outcomes. 
5. Financial health of the organisation 
As mentioned previously, the goals of safety and production are competing for 
resources in airlines and sometimes conflicts are caused as a result, especially in 
the era of cost cutting. It is senior management's biggest task to maintain the 
airline's financial health because a highly competitive commercial environment 
might cause lack of profit, which will reduce the incentives to invest in safety as a 
result. 
6. Decision-making style - to meet safety and production goals and shareholder 
demands 
Generating maximum profitability has always been airlines' primary goal, but risk 
is very expensive to eliminate completely. Thus, airlines' managers make 
decisions (allocate limited resources) on the basis of cost-effective comprehension, 
which results in a trade-off situation between two strategic goals, i. e. safety and 
investment costs. Senior management focus on what safety investment for how 
long may have a negative or positive impact on the airline's safety mechanism by 
showing management support. 
7. Relationship with the regulator 
How to directly develop a relationship of trust with the regulatory authority and 
compliance with regulatory practices within the industry is not the biggest task of 
senior management. However, the behaviours of senior management are so 
indicative to the employees and the public, which will consequently affect the 
safety mechanism. According to one CAA regulator, many of senior management 
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underestimate the extent to which the regulators "trust" the senior management of 
the airlines to deliver a safe system. 
8. Relationship with the public 
Similar to the above relationship with the regulators. Meanwhile, some 
interviewees identified that to establish a good relationship with the public has a 
positive impact on airline safety. 
Table 4-5 lists the results of the concerns and influences of line workers, middle 
management and senior management. For simplicity of further analysis, Table 4-5 
also summarises these concerns according to their similarities, and this forms the 
construct of the organisational factors of the safety mechanism. 
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Table 4-5 Various Groups' Concerns & Implied Factors 
Group Concerns Implied Factors 
  Individual safe and health - Perceived safety 
  Sense of safety and security - Perceived safety 
Line   Safety concept, skill, knowledge - Perceived safety 
worker and attitudes 
  Decision-making style - Decision-making style 
  Communication channel - Communication 
  Management ability , - 
Management control 
Middle " Decision-making style and process' - Decision-making style 
management   Communication bridge - Communication 
  Manager's leadership - Management control 
  Senior management's commitment - Management control 
  Maintain the stability in the - Post-incident/accident 
aftermath of incidents/accidents 
" Leadership and communication - Communication 
capability 
Senior " The way to monitor safety - Operation & 
performance maintenance 
management Financial health of the organisation - Commercial pressures 
Decision making style- to meet - Decision making style 
organisational goals and + The investment 
shareholder demands community 
  Relationship with the regulator - Industry regulation 
  Relationship with the public - Public relationship 
4.2.3.3 Summary of organisational factors 
Given that organisational factors are the macro forces that affect safety in an aviation 
organisation (Westrum, 1996), these influential factors are divided into internal factors 
and external factors. The former are those forces from within the company, while the 
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latter express the forces coming from outside the company. These hypothesised 
organisational factors are listed in Table 4-6. In addition to the factors summarised in 
Table 4-5, are additional factors found in the interviews and the literature, which 
include safety information, organisational structure, documentation, country influence 
and region influence. 
Table 4-6 Breakdown of the Factors 
External Factors Internal Factors 
1. Industry regulations 1. Perceived safety 
2. Public relationships 2. Operation and maintenance 
3. The investment community 3. Risk management (control) 
(shareholeders) 4. Management control (quality control) 
4. Country influences 5. Commercial pressures 
5. Regional influences 6. Safety information (info technology) 
7. Organisational structure 
8. Personnel communication and 
relationships 
9. Post-incident/accident (impact of 
incident/accident) 
10. Decision-making style and process 
11. Corporate safety policy 
12. Documentation 
In terms of external factors, country and regional influences are hypothesised to have 
influence on the safety mechanism in accordance with Hofstede's (1994) layers of 
culture, discussed in Chapter 2, which should take account of national culture, 
regional culture, gender culture, etc. Since organisational cultures are the subset of 
national cultures, the latter will provide the context in which organisational culture 
will develop. Moreover, people are usually part of a number of groups, and they are 
potentially influenced by the culture of these groups. Researchers have studied and 
confirmed the influence of national and regional cultures on cockpit crew 
performance (Westrum, 1996; Ho, 1996; Helmrcich, 1999) and also on maintenance 
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workers (Al-Harabi, 2001). Their analyses have led to the cultural assumption arising 
from the other groups of people, which has simultaneously affected the safety 
mechanism. 
Internal factors are summarised from the previous literature review, the interview 
findings and the concerns of different groups. Among these factors, "Commercial 
Pressures" is the one not acknowledged (or less so) by the airline interviewees, but 
one which obviously has a significant influence on safety. Reason (1990) describes 
how in a company, production and safety goals compete for a finite amount of 
investment in terms of capital, personnel, time, equipment, etc., and Westrum (1996) 
notes that safety is often one of the targets for cost-cutting34. As such, the following 
paragraphs will try to demonstrate the impact of commercial pressures on the safety 
mechanism from an economic point of view. 
The economic consequences of safety translate into accident costs and safety 
investment costs. The costs and benefits of safety cannot be measured only in 
economic terms; however, the concept of safety costs can be illustrated in the 
environment as follows: 
According to Pasman (2000), safety costs are the sum of safety investment, 
maintenance, insurance and residual costs, which can be expressed by this equation: 
Safety Costs = Safety investments + Maintenance cost 
+ Insurance cost + Residual risk costs 
34 Actually to "target" safety means it may manifest itself by deferring equipment fit, defer/minimise 
maintenance, training, etc. That does not mean safety is literally affected but does require the 
approach to managing safety to be revised. 
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This equation can be simplified as follows: 
Total Safety Costs (TSC 1) = (Safety investments + Maintenance cost) + 
(Insurance cost + Residual risk costs) 
= Risks prevention costs (RPC 1) + Accident costs (AC 1) 
Prevention costs are the costs invested by airlines in order to improve flight safety and 
prevent accidents from occurring. As illustrated in Figure 4-7, the more prevention 
costs are invested, the larger is the risk reduction achieved. For example, a 
well-trained crew will have more awareness of abnormal situations which will affect 
safety. Accident costs will then be reduced with the increase of the risk reduction and 
prevention costs. 
Figure 4-7 The Concept of Safety Cost 
Cost (p) II [deal situation 
Total safety cost (TSC 1) 
ýP1) 
Risk prevention cost (RPC 1) 
ALARP 
Accident cost (AC 1) 
ALARP (Q1) Risk reduction level (Q) 
E: the optimal safety cost 
ALARP: As low as reasonably practicable 
Source: Adapted from Pasman, 2000; Hsu, 1999 1 
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Ideally safety can be obtained by maximising risk reduction, which means that the 
right side of the diagram is a closer fit. Nevertheless, this comes with a higher safety 
cost. From the point of view of an airline's management, they may see the ideal point 
as being to the left of point E on the total safety cost line, in spite of the higher 
accident cost. An increased effort just to stay even or to attain modest reductions will 
not appear unless they are extremely farsighted. Within this area, it means that 
management is willing to risk more accidents so that they can pay less for prevention 
and place the resources elsewhere. 
To this end, Figure 4-8 portrays the hypothesised safety mechanism model: both 
internal and external factors exert influence on safety mechanism, which will manifest 
itself on the airline safety services, i. e. the performance of safety management system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Results of Model Test 
"The most important thing in life is to have the great aim and 
to possess the aptitude and perseverance to attain it. " 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
5.0 Introduction 
In accordance with the research methodologies described in Chapter 3, a retrospective 
case study and a survey of opinions with questionnaire are adapted to test the model, 
which will subsequently be presented in the next sections. 
5.1 Qualitative Method -A Retrospective Case Study 
5.1.1 The Event 
At 11.55 EST (Eastern Standard Time) 35 on Friday, March 10 1989, The Canadian 
carrier - Air Ontario Flight 1363, a Fokker F28 1000, departed Thunder Bay about one 
hour behind schedule. The aircraft landed at Dryden at 11.39 CST (Central Standard 
Time) 35. It was being refuelled with one engine running, because of an unserviceable 
35 EST = GMT minus 5 hours 
CST= GMT minus 6 hours, 
GMT: Greenwich Mean Time _. , 
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Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). Although a layer of 1/8-1/4 inch of snow had 
accumulated on the wings, no de-icing was done because de-icing with either engine 
running was prohibited by both Fokker and Air Ontario. 
Since no external power unit was available at Dryden, the engines could not be 
restarted in case of engine shutdown on the ground. At 12.09 CST the aircraft started 
its take-off roll using the slush-covered Runway 29. The Fokker settled back after the 
first rotation and lifted off for the second time at the 5700ft point of the 6000ft runway. 
No altitude was gained and the aircraft rushed in a nose-high attitude, striking trees. 
Less than one kilometre from the end of runway, Flight 1363 became a mound of 
smouldering metal and the death trap of 21 passenger and three crew members. 
After a 20-month investigation of the probable cause of the accident, the inquiry's 
report concluded that "Captain Morwood, as the pilot-in-command, must bear 
responsibility for the decision to land and take off in Dryden on the day in question.: 
However, it is equally clear that the air transportation system failed him by allowing 
him to be placed in a situation where he did not have all the necessary tools that 
should have supported him in making the proper decision. " To the benefit of the 
Canadian Aviation System, the accident became the subject of the most pervasive and 
intense inquiry in the history of aviation. 
In the introduction to the inquiry's lengthy report, Mr. Justice Moshansky outlined the 
systems perspective adopted by the commission. The Inquiry set out to identify the 
elements of the aviation system and examine each in turn. It is shown that this 
accident was the result of a failure in air transportation system. 
The failure to which Moshansky refers are those events and conditions which led toý 
the Captain of Flight 1363 finding himself in Dryden, behind schedule in poor 
weather conditions, without the possibility of de-icing the aircraft and without 
stranding the passengers on board in Dryden at the start of a holiday weekend. It is 
these conditions which defined the operational environment encountered by the 
individual, and to a large extent predetermines their response to that environment. In 
essence, these conditions combine to form the "safety mechanism" in Air Ontario. 
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5.1.2 The Pathogen Trails by Appling the Safety Mechanism Model 
The following are the pathogen trails dissected by applying the safety mechanism 
model with a bottom-up metaphor: 
Result (Failure) 
The crash happened because of a loss of lift caused by a build-up of ice on the 
wing and the aircraft crashed shortly after take-off from Dryden. 
Decision- Making 
Layer 
Decision- making 
Individuals 
1. Captain took off without de-icing in snowy condition. 
Line 2. Maintenance left APU un-serviced36 when the aircraft left 
personnel 
Winnipeg that morning. 
Middle The dispatch team sent the disabled aircraft to an airport lacking 
ground start facilities in bad weather; furthermore, APU was left 
management inoperative. 
Senior Managers intended to maximise the utilisation of aircraft and 
profit so the aircraft had to fly anyway. management 
3e APtJ is MLI. (Minimum Equipment List) item, Captain has to determine the effects. 
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Safety Philosophy 
Layer 
Individuals 
Safety Philosophy 
1. Line personnel were highly motivated to keep the aircraft flying 
Line and took necessary steps to do this. 
personnel 
2. Ground handlers were reticent. 
1. Managers appeared to regard the on time performance and 
aircraft dispatch rate as prime performance criteria. Middle 
management 2. Staff put the aircraft into service before an adequate supply of 
spare parts had been obtained, and did what was necessary to 
keep the aircraft flying. 
1. Managers saw the flight was behind schedule in poor weather 
conditions Senior 
management Managers required the aircraft had to llv, Cv cii %N itlhout the 
possibility of de-icing, because passengers could not be 
stranded in Dryden at the start of a holiday weekend 
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Safety Culture 
Layer Safety Culture 
Individuals 
1. Cockpit crew behaviour: did not walk around to have the aircraft 
inspected, so the development of ice was left unchecked. 
2. Cabin crew attitude: did not communicate well. 
(instruction was given to flight attendants, discouraged them from 
informing the air crew of the ice building up on the wings) 
Line 
personnel 3. Maintenance: deferred maintenance had become normal practice 
for maintenance and flight crew working on the F-28. 
4. Ground handling personnel: it was okay to refuel while the engine 
was running. (the aircraft left Winnipeg that morning with an 
unserviceable APU. Dryden Airport possessed no ground-start 
equipment, so at least one engine had to kept running during the 
stop over) 
1. Management failed to deliver and communicate safety information 
Middle to the line personnel. 
management 
2. Management ineffectively observed and coached safe behaviour. 
(Flight crew and maintenance staff used different information to 
determine what constituted "essential equipment"). 
Senior Management lacked communication with key persons, and safety 
management managers had no direct access to CEO. 
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Safety Climate 
Layer 
Individua S Safety Climate 
I. Maintenance: there was no harm in running the risks of 
maintenance deferment. 
2. Crew: a number of mandatory occurrences were never 
Line reported to Transport Canada. Crew were obliged to keep the 
personnel aircraft flying. 
(The involvement of line personnel in any safety initiatives was 
probably minimal because there was a significant degree of labour 
unrest in the months preceding the accident. ) 
I. Had no approved MEL for F-28, which served to outline which 
systems were of a degree of importance that the aircraft could 
not be operated without them. 
Middle 
management 2. Had no operation manual for F-28, so pilots referred to various 
other manuals for information, including a Fokker manual 
which had not been updated for four years. 
3. Failed to provide training in jet operations and performance to 
dispatchers. 
I. Failed to develop a safety organisation (committee). 
2. Appointed a management pilot as CP who had a significant 
Senior number of duties in the turbulent period while. (The check pilot 
management (CP) and first flight safety officer (FSO) resigned after one 
month in the position due to lack of management support, the 
position of FSO remained vacant until the accident) 
3. Forbad de-icing with the engine running. (and aircraft 
manufacturer of F-28) 
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Organisational Culture 
Layer Organisational Culture 
Individuals 
The airline was new (merger of two small airlines with different 
Line operating cultures). It was experiencing considerable 
personnel organisational change, including a lengthy pilot strike, 
introduction of two aircraft types, reduction of the workforce, 
etc. 
1. Either accepted or were unaware of the improper safety 
practices throughout the company. 
Middle 
management 2. Over taxed, inexperienced with jet operations. 
3. Lacked the support of senior management. 
1. Need to deal with different company culture, labour unrest, 
replace aging fleet with newer equipment, etc., and were faced 
with a merger. 
Senior 
management 2. Lack of the commmm cation of an organisational mission 
including safety, organising work to achieve the mission and 
striving for the continuous improvement in terms of safety. 
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Organisational Climate 
Layer 
Organisational Climate 
ndividuals 
Given the company environment being turbulent (merger, pilot 
Line strike, etc. ) and the recession in the 1980s where aviation jobs 
personnel were difficult to find, were likely to do what was necessary to 
ensure their own job security. 
1. As above. 
2. The developed working environment was "a new airline which 
Middle is responsible for the emphasis placed upon operational goals 
management by senior management". 
1. To maintain viability in the competitive airline industry, 
commercial imperatives were seemed to be felt by senior 
management to a greater degree than the requirement to 
Senior increase safety, partly in the absence of regulatory pressure 
management from Transport Canada. 
2. The developed working environment was "a new airline which 
is responsible for the emphasis placed upon operational goals 
by senior management". 
5.1.3 Conclusions of the Organisational Factors Which Influence the 
Safety Mechanism 
After analysing the safety mechanism of Air Ontario, the underfyin (influential) 
factors of the safety mechanism can be illustrated with a backward approach as 
follows (see Figure 5-1): 
166 
Chapter S Results of Model Test 
Figure 5-1 Findings and Conclusions of the Safety Mechanism Model 
Applied to Air Ontario Accident 
Note: 1. Org. = Organisation, Mgt. = Management, Phil. = Philosophy, a/c =Aircraft 
2. Please refer to section 5.1.3.1 & 5.1.3.2 for the description of the organisational factors. 
Line Worker 
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5.1.3.1 Conclusions of internal factors 
1 1. Decision Making Process 
This factor featured the action and decision-making process of the individuals 
in Air Ontario. It clearly showed that the decisions of line workers were 
influenced by senior management. 
1 2. Corporate Safety Policy 
Safety policy was motivated by on-time performance and aircraft utilisation. 
1 3. Perceived Safety 
The F-28 aeroplane was new to Air Ontario and it was the first jet aircraft to 
enter service with the airline. As such, inexperience could be attributed to a 
failure on the part of the maintenance crews, dispatchers and pilots to realise the 
potential implications of an unserviceable APU where no ground start facilities 
were available. 
14. Organisational Structure 
The structure of Air Ontario was not clear or healthy enough to fulfil its safety 
responsibilities. 
1 5. Safety Information 
Safety information was not communicated well throughout the company. 
16. Operation and Maintenance 
Deficient scheduling (over-commitment of F-28). There was no standardised 
manual which caused ambiguous operative, dispatch, and maintenance 
procedures. Deferred maintenance resulted from inadequate spares purchasing 
and inexperience on the part of maintenance (lack of skills and knowledge). 
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1 7. Risk Management 
The reporting of hazards was insufficiently practiced and the regulatory 
environment was not complete within the company. 
1 8. Documentation 
Maintenance personnel regularly defer repairs while awaiting spare parts, and 
pilots would delay recording technical problems in the aircraft log until the end 
of day if they thought the report would serve to ground the aircraft pending 
repairs. The practice of passing notes from one crew to the next so the last crew 
of the day could record all of the technical problems was commonplace. 
1 9. Management Control 
The merger of two airlines caused some management changes and pressures 
because of the different cultures of the two companies. The fact that managers 
could not have full support from the top manager resulted in the management 
control problem. 
1 10. Personnel Relationships and Communication 
Low morale caused inefficient communication between line personnel and 
management. 
I 11. Commercial Pressures 
To ensure that the organisation continued to exist, the primary concern facing 
senior management was the viability and survival of the airline. Increasing 
competition and commercial imperatives increased commercial pressures and 
the danger of decreased safety investment. 
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5.1.3.2 Conclusions of external factors 
E 1. Country Influences 
Deregulation failed to produce an effective regulatory environment. 
Government failed to respond to warnings from the industry and the regulator. 
E 2. Industry Regulations 
Transport Canada failed to provide clear minimum operating standards for 
operators. It also failed to be aware of the operational failings. 
E 3. The Investment Community 
The merger had caused the investment community to focus on operating 
revenue. 
The case study does not reveal the hypothesised internal organisational factors - post 
accident/incident (because of no previous accidents), and external organisational 
factors - public relationships and regional influence (because of no supportive 
information). It shows that any single occurrence will be unlikely to demonstrate all 
the factors of the model, and as such the model should not be rigidly applied to 
particular cases. Nevertheless, it is hoped the readers will have a better understanding 
of how the safety mechanism is useful in terms of identifying the number and 
complexity of interactions involved in the formation of a safety mechanism as set out 
in the hypothesis of this model. 
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5.2 Quantitative Study - Safety Questionnaire 
Followed the case study, safety questionnaire is the next method used to validate the 
model. As described in Section 3.3.2, this questionnaire is designed to consist of two 
parts - internal factors and external factors in accordance with the hypothesised 
organisational factors. As such, fifty-seven items were included in the first part of the 
questionnaire, dealing with the concerns of individuals in the internal environment. 
These items were intended to examine the degree to which the individual felt part of 
their organisations or considered organisational concerns when making choices at 
work. Included in this section were the questions related to the internal factors: "The 
concept of perceived safety", "Concerns in the aftermath of incident and accident", 
"Personnel relationships and communication within the company", "The recognition 
of organisational structure", "The development of information system technology", 
"Internal pressures from the commercial activities", "The ability of management 
control", "Risk management programmes", "Operation and maintenance related 
activities", ý "Decision-making style and process", "Corporate safety policy", and 
"Concerns of written documentation". 
In this section, questions related to the "Perceived safety", "Personnel relationships 
and communication", and "Operations and maintenance" are referred to in the SCQ 
developed by Glendon and Litherland, (2001), and Glendon et al. (1994), whose 
research investigated the structure of factors within a safety climate and the 
relationship between safety climate and safety performance. Six factors, including 
"Communication and support", "Adequacy of procedures", "Work pressure", 
"Personal protective equipment", "Relationships" and "Safety rules", were identified 
by these two research groups led by Glendon. Due to the similarity of the intended 
questions, four items loaded on the factor "Communication and support", three items 
loaded on "Relationships", two loaded on "Work pressures" and two loaded on 
"Adequacy of procedures", one loaded on "Safety rules", and these were selected for 
use in the internal environment part of the safety mechanism questionnaire. 
In the second section regarding the external factors, eighteen items were included, to 
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examine whether the external environment can exert an influence on airline safety, 
and in particular, on safety culture. Included in this category were the external factors: 
"The influence of industry regulation", "Public relationship", "Investment community 
(such as investors, etc)", "Country influence" and "Regional influence", "Terrorism", 
and "Political issues". 
5.2.1 Finding from Pilot Study 
Section 3.3.2.2 has outlined the method and participants of pilot study. The result of 
pilot questionnaire was encouraging in a number of respects. Although these 
participants generally accepted the questionnaire, some issues were raised which 
needed to be addressed in the questionnaire itself. These problems are reviewed below 
and actions taken to rectify there are outlined. 
1. Re-editing some questions (issues) in the survey: 
For example, over 80 percent of people suggest that the question about the 
satisfaction of "organisational learning" was too conceptual to be included in the 
survey, terrorism and political issues should not be included, etc. 
2. Enable respondents to select a category of "don't know": 
In the pilot questionnaire, there is no category for "don't know" because the 
respondents (the management) were expected to know the answers. However, in 
an attempt to enhance the accuracy of the questionnaire, steps were taken to 
expand the scale of response. In addition, "don't know" responses may be 
indicative of safety system failure. 
3. Increase one self-rated question to assess the safety performance of 
the organisation: 
This will be analysed separately and compared with the results of questionnaire. 
The question: How would you rate the safety performance of your company with 
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respect to the rest of airline industry? This variable was measured on a six point 
Likert scale ranging from "Below Average for Industry" through to "Average for 
Industry" and "Above Average for Industry". 
In summary, the substantive changes made to the questionnaire between the pilot 
study and the final study were: 
 The exclusion of three issues (one safety concept, terrorism, world-wide 
political issues). 
 The addition of a response scale and self-rated question item. 
 The addition of an expanded definition of the purpose of the questionnaire. 
 For the questionnaire distributed to Taiwan and Mainland China, a Chinese 
translation copy was added for the convenience of the respondents. 
No changes were made to other parts (other items) of the questionnaire. 
5.2.2 Results of the Safety Survey 
This section presents the results of questionnaire study. 
A total of 325 questionnaires were sent out (see Appendix K for the distribution list). 
Nine were returned and marked "cannot deliver" or "addressee has gone away". 
Therefore 316 were assumed to have reached the intended recipient. Of these, two 
people returned questionnaires which were only partially completed and they were 
deleted from the analysis. 104 questionnaires were returned completed. This 
constitutes a total response rate of 33.54 percent (106 out of 316) and a completed 
response rate of 32.91 percent37 (104 out of 316). 
37 The response rate for a market research survey is 25 percent in average. 
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5.2.2.1 Respondent demographics 
Figure 5-2 shows the distribution of questionnaires and the sample obtained around 
the world. As can be seen, 72 questionnaires were sent to North America, of which 22 
were returned. In Europe, 107 were sent out and 36 were returned. In the Middle East, 
16 were distributed and 2 were returned. 20 questionnaires were sent to Africa and 3 
were returned. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 23 were sent out and 5 were returned. 
87 were distributed to the Asia and Pacific region and 36 were returned. Appendix M 
lists the comments and suggestions of the participants. 
Figure 5-2 Distribution of Final Sample by Region 
AF- Africa, ME- Middle East, AP- Asia and Pacific 
174 
IVUIC. l'! ti- lave ul till la. l ILu, LAIi- L{I LII! i La. a. lwu uuu uiL ý. ul lva/Lul , .a Lulvýý., 
Chapter 5 Results of Model Test 
The distribution of respondents from around the world was not equivalent to the target 
sample. The proportion of returned questionnaires from Africa and the Middle East 
were much lower than the intended sample rates; both of them were lower than 3 
percent 3. In addition, the proportion of completed questionnaires from North America 
and Europe were only one or two percent different from the percentage of actual 
sample rate. The proportion of returned questionnaires from Asia and the Pacific 
region was higher then expected. Apart from the personal preference, the reason 
affecting the willingness to response the questionnaire may have a lot to do with the 
company `culture' and policy, some of which clearly state that response to external 
questionnaire is prohibited. The proportions of returned questionnaire are as indicated 
in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 Distribution Percentage of Final Sample by Region 
Region Intended sample 
(% of total 316) 
Actual sample 
(% of total 104) 
Africa 6.32 2.97 
Asia and Pacific 27.5 35.6 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
7.27 4.95 
Europe 33.86 35.6 
Middle East 5.06 1.98 
North America 22.7 21.7 
38 The potential impact of an uneven sample on the survey result will be discussed in next chapter 
when interpreting the results of survey. 
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5.2.2.2 Survey Results 
Table 5-2 shows the factor structure extracting from the survey responses, slightly 
different from the hypothesised model (Figure 4-8 in pagel57), which, however, 
confirm the existence of organisational factors within the safety mechanism, and 
provide a greater understanding of the forces at work within the internal and external 
working environment of the airline industry. The following chapter will further 
interpret the results by applying the statistical analyses and discuss their implication. 
The hypothesised model in Figure 4-8 and the result of this safety survey are 
compared in Chapter 6, section 6.6 (page 211). 
Table 5-2 The Factor Structure of a Proactive Safety \lechanism 
from Survey Result 
Internal factors 
1. Employee safety attitude& behaviour 
2. Employee safety concept 
3. Level of operational safety in 
operation and maintenance 
4. Corporate safety policy 
5. Personnel- quality of working life 
6. Employment of risk programmes 
7. Impact of accident/incidents 
8. Financial concern 
9. Procedures and documentation 
10. Commercial cost pressures 
11 Organ isational structure and 
management commitment 
12. Communication system 
13. Necessity of safety reports 
External factors 
1. Influences of region and country 
2. Public and the media influence 
3. Impact of regulatory environment 
4. Involvement of investment 
community 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analyses and Discussions 
"There is unlikely to be a single universal set of indicators for all 
types of hazardous operations, one way of communicating how safety 
health can be assessed is by listing the organisational factors that are 
currently measured. " 
-Prof. J. Reason, 1995 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse the survey results, explore and discuss the 
inter-relationships between variables (question items) in the questionnaire. Since the 
questions are classified into internal environment and external environment, the 
analysis of the organisational factor structure of the safety mechanism will be divided 
into two categories, i. e. internal and external factors. The results for internal factors 
and external factors are presented first to analyse their relationship with the items in 
the questionnaire. Then these factors are discussed respectively in section 6.5 (page 
195) as well as compared to the hypothesised model in section 6.6 (page 211) in order 
to further investigate their implication and how these factors can make their 
contribution to the industry. 
:; 4,. 
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6.1 Organisational Factors in Internal Environment 
In keeping with the aim of this chapter, Principal Component Analysis, followed by a 
varimax rotation, was performed on the 56-item (internal environment) questionnaire 
data from 104 respondents in order to examine the organisational factor structure. 
The data were deemed to be suitable for the analysis (data reduction procedures), as 
indicated by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy value of 0.74 
(Hair et al., 1995). The Bartlett Test of Sphericity was significant [x2 = 4527.621, P< 
0.05], indicating that correlations exist among some of the response categories (see 
Table 6-1). 
Table 6-1 KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of . 740 Sampling Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 4527.621 
df 1326 
Sign ificance . 000 
This method of factor extraction was preferred since it uses the maximum amount of 
variance available in the data, and the varimax rotation was selected since orthogonal 
factors would simplify both factor interpretation and later analyses by providing 
uncorrelated factors. 
The first analysis yielded a sixteen-factor solution, which accounted for of 76 percent 
of the variance. However, this interpretation was rendered problematic because of 
four complex items, each of them loaded on two factors. As a result, these items were 
removed from further analysis (Question 14,36,37 and 44). A subsequent analysis of 
the remaining variables yielded a new fifteen-factor solution. Several components had 
high factor loading (>. 70) and some variables had low loading numbers, such as 
variable 20,32, etc. These items were treated as suspect and may later be considered 
for removal from the analysis (Hair et al., 1995). Appendix N shows the reproduced 
Rotated Factor Loading Matrix. 
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Factor loading (or loading number) means the correlation coefficients between the 
variables (questionnaire items) and factors. It shows the extent to which the 
questionnaire items are correlated to the factor. The subsequent section therefore aims 
to illustrate the underlying nature of each factor, which is characterised by the 
grouped questionnaire items. 
6.1.1 Loading Factors from Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
The Principal Components Analysis produced some interesting results. The primary 
groupings of concern are shown together with the loading factors in the following 
paragraphs. The items loading primarily onto each factor were examined to see if the 
factors made theoretical sense and each factor is labelled in terms of its common 
underlying dimension nature. This result not only shows the current situations, but 
also demonstrates what representatives thought to be important. 
1) Factor 1: Employee safety attitude and behaviour 
All of the items which loaded onto this factor were concerned about the safety 
behaviour and attitude demonstrated by airline employees. Therefore, factor 1 is 
labelled as "Employee safety attitude and behaviour". The questionnaire items 
which correlated/loaded against "Employee safety attitude and behaviour" are listed 
in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2 The Underlying Nature of Factor I "Employee safety attitude and behaviour" 
v Loading Item 
03 . 815 Employees use correct safety procedures to carrying out the job. 
04 . 774 Employees ensure the highest levels of safety when carrying out the job. 
07 . 640 Employees voluntarily carry out the tasks or activities that help to improve safety. 
02 . 608 Employees know how to perform their job in a safe manner. 
1 . 462 There is an organisational awareness towards safety in the airline. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
2) Factor 2: Employee safety concept 
This factor dealt with the safety concepts of airline employees, and the degree to 
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which that safety perception was shared. Thus, factor 2 is labelled as "Employee 
safety concept". The questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against 
"Employee safety concept" are listed in Table 6-3. 
Table 6-3 The Underlying Nature of Factor 2 "Employee safety concept" 
v Loading Item 
09 . 834 
Safety rules can be followed without conflicting with work practices. 
05 . 830 Employees believe flight safety is an important issue. 
06 . 
609 Employees feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times. 
08 . 537 Employees are encouraged to submit 
ideas to improve safety in the airline. 
35 . 434 Safety management aims are sufficiently supported within the airline. 
Note: V- Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
3) Factor 3: Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance 
This factor "Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance" was 
concerned with the level of operational safety in association with front line, i. e. 
operation and maintenance issues, especially regarding training. Therefore, it is 
named "Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance". The 
questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Level of operational safety in 
operation and maintenance" are listed in Table 6-4. 
Table 6-4 The Underlying Nature of Factor 3 "Level of operational safety in operation & 
maintenance" 
V Loading Item 
46 . 940 
There are adequate opportunities to express views about operational problems. 
43 . 930 Training is carried out by the individuals with relevant operational experience. 
48 . 885 
There is an effective mechanism by which the safety manager or the safety 
committee can report to the CEO and can make recommendations for a change or 
action 
42 . 
420 Potential errors, consequences and recovery point are identified in training 
Note: V- Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
4) Factor 4: Corporate safety policy 
This factor groups variables concerning about the safety goal and policy issues 
within airlines. Therefore, it is labelled as "Corporate safety policy". The 
questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Corporate safety policy" are 
listed in Table 6-5. 
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Table 6-5 The Underlying Nature of Factor 4 "Corporate safety Policy" 
v Loading Item 
53 . 821 The airline has a clearly stated set of goals and objectives. 
52 . 763 The policy statements define the airline's fundamental approach towards safety. 
55 . 568 
An effective documentation management system ensures the availability of 
procedures. 
51 . 517 
Safety statements and policies of an airline define the management's intention in 
safety matters and company's commitment to safety. 
Note: V- Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
5) Factor 5: Personnel - quality of working life 
This factor dealt with the personnel working quality and relationships within the 
airlines. The low variable loading onto this factor of item 20 (0.345< 0.4) would be 
deleted in the further analysis. Therefore, it is labelled as "Personnel - quality of 
working life". The questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Personnel - 
quality of working life" are listed in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6 The Underlying Nature of Factor 5 "Personnel - quality of working life" 
v Loading Item 
17 . 825 Personnel are confident about their future within the airline. 
18 . 821 Morale is good. 
45 . 619 
Frustrations that arise from factors outside staff control can be accommodated. 
without adversely affecting work. 
19 . 599 Good working relationships exist in the airline. 
20 . 345 Employees' jobs are well-defined. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
6) Factor 6: Employment of risk programme 
This factor consisted of three items and represented the use of risk programme and 
the degree to which the risk programmes have influence on airlines' safety. 
Therefore, factor 6 is labelled as "Employment of risk programme". The 
questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Employment of risk 
programme" are listed in Table 6-7. 
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Table 6-7 The Underlvinq Nature of Factor 6 "Employment of risk programme" 
v Loading Item 
26 . 718 
Data collection, analysis and presentation have an influence on safety 
performance. 
38 . 685 
An effective ongoing hazard identification programme has an influence on 
organisational safety culture. 
24 . 515 
An adequate system exists for transmitting critical information regarding safety 
within the airline. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number. Loading: Correlation to the factor 
7) Factor 7: Impact of accidentlincidents 
This factor was concerned with how to deal with the aftermath of 
accidents/incidents and how airline safety performance is influenced by accidents 
and incidents. Thus, it is named "Impact of accident/ incidents". The questionnaire 
items which correlated/loaded against "Impact of accident/ incidents" are listed in 
Table 6-8. 
Table 6-8 The Underlying Nature of Factor 7 "Impact of accident/ incidents" 
v Loading Item 
11 . 849 
After an accident has occurred, appropriate actions are usually taken to reduce the 
chance of reoccurrence. 
12 . 777 
After an incident has occurred, appropriate actions are usually taken to reduce the 
chance of reoccurrence. 
13 . 738 There 
is a documented business continuity plan in the event of accidents. 
10 . 700 There 
is an appropriate Emergency Response Plan. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
8) Factor 8: Financial Concern 
This factor only consisted of two items and was somewhat difficult to define. Both 
of them seemed to identify airlines' financial concerns, but it was of interest that 
they were not grouped with Factor 10, which presented the commercial pressures of 
airlines. 
In the case of financial goals, this represents the degree to which a conflict exists 
between safety and financial goals. In the case of shareholders' welfare, it represents 
whether the welfare of shareholders and organisational safety culture are correlated, 
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i. e. the company's profitability and safety are correlated. According to both of their 
similar essence, this factor was resolved by the level of "Financial concern". The 
questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Financial concern" are listed 
in Table 6-9. Meanwhile, as the relatively high proportion of variance was explained 
by this factor (93 percent, refer to Appendix 0), it was decided to keep this factor in 
for further analysis. 
Table 6-9 The Underlying Nature of Factor 8 "Financial concern" 
v Loading Item 
30 . 876 There is no conflict between safety and financial goals. 
31 . 854 Shareholder's welfare and airline's organisational safety culture are correlated. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
9) Factor 9: Procedures and documentation 
This factor derived from the analysis which focused on the importance of written 
documentation and procedures regarding safety within the company. Therefore, 
factor 9 is labelled as "Procedures and documentation". The questionnaire items 
which correlated/loaded against "Procedures and documentation" are listed in Table 
6-10. 
Table 6-10 The Underlying Nature of Factor 9 "Procedures and documentation" 
v Loading Item 
54 . 669 
The roles and responsibilities for the personnel in the safety management 
s stem are early defined and documented. 
56 . 576 Written work procedures match the way tasks are done in practice 
49 . 536 
In the event of CEO making an unfavourable response to a safety 
recommendation, there is a procedure whereby the matter is monitored by the 
safety manager or the safety committee until it is resolved. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
10) Factor 10: Commercial cost pressures 
This factor dealt with the degree to which commercial pressures influenced airline 
safety. Interestingly, item 27 and item 28 rendered minus loading numbers, because 
the statements of these two items used negative expression to emphasise the 
problems. As predicted, they were grouped together within the factor concerning 
commercial pressures. Hence, even though the numbers concerning internal 
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consistency" were affected by their low proportion, this factor "Commercial cost 
pressures" remained valid. The questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against 
"Commercial cost pressures" are listed in Table 6-11. 
Table 6.11 The Underlying Nature of Factor 10 "Commercial cost pressures" 
v Loading Item 
27 -. 818 Management is concerned for cost more than safety. 
28 -. 675 
Safety budget is the first item to be reduced when commercial pressures 
emerge. 
34 . 534 The values of management are identified as being safety orientated. 
29 . 517 Safety rules are adhered to even under cost pressures. 
Note: V- Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
11) Factor 11: Organisational structure and management commitment 
This factor consisted of four items, which mainly dealt with the degree to which 
airline safety is affected by organisational structure and management commitment. 
Therefore, it is labelled "Organisational structure and management commitment". 
The questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against Organisational structure 
and management commitment are listed in Table 6-12. 
Table 6-12 The Underlying Nature of Factor 11 "Organisational structure& management 
r_nmmitmAnt" 
v Loading Item 
21 . 695 
The size of the airline has an influence on organisational safety culture. 
22 . 665 
The airline's history has an influence on organisational safety culture. 
33 . 437 
Senior management commitment plays an important role in determining the 
safety performance. 
23 . 403 Airline ownership has an influence on organisational safety culture. 
Note: V- Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
12) Factor 12: Communication system 
This factor derived from the analysis focused on the importance of a safety 
communication system. It was of interest that the internal consistency of this factor 
(refer to footnote 39), consisting of items 25,16,15 and 50, increased from 54 percent 
to 66 percent if item 50 was excluded. As such, in the further analysis, item 50 is 
39 Please refer to section 6.1.2 for the calculation of internal consistency. 
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is excluded from the factor. As such, this factor is labelled as "Communication 
system". The questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Communication 
system" are listed in Table 6-13. 
Table 6-13 The Underlying Nature of Factor 12 "Communication system" 
v Loading Item 
25 . 605 
An adequate system exists for exchanging critical information regarding 
safety problems with other airlines. 
50 -. 502 Personnel's decision-making is affected by the organisational safety culture. 
15 . 441 There is good communication between different groups in the airline. 
16 . 328 
Changes in working procedures and their effect on safety are effectively 
communicated to employees. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
13) Factor 13: Necessity of safety reports 
This factor consisted of only two items and represented the degree to which the 
safety reports were concerned. The limited number of items loading onto this factor 
indicated that further study in this area might be warranted. Thus, this factor is 
named "Necessity of safety reports". The questionnaire items which 
correlated/loaded against "Necessity of safety reports" are listed in Table 6-14. 
Table 6-14 The Underlying Nature of Factor 13 "Necessity of safety reports" 
v Loading Item 
39 . 817 
Confidential reports should be properly de-identified in order to foster 
organisational safety culture. 
40 . 528 
There should be a procedure established for acknowledging safety-related 
reports. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
14) Factor 14: Requires further definition 
This factor derived from the analysis focused upon to which degree the risk 
programmes have the influence on organisational safety culture, i. e. how safety 
programmes affect safety. It is of interest to note that this item was not grouped with 
factor 6 "Employment of risk programme" or factor 13 "Necessity of safety report". 
More work is required in this area. Given the low number of variables loading onto 
this factor, and the difficulty ässociated with its interpretation; - this factor was' not 
included for further analyses. 
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Table 6-15 The Underlvina Nature of Factor 14 
v Loading Item 
41 . 701 Risk audit, risk assessment, and risk evaluation have an influence on 
organisational safety culture. 
Note- V. Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
15) Factor 15: Requires further definition 
This factor was somewhat difficult to define as it contained only two different items. 
In the case of variable 47, it represented the decision-making process regarding 
safety. For the case of variable 32, it represented the degree to which the role of the 
safety committee was played in determining the safety performance, providing the 
low number of variables loading onto this factor. This factor requires further 
definition and investigation to provide a precise interpretation. As such, this factor 
was deleted from further analysis. 
Table 6-16 The Underlying Nature of Factor 15 
v Loading Item 
47 . 820 Final decisions about safety investment are made by the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). 
32 . 392 Safety committee has an influence on organisational safety culture. 
Note- V. Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
6.1.2 Statistical Analyses for Internal Factors 
+ Reliability and consistency 
To judge the internal reliability of factors, Cronbach's Alpha statistics were calculated 
for the factors (See Appendix 0). For example, factor 1, with all items loaded onto it 
demonstrated an internal consistency of . 85. Similarly the other factors all 
demonstrated acceptable levels of internal consistency, except for factors 10,12,13 
and 15 (factor 2= . 846, factor 3= . 89, factor 4= . 83, factor 5= . 82, factor 6= . 74, factor 
7= . 759, 
factor 8= . 93, factor 9= . 72, 
factor 10= . 04, factor 11= . 61, factor 12= . 66, 
factor 13=. 54, factor 15=. 33). 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the low reliability generated by factor 10 was 
because of the expression of the variables of 27 and 28, while the reliability of factor 
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12 rose to 0.66 when variable 50 was excluded. 
In addition, factor 15, which remained undefined, demonstrated predictably low 
internal consistency. Meanwhile, a reliability score could not be calculated for factor 
14 as it only contained one variable. These three factors were excluded from further 
analyses, leaving thirteen factors: Employee safety attitude & behaviour, Employee 
safety concept, Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance, Corporate 
safety policy, Personnel- quality of working life, Employment of risk programme, 
Impact of accident/incidents, Financial concern, Procedures and documentation, 
Commercial cost pressures, Organisational structure & management commitment, 
Communication system, Necessity of safety reports. 
+ Mean, Standard deviation & Scale scores 
For the purpose of subsequent analyses, mean and factor scores (Appendix P) /scales 
scores (Appendix Q) were calculated for each of the scales identified in the Principal 
Component Analysis in order to further investigate what respondents" thought to be 
important and what they felt satisfied with, and in which regions. 
Factor scores are coefficients of cases on the factors, while scale scores are the sum of 
the responses for all items loading onto the factor, which was calculated and divided 
by the number of items loading onto that factor, which is named the scale score. In 
order to indicate the highest and the lowest scores rated by the representatives, mean 
of scale scores were applied within this section. Mean and standard deviation of scale 
scores can be found in Appendix P. 
+ Oneway Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) across regions 
In order to see whether these underlying factors differed across the regions, oneway 
Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each factor across regions. 
Respondents were asked to reveal which regions they came from when completing the 
survey. There were six regions in the world; namely Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Europe, Middle East and North America, as shown in 
Figure 5-2 (page 174) and Table 5-1 (page 175). The complete tables of ANOVA 
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plus Mean and Standard Deviation for all 13 internal factors can be found in 
Appendix Q. 
The observation from these various analyses will be discussed and compared to 
the empirical experiences in section 6.5.1 (page 196), when interpreting the 
internal factors respectively. 
6.2 Organisational Factors in External Environment 
As mentioned previously, this questionnaire consisted of two parts: internal 
environment and external environment. The following sections are the analyses of 
external factors exerting influences on the structure of safety mechanism. 
The purpose of this section is to explore the inter-relationships between external 
variables on the questionnaire, and to develop factors which could be used in 
subsequent analysis. Similar to section 6.1, PCA followed by a varimax rotation was 
performed on the 16-item questionnaire data from 104 respondents in order to 
examine the underlying structure. 
The data were deemed to be suitable for the analysis (data reduction procedures), as 
indicated by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy value of 0.724 
(Hair et al., 1995). The Bartlett Test of Sphericity was significant [x2 = 633.276, P< 
0.05], indicating that correlations exist among some of the response categories (see 
Table 6-17). 
Table 6-17 KMO and Bartlett's Test: External factors 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of . 724 
Sampling Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 633.276 
df 120 
Sig. 
. 000 
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The first analysis yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater than one, which 
together accounted for 68.51 percent of the explained variance. A varimax rotation 
was performed to enhance factor interpretability. Appendix N displays factor loadings 
from the varimax rotation. 
The Principal Components Analysis produced some interesting results. Each factor 
will be discussed in turn. Before that, the individual items loading onto each factor are 
outlined in the tables (from Table 6-18 to Table 6-21), which accompany the result of 
analyses. 
6.2.1 Loading Factors from Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
1) Factor El: Influences of Region and Country 
Factor El "Influences of region and country" dealt with the degree to which the 
impact of region and country was perceived to have on organisational safety culture. 
Included within this factor were regional economic, regional geography, regional 
culture, regional religion and country economics. Interestingly, regional and country 
influences were originally designed as two separated factors. This finding revealed 
that they were seen as one concern (factor) from managers' point of view, and 
regional economic influence attracted more concerns than country economic 
influence. The questionnaire items which correlated/loaded against "Influences of 
region and country" are listed in Table 6-18. 
Table 6-18 The Underivina Nature of Factor El "Influence of region and country" 
v Loading Item 
70 . 879 Regional economic influence and organisational safety are correlated. 
69 . 857 
Regional geographical influence and organisational safety culture are correlated 
72 . 804 
Regional cultural influence and organisational safety are correlated. 
68 . 715 The country economic 
influence and organisational safety culture are correlated 
71 . 685 
Regional religion influence and organisational safety culture are correlated. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
2) Factor E2: Public and the Media Influence 
Factor E2 "Public and the media influence" focused on the company's relationship 
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with the public and the media, and to what extent organisational safety culture was 
influenced. The items loaded onto this factor and were all indicative of the media 
and public influences; customers' and consumers' perspectives were included. The 
questionnaire items, which correlated/loaded against "Public and the media 
influence" are listed in Table 6-19. 
Table 6-19 The Underlying Nature of Factor E2 "Public and the media influence" 
v Loading Item 
61 . 881 
The customer's reaction has influences on organisational safety culture. 
63 . 777 The perceived corporate 
image has influences on organisational safety culture. 
62 . 757 
Consumer habits have influences on organisational safety culture. 
60 . 546 
The relationship with the media has influences on organisational safety culture. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
3) Factor E 3: Impact of the Regulatory Environment 
This factor dealt with the degree to which organisational safety culture was 
influenced by industry regulation/regulators. Included within this factor were the 
adherence to, and influence of, safety authorities. As such, this factor is labelled as 
"Impact of the regulatory environment" which shows that safety authority has been 
regarded as one of the most influential and important factors of the safety 
mechanism. The questionnaire items, which correlated/loaded against "Impact of the 
regulatory environment", are listed in Table 6-20. 
Table 6-20 The Underlying Nature of Factor E3 "Impact of the regulatory environment" 
v Loading Item 
58 . 809 Safety 
information from aviation safety authorities is highly valued. 
59 . 756 
The regulations from the aviation safety authority have an influence on 
organisational safety culture. 
57 . 750 
The recommendations and suggestions from the industry safety committee are 
adhered to all the time. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
4) Factor E 4: Involvement of Investment Community 
Factor E4 "Involvement of investment community" was concerned with the degree to 
which organisational safety culture was influenced by the investment community. It 
is unclear why the last item was included in this factor. Yet since the number of 
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loading is so low, this item is deleted in the further analysis. The questionnaire items, 
which correlated/loaded against "Involvement of investment community", are listed 
in Table 6-21. 
Table 6-21 The Underlying Nature of Factor E4 "Involvement of Investment community" 
v Loading Item 
65 . 797 
The investors' perspective has influences on organisational safety culture. 
66 . 788 The stock market's reaction has influences on organisational safety culture. 
64 . 555 
The organisation's investments in other businesses are correlated with the 
organisational safety. 
67 . 219 The country culture and organisational culture are correlated. 
Note- V: Questionnaire item number, Loading: Correlation to the factor 
6.2.2 Statistical Analyses for External Factors 
+ Reliability and consistency 
Cronbach's Alpha statistics were calculated to assess the internal consistency of these 
factors. All of the factors were shown to be reliable (Factor E1= . 8575; Factor 
E2= . 7854; Factor E3= . 686; Factor E4= . 
636), as shown in Appendix 0. As such, 
these four external factors are: Influences of region and country, Public and the media 
influence, Impact of regulatory environment, and Involvement of investment 
community. 
+ Mean, Standard deviation & Scale scores 
For the purposes of subsequent analyses, factor scores (Appendix P) /scale scores 
(Appendix Q) were calculated for each factor identified in the Principal Component 
Analyses (PCA) in order to further investigate what respondents thought to be 
important and what they felt satisfied with, and in which regions. The same method 
was used as in the internal factor structure. In order to arrive at the best interpretation, 
both scale scores and factors scores were calculated. However, mean of scale scores 
were applied within this section because they indicated the highest and the lowest 
scores rated by the representatives. Mean and standard deviation of scale scores can 
be found in Appendix Q. 
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+ Oneway Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) across regions 
In order to see whether these underlying dimensions differed across the regions, 
oneway Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each questionnaire scale 
across six regions: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Central/South America, Europe, Middle 
East, North America. Appendix Q lists the table ofANOVA for all 4 external factors. 
The observations from these various analyses will be discussed and compared to 
the empirical experiences in section 6.5.2 (page 206), when interpreting the 
external factors respectively. 
6.3 Relationship between Organisational Factors and Safety 
Performance 
Looking back to the hypothesised model illustrated in Figure 4-8 (page 157), both 
internal and external factors (input) exert influence on safety mechanism, which will 
manifest on the safety performance (output). Therefore, this analysis aimed to explore 
the relationship between the organisational factors (both internal and external) 
identified in this chapter and safety performance through the survey. As it is not 
possible to identify the safety performance from the anonymous survey, self-rated 
safety performance is therefore adopted. It was thought that an examination of the 
factors identified in the study were the biggest predictors of self-rated (perceived) 
safety performance, i. e. what organisational factors contributed to the explanation of 
the perceived safety performance, and to what degree, would provide some interesting 
insights into the development of a proactive safety mechanism. Hence, a stepwise 
multiple regression procedure was used. This part of the research was intended only 
as a guide to indicate which factors were the best predictors of perceived safety 
performance. 
By applying the standard multiple regression analysis, the dependent variable was the 
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self-rated safety performance, and the independent variables were the organisational 
factors - the influential dimensions of the safety mechanism; the latter were assessed 
in order to forecast the former. Appendix R shows that the result of the multiple 
regression and variance accounted for by the factor scores in the regression equation 
was significant (F4,99 = 28.822, P<0.05). It indicates that there is a relationship 
between self-rated safety performance and organisational factors. And without 
the existence of external factors, internal factor 2 "Employee safety concept", factor 
12 "Communication system", factor 7 "Impact of accidents/incidents" and factor 3 
"Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance" are the best predictors of 
self-rated safety performance among these organisational factors. If expressed by a 
linear equation, they have the form, according to Appendix R: 
Y1 = . 486+ . 403 
* (factor 2) +. 244* (factor 3) +. 113* (factor 7) +. 133* (factor 12) 
Where 
Yl is self-rated safety performance 
Factor 2 is Employee safety concept 
Factor 3 is Level of organisational safety in operation and maintenance 
Factor 7 is Impact of accidents/incidents 
Factor 12 is Communication system 
It is worth noting that in the equation, the regression coefficients (or B coefficients) 
represent the independent contributions of each independent variable (factors) to the 
prediction of the dependent variable (self-rated performance), i. e. for example, factor 
2 "Employee safety concept" is'correlated with the Yl (self-rated safety performance) 
after controlling for all other factors (factor3, factor 7 and factor 12). The direction of 
the correlation coefficients in the equation also indicates that higher factor scores are 
associated with better rated perceived safety performance. 
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6.4 Relationship between Internal and External Factors 
One of the four hypotheses of this thesis is that the safety mechanism is a multiple and 
complex construct. This has been demonstrated through the case study included in 
Chapter 5 and will be further explored here in order to shed some additional light on 
this hypothesis. 
As such, the following analysis was carried out to explore the relationship between 
the internal and external factors that were identified to have influence on a proactive 
safety mechanism in the previous sections, given that in Table 6-1, the Bartlett Test of 
Sphericity, indicates that correlations exist between some factors. For this purpose, 
correlations were calculated for each internal factor against each external factor. 
Appendix S shows the correlation and significant relationship between internal and 
external factors, including: 
Correlation between El "Influences of region and country" and internal 
factors: 
As shown in Appendix S, external factor El "Influences of region and country" 
demonstrated quite low correlations with all thirteen of the internal factors. The 
highest correlation (r=. 216) was observed between this factor and internal factor 
11 "Organisational structure and management commitment". A moderate and 
significant correlation (r=. 198) was also observed between this factor and internal 
factor 10 "Commercial cost pressures". 
Correlation between E2 "Public and the media influence" and internal 
factors: 
Factor E2 "Public and the media influence" is found to be most correlated with 
internal factor 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour", factor 2 "Employee 
safety concept", factor 9 "Procedures and documentation", and factor 11 
"Organisational structure and management commitment", shown in Appendix S. 
The highest correlations were observed between this factor and internal factors 
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relating to "Organisational structure and management commitment" (r=. 367) and 
"Employee safety concepts" (r=. 272). Further significant correlations were 
observed between this factor and internal. factors relating to "Procedures and 
documentation" (r=. 244), and "Employee safety attitude and behaviours" (r=. 216). 
ºý Correlation between E3 "Impact of regulatory environment" and internal 
factors: 
This factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment" was significantly correlated 
with all internal factors. Among the internal factors, the highest correlation was 
observed between this factor and internal factor 3 "Level of operational safety in 
operation and maintenance" (r=. 455). 
Correlation between E4 "Involvement of investment community" and 
internal factors: 
Factor E4 "Involvement of investment community" demonstrates low correlations 
with all thirteen of the internal factors. However, this factor was found to be 
highly correlated with "Commercial cost pressures" (r=. 226), and "Financial 
concern" (r=. 198). Meanwhile, significant correlations were observed between 
this factor and those factors relating to "Corporate säfety policy" (r=. 235), and 
"Impact ofAccident/incidents" (r=. 219). 
The implication of the results will be interpreted together with the discussion of 
each factor respectively in the following section. 
6.5 Interpretation of Individual Factors 
With the confirmation of the existence of organisational factors in the safety 
mechanism, a greater understanding of the forces (input) is provided at work within 
the internal and external working environment of the airline industry as well as the 
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relationship to safety performance (output). Table 6-22 lists the summaries of 
statistical analyses from the preceding analyses. The following sections will carry out 
the in-depth discussion of the result findings. 
6.5.1 Discussion of Internal Factors 
+ Factor 1: Employee safety attitudes and behaviour 
The first factor derived within the internal environment is "Employee safety attitude 
and behaviour". Thus, the importance of employee competence regarding safety is 
emphasised. Among the skills and abilities (loading items) included within these 
factors are: employees' ability to comply with safety procedures, safety knowledge, 
safety participation, and safety motivation, which echoes the existing literature on 
safety culture explored in Chapters 2 and 4. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that this factor did not predict perceived safety 
performance, i. e. individuals who rated the "Employee safety attitude and behaviour" 
highly on the questionnaire did not rate the Perceived safety performance more 
highly. 
Additionally, the table of means indicated that means of factor 1 "Employee safety 
attitude and behaviour" scores were in the range of 4.2- 4.9. Safety managers in 
Africa reported the perceived factor 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour" more 
frequently than other regions within the airline industry, which also demonstrated an 
awareness of such concerns has more effect in this region compared to others. 
A significant difference was observed on this factor across different regions (F5,98 
2.997, P<0.05). When the effects are significant, the means must then be examined in 
order to determine the nature of the effects. There are procedures called "post hoc 
tests" to assist to perform this task. One of the post hoc multiple comparisons used 
was Least-Significant Difference (LSD). It indicated that this was attributable to a 
significance between respondents in North America compared to Europe as well as 
Asia and Pacific (p<. 05), i. e. the mean difference was significant at the . 05 level, 
which meant that there was variability of the opinions (rating scores of questions in 
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the survey) towards employee safety attitudes and behaviour within these three 
regions. Generally speaking, the higher the rating scores, the more satisfaction there 
was towards employee safety attitudes and behaviour, and the more importance and 
attentions of safety culture were placed in the company. Further referring to the table 
of mean (Appendix P), the mean scores of this factor in six regions showed that the 
lowest ratings on this factor originated from the Middle East while the highest ratings 
came from Africa. This seems to contradict industry indicates: Middle East airlines 
have better airline publicity and aircraft performance than Africa airlines which tend 
to have poor publicity, poor accident record and lack of regulatory framework. The 
contradiction will be further explained when discussing the bias of the questionnaire 
responses. 
A significant correlation was also observed between factor 1 "Employee safety 
attitude and behaviour" and external factor E2 "Public and media influence" and 
external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment", in particular E3. As to E2, 
since public and media influence involve company reputation management, it is 
therefore more related to employee safety knowledge and safety motivation, which 
constitute this factor. Thus, a higher level of understanding and activity on the part of 
the regulatory environment and the public and media are associated with employee 
safety attitudes and behaviour which favours the development of a proactive safety 
mechanism. 
+ Factor 2: Employee safety concept 
The safety concept factor included employees' beliefs, shared perceptions and 
organisational atmosphere. The presence of this factor is consistent with the literature 
which described the contribution of a safety climate to the organisation, in Chapter 4. 
No significant differences were observed for this factor (F5,98 = 2.123, P>0.05). It 
showed the degree of perceived employees' safety concepts rated by respondents at all 
regions were similar to each other. Furthermore, an examination of the mean scores 
for each group on this factor revealed that higher scores tended to be rated (except for 
Latin America' and the Caribbean, and the Middle East), which showed the highest 
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satisfaction of the perceived safety concept, and the importance of a safety climate 
was felt by the respondents. Across the regions, scale , scores reveal the 
highest ratings 
(higher satisfaction) were observed in Africa, while the lowest were in the Middle 
East (lower satisfaction). 
Factor scores from the multiple regression analysis (Appendix R) show this factor to 
be a significant predictor of perceived safety performance. It meant that those who 
rated the employee safety concept highly on the questionnaire rated the perceived 
safety performance more highly. Meanwhile, the direction of the correlation 
coefficients indicates that higher factor scores are associated with better rated 
perceived safety performance. 
A significant correlation was observed between factor 2 "Employee safety concept" 
and external factor E2 "Public and media influence", and external factor E3 "Impact 
of regulatory environment", shown in Appendix S. In other words, employee safety 
concept is likely to be more influential on a proactive safety mechanism when the 
media and public and the regulatory environment become more active and involved. 
ºý Factor 3: Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance 
Operation and maintenance issues were highlighted since this factor is concerned with 
the degree to which individuals are empowered to deal with operations and 
maintenance issues, especially regarding training. In Chapters 2 and 4, the importance 
of these items was identified as being critical to the continual improvement of safety. 
The oneway ANOVA for this factor approached, but failed to reach statistical 
significance (F5,98 = . 647, P>0.05). Therefore, -it could be concluded that managers 
working in all regions displayed a similar degree of concern for operation and 
maintenance aspects. 
Factor scores from the multiple regression analysis show that this factor is a 
significant predictor of perceived safety performance (Appendix R) within the airline 
industry, i. e. individuals who rated this factor highly on the questionnaire rated the 
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Perceived safety performance more highly. It also indicates that higher factor scores 
are associated with better rated perceived safety performance. 
A significant correlation was observed between factor 3 "Level of operational safety 
in operation and maintenance" and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory 
environment", shown in Appendix S. This finding reveals that the influence of 
regulators and regulations for safety is associated with the level of operational safety 
in operation and maintenance to a significant degree. With African region reveals the 
highest mean score of this factor, it seems to conflict with the conclusion in previous 
paragraph and industry findings since African regulatory regimes are largely regarded 
as ineffective. Again, similar to factor 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour", the 
bias will be explained in section 6.7 and 6.8. 
+ Factor 4: Corporate safety policy 
The safety policy within airlines was represented by a factor of its own which 
includes items relating to clear stated policy towards goals, objectives and approaches 
to safety. A significant difference (F5,98 = 2.363, P<0.05) was observed on this factor 
between groups of respondents representing different regions, which described the 
degree to which the airline focused on and practiced its safety policy. In a similar 
manner to factor 1"Employee safety attitude and behaviour", the post hoc multiple 
comparison - Least-Significant Difference (LSD) indicated that region of North 
America differed from the regions of Europe and Asia and Pacific (P<. 05), indicating 
the variability which exists within these regions. Meanwhile an examination of means 
revealed that Africa perceived this aspect to be more satisfactory in their working 
environment, and regarded this factor to be more important than those who were in' 
other regions. The lowest ratings on this factor originated from the Middle East (refer 
to previous factors for the African issue). 
A significant correlation was observed between factor 4 and external factor E4 
"Involvement of investment community", and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory 
environment", presented in Appendix S. It indicates that the investment community is 
likely to be more associated with the organisations which value safety policy and/or 
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post event impact in order to develop a proactive safety mechanism. 
+ Factor 5: Personnel - quality of working life 
Factor 5 "Personnel - quality of working life" included items relating to personnel 
attitudes, morale, working relationships, and frustration accommodation. No 
significant differences were observed between the responses from various regions on 
this factor (F5,98 =. 111, P>0.05). Thus, there is no need to conduct the post hoc 
multiple comparisons because groups of respondents representing all regions reported 
similar attention to their companies' personnel working life quality. 
Given the similar degree across regions, two points were observed from the 
Mean/Standard Deviation Table for factor 5 "Personnel - quality of working life". 
One was that the scores rated by all representatives were relatively low compared with 
other factors, which showed less satisfaction with the quality of employee working 
life, because no significant difference was observed on this factor across different 
regions40 and the observation of lower ratings is shown in the table of mean. The 
other was that the highest rating on this factor originates from Asia and Pacific, while 
the lowest one is from the Middle East. As such, Asia Pacific representatives had a 
better acknowledgement of this factor, given the low tendency of mean scores of other 
regimes. 
A significant correlation was observed between factor 5 "Personnel - quality of 
working life" and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment", shown in 
Appendix S. As such, regulators are likely to take greater steps towards encouraging 
proactive safety in the organisations in which employees' working quality support 
such action. 
ao Notwithstanding the lack of regional variations, there is likely to be variations between the 
different workforce group, e. g. pilots, engineers, cabin crew, etc. 
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+ Factor 6: Employment of risk programmes 
This factor was represented by three variables relating to the importance of data 
analysis systems, safety information and hazard identification systems to safety 
culture, identified in Chapter 2. Respondents were thought to have a similar degree of 
feeling towards the employment and benefit of risk programmes because no 
significant differences were observed (F5,98 = . 693, P>0.05) between regions on this 
factor across different regions. As such, representatives from various regions have a 
similar degree of view regarding airline risk programmes. 
A significant correlation was observed between factor 6 "Employment of risk 
programmes" and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment. It indicated 
that regulators are likely to encourage proactive safety in the organisations in which 
the employment of risk programme helps to support such action. 
+ Factor 7: Impact of accidents/incidents 
This factor includes the existence of emergency plans, actions taken in the aftermath 
of accidents and incidents, and business continuity plans. In Chapter 2, the importance 
of these items was identified as being critical to safety improvement. 
The oneway ANOVA across regions on factor 7 "Impact of accident/incidents", 
dealing with the management's view of the influence of incidents/accidents, did not 
demonstrate any statistical significance (FS, 98 = . 598, P>0.05). Therefore respondents 
across different regions did not vary appreciably in their views of the actions that the 
company took to deal with the aftermath of incidents/accidents. 
However, Mean/Standard Deviation Table of factor 7 showed standard deviations of 
five regions were over one, showing that there was variability within all regions 
except Latin America and the Caribbean. This interesting observation might be caused 
by that not all the airlines were used to have accidents, which had the responses 
deviated within regions. 
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Multiple Regression analysis shows that this factor is a significant predictor of 
perceived safety performance (Appendix R) within the airline industry. It indicates 
that there exists a positive relationship between "Impact of accident/incident" and 
Perceived safety performance, i. e. individuals who had high rating scores of the 
former was likely to rate the latter with high scores. 
A significant correlation - was also observed between factor 7 "Impact of 
accident/incident" and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment" and 
external factor E4 "Involvement of investment community", demonstrated in Appendix 
S. 
ºý Factor 8: Financial concern 
Factor 8 "Financial concern" is the one split from commercial pressures. It 
-is 
represented by two variables relating to conflict between safety and financial goals 
and shareholders' welfare. ANOVA of factor 8 "Financial concern" did not reveal any 
significant difference across regions (F5,98 = . 675, P>0.05). Given this fact plus the 
mean scores were lower, it implies that representatives rated this factor -Financial 
concern, to a similar degree, which indicates that financial concerns did influence 
safety goals, but not by much, compared to other factors. . 
Five standard deviations within regions were observed to be higher than one 
(Appendix Q), showing the potential differences of concerns towards factor 8 within 
individual regions. Secondly, the managers in North America demonstrated the 
highest concern in this regard compared with managers in other regions. 
+ Factor 9: Procedures and documentation 
Factor 9 "Procedures and documentation" included items relating to documented 
responsibilities, written work procedures and written monitor procedures. 
Respondents across the regions had a similar degree of opinions towards procedures 
and documentation in their airlines since no significant difference was observed on 
this factor across the different regions (F5,98 = . 384, P>0.05). As such, respondents 
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across different regions displayed a similar degree of concern regarding factor 9 
"Procedures and documentation" with their airlines. An examination of the mean: 
scores for each group on this factor (Appendix OJ revealed that managers in all 
regions had their companies' documentation process rated with a similar frequency of 
4.3. The highest rating on this factor originates from Africa, while the lowest one is 
from Latin America and the Caribbean. The contrary to the empirical experiences will 
be explained in later sections. 
+ Factor 10: Commercial cost pressures 
This factor derived from items relating to management concerns, safety budget, value 
of management, and trade-off between cost and safety, demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
Similar to factor 8 "Financial concerns", oneway ANOVA for regions approached, 
but failed to reach statistical significance (FS, 98 = . 415, P>0.05). Therefore, 
respondents across different regions did not vary appreciably in their views of 
commercial cost pressures on safety performance. 
An examination of the table of means (Appendix Q) revealed the highest rating on 
this factor originated from Asia and Pacific, while the lowest one was from the Middle 
East. The lower mean scores suggest that respondents across the regions had low 
appreciation of the influence of this factor upon safety. It reflected the fact that 
commercial cost pressures were not significantly perceived by safety mangers across 
regions, especially Middle East. 
"Commercial cost pressures" was significantly correlated to El "Influence of region 
and country", E3 "Impact of regulatory environment" and E4 "Involvement of 
investment community" (Appendix S). This shows that commercial cost pressures 
exert a significant impact on promoting proactive safety with the influence of region 
and country, regulatory environment and investment community. The smaller 
correlations indicated the decreasing impact actions. 
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+ Factor 11: Organisational structure and management commitment 
This factor represented by five. items relating to the size and history of airline, 
leadership, senior management commitment and airline ownership. Although no 
significant difference (F5,98 = . 981,. P>0.05) was observed on this factor across the 
different regions, the table of mean (Appendix Q) shows the high rating tendency of 
respondents, which means that the importance of organisational structure and 
management commitment was highly appreciated by representatives across regions to 
a similar degree, as factor 11 "Organisational structure and management 
commitment" indicated the importance of understanding and involvement of 
organisational structure and management commitment in the company. The highest 
rating on this factor originated from Africa, while the lowest one was from the Middle 
East and Central/ South America. 
Factor 12: Communication system 
This factor included the exchanging safety information system, personnel's decision- 
making, group communication, and employee communication. No significant 
difference was observed on this factor across different regions (F5,98 =, 1.313, P>0.05). 
By this result, respondents across different regions did not vary appreciably in their 
views of the communication system. Moreover representatives tended to have a low 
rating across regions on this factor, showing that similar degree of view of airline 
representatives was less satisfaction towards the individual airlines and 
Communication system is seen as less effective. 
In addition, factor 12 "Communication system" is a significant predictor of perceived 
safety performance within the airline industry (Appendix R). This relationship not 
only indicates the positive correlation between these two factors, but also the 
contribution of the communication system to perceived safety performance. Across 
the regions, the highest ratings were observed in Africa, while the lowest were in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. A significant correlation was also observed between 
factor 12 "Communication system" and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory 
environment", indicating the positive relationship between these two factors. 
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+ Factor 13: Necessity of safety reports 
Factor 13 "Necessity of safety reports" included two items relating to confidential 
report identification, and procedures for safety reports, described in Chapter 2. The 
oneway ANOVA across regions on this factor approached, but failed to reach 
statistical significance (F5,98 = . 565, P>0.05), 
i. e. respondents across the regions were 
deemed to have a similar degree of concern, which tended to be high on this factor. 
Thus, respondents across different regions did not vary dramatically in view of the 
safety reports, and the representative across regions all placed importance on the 
necessity of safety reports. This can be explained, for example, although various 
European JAR requirements for mandatory operating on maintenance and operational 
issues, the necessity and importance of safety reports are never been neglected and 
still been highly concerned. 
The highest rating on this factor originated from North America, while the lowest one 
was from Asia and Pacific. A significant correlation was observed between factor 13 
"Necessity of safety reports" and external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory 
environment", shown in Appendix S. Again, it showed that the necessity of safety 
reports and the impact of regulatory environment were positively correlated. 
Within the interpretation of internal factors, it showed some findings are 
contrary to the industry experiences. The contradiction will be further 
interpreted in section 6.7 (page 214). 
6.5.2 Discussion of External Factors 
+ Factor El: Influences of region and country 
Factor El "Influence of region and country" included items relating to economic, 
geographic, cultural and religious influence of region and country. No significant 
difference was observed on this factor across the different regions (F5,98 = . 669, 
P>0.05), so respondents were seen to regard the impact of region and country to a 
similar degree and they had a common feeling of less impact of this factor, shown by 
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the lower mean scores. 
Factor El "Influence of region and country" demonstrated quite low correlations with 
all thirteen of the internal factors as shown in Appendix S. As such, one can conclude 
that the influence of region and country does exert an influence on the safety 
mechanism but it was seen to play a relatively minor role in the development of a 
proactive mechanism. However, a number of moderate correlations were observed 
which warrant some further discussion at this point. 
The highest correlation was observed between this factor and internal factor 11 
"Organisational structure and management commitment". This finding indicates that 
a higher level of influence of region and country is associated with organisational 
structure and management commitment towards developing proactive safety 
mechanism to a significant degree. It also suggests that regions and countries are 
likely to exert an influence on encouraging proactive safety in the organisations in 
which structure and commitment support such action. 
A moderate and significant correlation was also observed between El "Influence of 
region and country" and internal factor 10 "Commercial cost pressures", which 
demonstrates the impact of commercial pressures. It shows that the degree to which 
region and country exert an influence to establish a proactive safety mechanism is 
associated to a significant degree with commercial cost pressures. 
+ Factor E2: Relationship with the public and the media 
Factor E2 "Relationship with the public and the media" was represented by four 
variables relating to customer relations, perceived corporate image, customer habits 
and media relationships. Representatives across the regions were thought to have no 
different degree of concerns regarding this factor because no significant difference 
was observed on this factor across different regions (F5,98 = . 909, P>0.05). Therefore, 
respondents across different regions did not vary appreciably in their views of how the 
public and the media influence organisational safety. Compared to El "Influence of 
region and country", the mean score of E2 "Relationship with the public and the 
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media" in various regions was much higher, indicating that the public and media were 
deemed as an importantly influential factor. 
A significant correlation was observed between E2 "Relationship with the public and 
the media" and internal factor 11 "Organisational structure and management 
commitment", factor 2 "Employee safety concept", factor 9 "Procedures and 
documentation" and factor 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour", shown in 
Appendix S. The highest correlations were observed between this factor and internal 
factors relating to "Organisational structure and management commitment" and 
"Employee safety concept". As such, a higher level of understanding and activity on 
the part of the public and media is associated with an organisational structure and 
management commitment and employee safety concept which favours the 
development of a proactive safety mechanism. 
Further significant correlations were observed between E2 "Relationship with the 
public and the media" and internal factors relating to "Procedures and 
documentation", and "Employee safety behaviours". Accordingly, a better 
appreciation of procedures and documentation with respect to safety and 
well-behaved employee safety behaviours is likely to involve more positive relation to 
influence media and public or receive its influence, which in turn affect a proactive 
safety mechanism. 
+ Factor E3: Impact of regulatory environment 
This factor was represented a factor of its own, which included items relating to: value 
of safety authority information, the influence of regulations and the adherence of 
industry safety committee suggestions. The oneway ANOVA for region on Factor E3 
"Impact of regulatory environment", dealing with safety authority's influence on 
organisational safety demonstrated statistical significance (F5,98 = 2.435, P<0.05). 
Post hoc multiple comparisons - Least-Significant Difference (LSD) indicated that 
this was attributable to a significance between respondents in North America 
compared to Africa as well as Asia and Pacific (p<. 05), i. e. the mean difference is 
significant at the . 05 level. 
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The examination of table of means revealed the highest rating on this factor originated 
from Africa, while the lowest one was from North America. However, the empirical 
experiences show North America is heavily regulated, perhaps too much, while Africa 
less so with safety information promulgated by regulators. The Africa result may 
indicate a dependence upon regulatory impact due to inadequacies in the company 
management structure. Yet there is still a need to further investigate the impact of bias 
of questionnaire in subsequent sections. 
Additionally, a significant correlation was observed between E3 "Impact of regulatory 
environment", and all internal factors. (Appendix S), showing the close relationship 
between airlines and regulatory environment. This finding is of importance, and it 
indicates that a higher level of understanding and activity on the part of the regulatory 
environment is associated with all internal factors which favour the development of a 
proactive safety mechanism. It demonstrates that the role of the regulator and 
regulation were deemed to be important to the internal organisational factors for 
promoting proactive safety. 
Among the internal factors, the highest correlation was observed between this factor 
and internal factor 3 "Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance".. This 
finding reveals that the influence of regulators and regulations for safety is associated 
with the level of operational safety in operation and maintenance to a significant 
degree4'. Regulators are likely to take greater steps towards encouraging proactive 
safety in the organisations in which operation and maintenance support such action. 
+ Factor E 4: The influence of investment community 
Factor E4 "The influence of investment community" included items relating to 
investors' prospective, stock market's reaction, and business investment. No 
significant difference was observed on this factor across different regions (F5,98 = . 910, 
P>0.05). Thus, respondents across different regions did not vary appreciably in their 
view of how investment influenced organisational safety. 
41 It is interesting to note that despite the regulatory environment and the findings here it is 
non-compliance with regulatory requirements that after leads to incidents/accidents. 
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Also, table of mean/standard deviation showed relatively lower mean scores, 
compared to other factors. Most of the standard deviations were greater than one or 
close to one, indicating the variance within the individual regions. The highest rating 
on this factor originated from Latin America and the Caribbean, while the lowest one 
was from Africa. 
According to Appendix S, factor E4 shows low correlations with all thirteen of the 
internal factors. A significant correlation was observed between E4 "The influence of 
investment community" and "Commercial cost pressures", and "Financial concern". 
As such, the degree to which the investment community's influence on establishing 
proactive safety mechanism is associated with organisations' financial issues to a 
significant degree. 
Meanwhile, significant correlations were observed between E4 "The influence of 
investment community" and those factors relating to "Corporate safety policy", and 
"Impact of Accident/incidents". It indicates that the investment community is likely to 
be more associated with the organisations which value safety policy and/or post event 
impact in order to develop a proactive safety mechanism. It reflects a tendency of 
investors to continue investing if an airline does not have an accident or bad press 
imperative of its safety policy. 
In summary, the evidence from these findings support the second hypothesis of this 
thesis which states that the safety mechanism will be demonstrated as a complex and 
multidimensional construct, which will be influenced by a set of factor-structure. 
Hypothesis three, stating that the organisational factors mediate the relationship 
between the safety mechanism and safety performance, and act as predictors of safety 
performance, is also supported by the findings. 
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6.6 Comparison with the Hypothesised Factor Structure 
The results of survey reveal a slightly different factor structure in comparison to that 
of the hypothesised model (see Table 6-23). In terms of internal underlying factors, 
the factors derived from the internal environment confirm the general structure of the 
safety mechanism model with few changes, when compared with the hypothesised 
internal factor structure. These changes are listed below: 
Factor 1- "Perceived safety" in the hypothesised model was separated into two 
internal factors: "Employee safety attitude and behaviour" and "Employee safety 
concept" in the survey results and the latter is the predictor of perceived safety 
performance. This finding is of interest because, as mentioned in the previous 
section, safety behaviour is related to safety culture, while safety concept is more 
related to safety climate. It therefore indirectly proves the construct of the safety 
mechanism and would be able to provide the airlines with exact influential factors 
to promote proactive safety. 
Factor 8- "Personnel communication and relationship" was split into two factors 
in the survey results- "Personnel-quality of working life" and "Communication 
system". It shows that to employees, good working relationship in the company 
manifest itself on the quality of work life, including morale, well defined job 
function, and accommodation of frustration. These are what personnel deem to be 
as important in the working environment and have influence on proactive safety. 
Meanwhile, the appearance of "Communication system" indicates the importance 
of the organisational communication system, especially when the issue is related 
to proactive safety and examined as one of the predictors of perceived safety 
performance. 
+ Factor 6- "Safety information" was reconstructed to create a new factor- 
"Necessity of safety report". This result reveals that within airline safety 
information systems, safety reports attract higher attention and are thought of as 
one of the influential factors on a safety mechanism, and as one of the predictors 
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of perceived safety performance. 
*ý Items in Factor 4- "Management control (or quality control)" were not grouped 
together; instead most of them were included in "Organisational structure and 
management commitment". As such, "Management control" was dismissed and 
replaced by "Organisational structure and management commitment" to cover the 
managerial issues, which echoes to Chapter 2 when describing the important of 
these managerial issues on airline safety. 
*3' Factor 10- "Decision-making style and process" was out of the factor structure 
because the results did not reveal the characteristic of this factor. Similarly, a new 
factor emerged and grouped the financial issue items together. This new factor 
was therefore named "Financial concern". Again, it showed the degree to which 
the survey respondents regarded these concerns important to the development of a 
safety mechanism. 
In terms of external factors, in total the results of the survey identified four factors in 
the external environment. Compared with the original ones proposed (five in total), 
country influence and regional influence were combined into one factor. This finding, 
together with the fact that the scores rating of this factor was lower than that of others 
pointed to the fact that influences of region and country were not exerting as powerful 
an influence on proactive safety mechanisms as was initially proposed. As to the other 
three factors, the survey results revealed the same factor structure. However, the 
factor names were changed slightly in order to describe their characteristics more 
accurately. 
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Table 6-23 Comparison of the Factor Structure 
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1. Perceived safety 
2. Operation and maintenance 
3. Risk management (control) 
4. Management control (quality control) 
5. Commercial pressures 
6. Safety information (info technology) 
7. Organisational structure 
8. Personnel communication and 
relationships 
9. Post-incident/ accident (impact of 
incident/accident) 
10. Decision making style and process 
11. Corporate safety policy 
12. Documentation 
Survey result 
1. Employee safety attitude& behaviour 
2. Employee safety concept 
3. Level of operational safety in 
operation and maintenance 
4. Corporate safety policy 
5. Personnel- quality of working life 
6. Employment of risk programmes 
7. Impact of accident/incidents 
8. Financial concern 
9. Procedures and documentation 
10. Commercial cost pressures 
11. Organisational structure and 
management commitment 
12. Communication system 
13. Necessity of safety reports 
1. Industry regulations 1. Influences of region and country 
2. Public relationships 2. Public and the media influence 
3. The investment community 3. Impact of regulatory environment 
oý w 4. Country influences 4. Involvement of investment 
5. Regional influences community 
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6.7 Discussion of the Bias in the Result 
The conclusions outlined in the previous section support the -perspectives which 
underline the safety mechanism in Chapter 4. This section aims to identify the ways in 
which the conclusions regarding organisational factors expand the understanding of 
the development of a proactive safety mechanism. As such, some consideration of the 
interpretation of the data and some discussion of where the results fit within the 
existing literature are in order. 
There are two points worth noting as the bias the results when applying results from 
this study. 
1. The uneven representation of respondents across different regions: 
The respondents from different regions include twenty-two from North America, 
three from Africa, thirty-six from Europe, thirty-six from Asia and Pacific, five from 
Latin America and the Caribbean and two from the Middle East (Figure 5-2, page 
. 174). 
Two points need to be addressed here. Firstly, according to Figure 5-2, the 
proportion of returned questionnaires from Africa and the Middle East were much 
lower than the intended sample rate. Secondly, the low number of representatives 
from Africa and the Middle East in the current sample revealed that higher scores 
were rated by African representatives, while lower scores were rated by 
representatives from the Middle East on most of the factors, which may limit the 
power of the analyses, especially when discussing these three factors with 
significant differences across regions. As such, there is a need to review the results 
of factors 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour", factor 4 "Corporate safety 
policy" and factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment", which will be discussed 
in next section - Implication for the proactive safety mechanism model. 
2. Two undefined factors: internal factor 14 and 15: 
These two factors remained undefined and were not subjected to further analyses. 
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Both factors contained items which, although only moderately related to other items 
within the questionnaire, still point to elements which were thought to be important 
to the development of a proactive safety mechanism. The fact that they were not 
- included in the other thirteen internal factors would demonstrate that they account 
for some degree of variance which was not accounted for by other factors. Therefore, 
some thought is required before they should be dismissed as unimportant, and. it 
may be advisable to expand upon these factors in future research. 
Factor 14 contained one item which dealt with the degree to which the individuals 
felt the influence of risk audit, risk assessment and risk evaluation on organisational 
safety culture (Table 6-15, page 186). The fact that this item was not included in 
factor 6, which represents the "Employment of a risk programme", would indicate 
that the individual's assessment of the level of risk posed by the organisation is not 
indicative of the correlation between risk management and organisational safety. 
This is curious when interpreted in the context of the finding described in Chapter2, 
which indicated that the system approach to risk management is known as system 
safety, implying that the process of risk management, which is used throughout 
industry and commerce, involves identifying work activities and hazards and 
estimating, evaluating and controlling the associated risk, is the just tool used to 
achieve SMS (GAIN, 2000). 
Factor 15 associates two items which indicate the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) 
decisions about safety investment, and the influence of the safety committee on 
organisational safety culture (Table 6-16, page 186). There is no similarity between 
these two items, making this. factor difficult to define, although both items were 
deemed to be variables influential on organisational safety culture. The former item 
focuses on the decision making style in the organisation, which the interview 
suggested may not be symbolic enough to promoting a proactive safety mechanism, 
and needs more work. The latter considers the influence of the safety committee . on 
safety, which is supposed to be included in internal factor 11 "Organisational 
structure and management commitment". Chapter 2 highlighted Edward's (1999) 
and Overall's (1999) 'comments regarding the importance of an effective 
1, ",; "4 
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organisational structure for airline safety culture. This result may imply that a safety 
committee has a review role to play in determining what are the safety issues; 
however, the setting and planning of the safety committee depends on the 
characteristics and operations of different airlines, which in turn influence 
organisational safety and the proactive safety mechanism. 
6.8 Implications of the Survey Results 
Described in Chapter 4, the top-down method was selected for the safety mechanism 
model since it provided a useful description of the complex interactions which take 
place between the myriad factors critical to the development of proactive safety. As 
discussed previously, this analogy represents a way of thinking and the actions of 
organisation. The aim of this model is to provide a greater understanding of such 
organisational factors as influence an airline's proactive safety mechanism, and the 
evolution of safety management system and safety performance (services). The 
current result is useful in this regard. 
Looking back on the results: 
1. Predictors of perceived safety performance 
It is worth noting that the significant predictors of perceived organisational safety 
performance were: "Employee safety concept", "Communication system", "Impact 
of accident/ incidents" and "Level of operational safety in operation and 
maintenance". Although a causal relationship could not be established from 
correlational analyses, these findings do provide some insight into the critical 
factors of perceived airline safety performance. 
Firstly, this finding demonstrates a relationship does exist between organisational 
factors and safety performance. In particular, it was discovered that these four 
factors - the importance of employee safety concepts, organisational communication, 
post-event adjustment, and the requirement for management to create an atmosphere 
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where personnel's contribution to safety in operation and maintenance, predict and 
contribute to airline safety performance to a significant degree. The regression 
equation also shows that "Employee safety concept' 'makes the largest contribution 
to the prediction of perceived safety performance, while the "impact of 
accidents/incidents" makes the least contribution to the prediction. It reflects the 
literature in chapter 2: safety concept defines safety policies and principles, which 
assign safety accountability, practice safety directives and consequently influence 
the outcome of SMS. 
Meanwhile, the highest, rating of perceived safety performance was from the 
European region. Interestingly, it was found that regardless of the low number of 
African representatives, European representatives rated the highest scores for factor 
1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour", factor 2 "Employee safety concept" and 
factor 3 "Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance". This implies 
that European airlines acknowledge more readily employees' safety concepts, 
attitudes, behaviour and performance on operation and maintenance within their 
airlines, and are reported to demonstrate these concerns more frequently and more 
satisfactorily than other regions within the airline industry. This result is expected 
also because European Authorities influence on SMS and related issues. As such, it 
may be concluded that airlines in which these issues are thought to be important and 
are acknowledged by the management may have the appropriate motivation and 
attitudes to participate in safety initiates. 
2. Implication of mean scores and standard deviation of factors 
As described previously, the scores rated by the respondents not only showed the 
current situation of individual airlines, but also revealed what people thought to be 
important, the degree to which they felt satisfied with them, and the regions they 
came from. Across different regions, the results of ANOVA indicated that no 
significant differences on each organisational factor were observed, except for 
internal factor 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour" and factor 4 "Corporate 
safety policy", plus external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment". This 
finding pointed to the fact that safety managers from different regions viewed each 
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organisational factor influencing the proactive safety mechanism to a similar degree, 
with the exception of these three factors. This is useful especially for the regulatory 
authorities such UKCAA, FAA, Transport Canada, etc. when they promote the 
concept of SMS. As such, followings will be divided into three parts to discuss: 
+ With significant difference across regions: 
In terms of factor 1 "Employee safety attitude and behaviour", a significant 
difference was observed for factor scores across regions. Post hoc multiple 
comparisons - Least-Significant Difference (LSD) - indicated that this was 
attributable to a significance between respondents in North America compared with 
Europe, as well as Asia and Pacific. Moreover, regardless of the responses from 
Africa and the Middle East, the table of means shows that safety managers in 
Europe reported to voice this concern more frequently than other regions within the 
airline industry. As such, one may conclude that European representatives (safety 
managers) are more satisfied with their employees' competence on safety attitudes 
and behaviour and are more aware of the influence of employee safety attitudes and 
behaviour on the proactive safety mechanism. 
In terms of factor 4 "Corporate safety policy", post hoc multiple comparisons - 
LSD - indicated that this was attributable to a significant difference between 
respondents in North America compared with Europe and Asia and Pacific. Taking 
Africa and the Middle East out of consideration, the table of means shows that 
safety managers in North America observed this aspect more frequently in their 
working environment and deemed the influence of corporate safety policy on the 
proactive safety mechanism to be more significant than did those from other regions. 
The occurrence may result from the heavily regulated environment and regulatory 
compliance in the region of North America. 
In terms of external factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment", post hoc multiple 
comparisons - LSD - indicated that this was attributable to a significant difference 
between respondents in North America compared with Africa as well as Asia and 
Pacific. Without taking into account those respondents from Africa and the Middle 
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East, the table of means shows that safety managers in Asia and Pacific regarded 
the impact of the regulatory environment, including regulators and regulations, on 
proactive - safety mechanisms as being more important than did those from other 
regions. Apart from the effect of European influence, such as in Malaysia, HK, 
Brunei, and Singapore, the influence of Power Distance in National culture 
dimension, identified in Chapter 2 may be the main effect. 
+ With no significant difference across regions: 
In terms of internal factors that were found to have no significant differences 
across regions, the following factors were rated with lower mean scores on average 
when compared with the mean scores of other factors: "Personnel - quality of 
working life", "Financial concern", "Commercial cost pressures" and 
"Communication system". Tested by ANOVA, safety managers from various regions 
had similar degree of concerns regarding these factors. This indicated that in 
addition to regarding these factors as being influential upon the safety mechanism, 
safety managers from various regions had common feelings of their employees 
being less satisfied with the quality of their working life, less effective 
communication systems, and fewer perceived financial pressures compared with 
other internal factors. 
Some factors were rated with higher scores including: "Employee safety concept", 
"Organisational structure and commitment", and "Necessity of safety report". This 
demonstrated that the safety representatives had common feelings of higher 
satisfaction of employee safety concepts, the importance of organisational structure 
and management commitment, and the necessity of safety reports. 
In terms of external factors, the two following factors were rated with lower scores, 
and across the different regions respondents viewed these factors to a similar degree: 
"Influences of region and country", and "Involvement of investment community". 
The findings demonstrated that firstly, these factors are regarded as being the 
influential factors within the safety mechanism in the external environment; and 
secondly, respondents from various regions had common feelings of relatively less 
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influence of region and country on organisational safety (the analysis of the 
relationship of internal and external factors in section 6.4 also found that the 
influence of region and country was seen to play a relatively minor role in the 
development of proactive safety mechanism), and less influence of the investment 
community than other external factors. 
With a difference within regions: 
Meanwhile, the two factors: "Impact of accidents/incidents" and "Financial 
concern" were tabled to have a standard deviation value greater than one within 
most of the regions, except Latin America and the Caribbean on the factor "Impact 
of accident", and Africa on the factor "Financial concern". This meant that there 
was some variability in responses to the factors within the individual regions, and 
future study may be needed. 
3. Factor 2 "Employee safety concepts" vs. Factor 1 "Employee safety attitudes 
and behaviour" 
As mentioned in section 6.6, these two factors were split off from one factor in the 
original proposed model. In accordance with the definitions of safety climate and 
safety culture within the airline industry, given in Chapter 4, safety concept is 
related to safety climate, while safety attitude and behaviour is more closely related 
to safety culture. Further investigation of the factor scores revealed that the mean 
scores for safety concept tend to be higher than for safety attitude and behaviour. As 
such, one may conclude that the former is deemed to be more important and 
satisfactory than the latter. 
4. Factor E3 "Impact of regulatory environment" is correlated to all internal 
factors 
Factor E3 emerged as one of the most influential factors of the safety mechanism, 
although the result of ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference 
between respondents in North America compared with Africa, as well as Asia and 
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Pacific, on this factor. The most noticeable point is that it is correlated to all the 
internal factors by the correlation test. This finding revealed that the airline industry 
is a highly regulated business and with the rising competitive airline industry (e. g. 
Alliance, network sharing), the role of regulator will become more crucial. .- 
5. Factor 10 "Commercial cost pressures" and Factor 8 "Financial concern": 
The appearance of factor 10 "Commercial cost pressures" proved that commercial 
cost pressures do exert an influence on airline safety mechanism, although, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, those airline safety managers interviewed did not admit any 
cost pressure on safety. More interestingly, factor 8 "Financial concern" emerged as 
a newly formed factor, which was identified to be one of the influential factors on 
the safety mechanism in the survey results. It further showed that financial issues 
also attracted the attention of the respondents to a critical degree, although the mean 
scores of it and factor 10 "Commercial cost pressures" were not as high as other 
factors. 
6. Implication of organisational learning: 
One point worth noting here is the survey results reveal the implication of 
organisational learning within the model. Choularton (2001) and Sagan (1993) 
present four constraints on organisational learning. These are: 
1. Feedback from the real world is often ambiguous. This allows 
pre-conceived and convenient positions to be supported through different 
interpretations of the available information. 
2. Post-event adjustment often takes place in a highly charged or political 
environment in which apportion of blame is sought. 
3. Fault reporting from those individuals with vested interests in obscuring 
the truth prevents objective analysis of the situation. 
4. Secrecy, or the failure of internal organisational communication due to 
restrictions on information flow, prevents learning from taking place. 
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These four points correspond to the three predictors of perceived safety performance: 
"Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance", "Impact of 
accidents/incidents" and "Communication systems". Assume that the barriers of 
organisational learning (Y1) is the function of these three organisational factors (A, 
B, Q. This could transform the relationship into a new equation, which is that 
perceived safety performance (Y) is the function of Yl and D (see Figure 6-1). As 
such, organisational learning barriers can be concluded to be one of the predictors 
(factors to predict and influence) of perceived safety performance. This equation 
indicates the contribution that organisational learning barriers can have on self-rated 
safety performance, although it does not prove the degree of this contribution. 
Interestingly, this safety survey initially included the concern of organisational 
learning, but the results of the pilot study suggested that this concern should be 
dismissed, as stated in Chapter 5. Hence, the validation of organisational learning- 
related issues in the organisational factors might need further investigation in the 
future. 
Figure 6-1 Organisational Learning Barriers vs. Perceived Safety Performance 
Perceived Safety Performance Predictors from the survey result 
/Barrier of organisational learning identified by Choularton and Sagan 
A: Level of operational safety in operation 
and maintenance/ Feedback+ Fault reporting 
Y1: Barriers of 
organisational learning 
B: Impact of accident/incident Yj= f (A, B, C) 
/ Post event adjustment 
C: Communication system 
/Organisational communication 
D: Employee safety concept 
Y. Perceived safety 
performance 
Y =f (YI, D) 
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6.9 Examination of the Findings for the Primary Hypotheses 
Previous sections have identified the factors which influence proactive safety 
mechanism and discussed some relationships between these factors - and their 
implications. The next will integrate the findings from the study and the rest of the 
investigations reported in this thesis. 
Four general hypotheses were explored and tested in order to develop the safety 
mechanism within a proactive management. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the term 
hypothesis as used here should be understood in the broad sense of the word as these 
are intended to outline the aims and objectives of the model. These statements should 
be considered to be propositions, made from known facts, which form the basis for 
this investigation, rather than hypotheses in the statistical sense, which will be tested 
and either accepted or rejected. 
To this end, four hypotheses were set to be explored and tested in this thesis. The 
outcomes of the investigation with respect to these hypotheses will be discussed in the 
following sections in order to summarise the results of the investigation which formed 
the substances of this thesis. 
6.9.1 Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis 1: 
The safety mechanism is the composite of organisational climate/culture, safety 
climate/culture, safety philosophy, and decision-making. The definition of each layer 
will be redefined (except decision-making) to suit the airline industry. 
The first hypothesis, the redefinition of organisational climate, organisational culture, 
safety climate, safety culture and safety philosophy, is critical to the application of a 
safety mechanism for the ' airline industry. As the current existing definitions of 
organisational climate, organisational culture, safety climate, and safety culture' are 
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the generalisation for an open system, there is a need to distinguish the differences 
between airlines and other industries in order to develop an airline safety mechanism. 
Building upon the knowledge of existing definitions of organisational climate/ culture, 
and safety climate/ culture stated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the primary evidence for 
this hypothesis was presented in Chapter 4, where organisational climate, 
organisational culture, safety climate, safety culture and safety philosophy were 
redefined to illustrate and suit the needs of the airline industry. As such, through the 
literature and empirical findings, the first hypothesis is supported. 
6.9.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2: 
The safety mechanism model will be demonstrated as a multi-dimensional construct, 
which will be influenced by a complex factor-structure. Meanwhile, this factor 
structure will also reflect the current environmental factors in the airline industry. 
The hypothesis that each layer of this safety mechanism would have a unique 
definition (Hypothesis 1) is critical to the justification of a complex and 
multi-dimensional construct underlying the safety mechanism model. Having defined 
the. components in the model, this model illustrates a top-down metaphor, which 
shows that the organisational climate exerts an influence on organisational culture, 
which affects safety climate and culture; safety culture influences safety philosophy, 
and safety philosophy informs decision-making, which results in good or bad 
consequences in safety services. The multi-dimensional relationships are explained 
and supported by the literature described in Chapter 4 regarding the development of 
the model. 
Meanwhile, the assertion that this construct would be found to be influenced by a set 
of identifiable factors is important. The identification of a limited number of factors 
serves to reduce the myriads of issue relating to the development of a safety 
mechanism to a reasonable number of items, and to acknowledge there are real effects 
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imposed by theses factors. The results of principal component analyses were 
successful in identifying the internal (thirteen) and external (four) factors for the 
safety mechanism; for example external factor El "Influence of region and country" 
shows the effect of culture and value of the country and region in which the 
organisation exists, although no efficient evidence proves whether the influence of 
country or region can override any organisational attempts at developing itself. If 
expressed by an equation, it has the form: 
Y=F(X X2... X13) 
Y=F(EI... E4) 
Where 
Y is the safety mechanism, (the composite of Y is defined in Hypothesis 1) 
Xs are internal organisational factors, 
Es are external organisational factors. 
Various ANOVA in this chapter further reveal the complexity of the factor-structure 
by identifying the fact that not all respondents regard these factors to be important to 
the same degree, and identifying which factors are placed as high concerns in which 
regions. 
Moreover, the case study in Chapter 5 provides sufficient evidence to test the model 
and conclude this hypothesis. However, one point to note here is that there are slight 
differences regarding the factor-structure compared with the one originally proposed, 
discussed in section 6.6. As such, there is a need to redraw the case study by using the 
new factor-structure of the safety mechanism (Figure 6-2). 
Chapter 6 Analyses and Discussions 
Figure 6-2 The Safety Mechanism Model Applied to the Air Ontario Accident 
Line Worker Middle MQt. Senior Mgt. Ora. Factors 
Org. " job security " future of company " operation goals """"""..... ... 
Involvement of E4: investment comma 
Climate " future " operation goals " viability + survival 
`" g: Financial concerns 
I. count regulatory 10: 
Commercial cost f country 
""" 
pressures 
pressures (culture), """ý"" ""º El: Influence of regloo country 
E3: Impact of regulato 
environment 
Org. " org. changes " turbulent " lack communication -º 12: Communication 
Culture " turbulent environment with middle mgt. 
environment (over taxed, ... ) " merger undergoing 5: Personnel 
" lack of support from 11: Or mýi geonnaalt huc t 
senior mgt. commitment 
9: Procedures & Documentation 
...... . ... º Safety " minimal safety " failure to issue MEL " poor regulatory .... E3: Impact of regulato 
Climate initiates " failure to provide environment 
environment 
" bent to keep training and " short-term focus in 6: Employment of ris 
a/c flying manual turbulent environment 3: L, vel of f operati safety onal 
Safety " deferral of " safety information not " failure of regulatory """""" """"º E3: environment 
act of gnlt° 
Culture maintenanceý communicated wel compliance 
" lack of training " little observation an " safety manager has 
safety knowledge coaching in safety no direct access to 
behaviour CEO " safety manager has 
no direct access to -º 
11: Organisational 
strut & management 
commitment 
Safety " highly motivated-on time performance-+" flight was behind the _. 2: 
Employee 
safety concept 
Phil. to take necessary was prime criteria schedule 
steps to keep -'" take necessary steps " passenger could not beº 4: CQTPorate safety policy 
a/c flying to keep a/c flying stranded on board 
Decision I " captain took -º" Sent the disabled -º" a/c had got to fly 1: ä ade s Emplqyee safe 
-making off without de-icing a/c to an airport 
" maintenance left without ground 
APU un-serviced starting facilities 
Result 
I Dryden Accident 
Note: 1. Org. - Organisation, Mgt. = Management, Phil. = Philosophy, a/c = Aircraft 
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Moreover, the evidence of a complex factor-structure is also supported by some 
analyses conducted in this chapter, where the factor scores between internal factors 
and external factors were correlated to a significant degree. In particular, all the 
internal factors were found to be significantly correlated to "the impact of the 
regulatory environment", which was evidence that the airline industry is a highly 
regulated business, and that regulators strongly desire airlines' co-operation. It also 
implies that with the different regulatory structures across regions, a more harmonised 
regulatory environment is necessary. 
The safety mechanism model is not a model of proactive safety management or 
organisational climate/culture. It is a model of the evolution of safety services within 
a proactive safety management system. The importance of this model is to assess 
airline proactive safety by identifying the organisational factors which will affect 
organisational climate and analogously influence the safety mechanism. These 
findings generally support the second hypothesis that the safety mechanism model is a 
multi-dimensional construct, which is influenced by a factor-structure: internal factors 
exert influence within the airline, while external factors reflect the environmental 
influential forces. 
6.9.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3: 
The organisational factors mediate the relationship between the safety mechanism 
and safety performance, and act as predictors of safety performance. 
The third hypothesis, that the organisational factors mediate the relationship between 
the safety mechanism and safety performance, and act as predictors of safety 
performance, is important in fully understanding the implications of the safety 
mechanism. There are two reasons. Firstly, it highlights the relationship between the 
safety performance and organisational factors, i. e. the particular factors at a particular 
time, which affect airline safety performance to a significant degree. Secondly, the 
identified predictors serve to identify the areas recommended for improvement and for 
future study of this research topic (see section 6.11). 
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The evidence of influence of safety mechanism on self-rated safety performance is 
presented in Chapter 4 when discussing the model demonstrated by Neal et al (2000). 
The primary evidence with regard to this hypothesis was presented in this chapter. 
The result of the multiple regression analysis indicates that there is a relationship 
between safety performance factor and organisational factors, i. e. four factors are the 
best predictors of self-rated safety performance among these organisational factors. If 
expressed by a conceptual equation, it has the form (refer to section 6.3): 
Yj=. 486+. 403*X2 +. 244*X3 +. 113*X7 +. 133*X12 
Where Yl is the perceived safety performance (output or effect), 
Xs are organisational factors (inputs or causes): 
X2: Employee safety behaviour 
X3: Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance 
X7: Impact of accidents/incidents 
X12: Communication system 
Although one may argue that the essence of organisational factors in a company's 
organisation deliberations will almost certainty affect safety performance as it leaves 
the way open to error and failure, it is worth noting that the questionnaire respondents 
rated the "safety performance" here because there exists the difficulties to define/ rate 
airline safety performance in reality plus the questionnaire is anonymous. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 should be the hypothesis regarding the organisational factors as the 
predictors of perceived safety performance. The findings of these four internal factors 
show internal environment will have more influence on the perceived safety 
performance than external environment, and the attention should be paid more than 
other factors when proactive safety management system is developed. 
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6.9.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4: 
The safety mechanism model is seen as being critical to the development of proactive 
safety management; however, the airline safety health and performance still needs the 
coordination of proactive and reactive safety management. 
The last hypothesis stated that the safety mechanism model is critical to the 
development of proactive safety management and airline safety health; however, 
airline safety performance still needs the co-ordination of proactive and reactive 
safety management. The logic underlying this hypothesis is that in the light of 
empirical study and literature review, current proactive concepts and approaches aim 
to uncover the latent organisational conditions and avoid the surrounding errors or 
inadequate recognition, which cause safety to be degraded in the workplace. Building 
on this knowledge, this research aims to identify the importance of the safety 
mechanism, and the organisational factors which affect it in order to establish a 
proactive approach to safety. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, and in keeping with the aim of maintaining a 
well-functioning safety services, continual adjustments, and sometimes the 
introduction of new methods, are required. Nevertheless, when undertaking such 
changes, one must be also careful that those aspects of safety services that function 
well are not destroyed. From the result of literature review, retroactive approaches to 
safety have been identified as important existing tools to improve airline safety 
management system. This fact is also supported by the results of survey, which reveal 
the factor-structure containing these factors "the employment of risk programmes", 
"impact of accidents/incidents", and "the necessity of safety reports", which were 
identified as retroactive approaches to safety in Chapter 2. Moreover, this factor - 
"impact of accidents/incidents" is found to be one of the predictors of perceived 
safety performance. These findings indicate that the safety mechanism is built on a 
proactive concept; however, retroactive and proactive vehicles both exert influences 
on this mechanism model in order to achieve safety performance and safety health. 
As such, it can be concluded that that the airline's safety health and performance do 
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need the co-ordination of both retroactive and proactive safety management and the 
fourth hypothesis is accepted. 
From these results, the safety mechanism model provides an indication as to what 
drives the development of a safety mechanism, what the influential factors of the 
safety mechanism are, and what organisational factors are the predictors of perceived 
safety performance. Figure 6-3 portrays the safety mechanism model resulting from 
the survey. By the acceptance of the four hypotheses, these results are the main 
contributions that have been made from the thesis. 
230 
Chapter 6 Analyses and Discussions 
o 
o 
CL) M 
(3) 0 
.0m 
ot5 'ý 
V 
- 
ü 
ö 
79 O 
a uni L-' C- 0 
Q U) . 
=ý 
Ü 3g: 
ü QC 
Cl) 
ý 
G) + 0] 
iu to - 
J .ý 
a 0) 
0) W 4 ca 0 üa°m - z . a' Q1 (13 2 :Doa 70 ° co ik (ß i- 
w (o dl 
N 
r, 
C4 r5- ++ 
{A ü 
c f6 -cm . - OO QD C-) O 
W OO Q7 M üii 76 E 
O es - t+ aE E F- U) OO CD p 
M 
E 
E 
Q C2 a) 
EE 
Z 
_Q 
U7 
- C- CL 
0- 
O 
IÖE 
a1 O 41 C O 
WWJ E 
d) 
OWWE iL W0U 
XX? X>ý>ý> >X 7C 7C 
8 
co CD 
Eb IE 
Y1 
O (D 
U7 ý 
ky , [ß +i 
0 0) 
V 
CU v 
G; 
H C F3 L' Q) 
V Q as o > 
d aF- 
Lj- a> > o 
CD 
. 0 
CD 
cl) 
z o Co 
üU 
E 
> 
H 3 0- ° o X 
ß 
W U W 
WWW W 
aý 
0 
äý 
b 
0 
E 
U 
w 
CC 
Ct 
H 
M 
G) 
i. 
bA 
"rr_ 
h+ýl 
231 
Chapter 6 Analyses and Discussions 
6.10 Limitations and Validation of the Safety Mechanism 
Model 
Although the items (questions) of the safety survey were developed from an extensive 
literature review, and qualitative data was collected by means of interviews, it is not 
possible to say at this time whether the factors analysed from the survey would be 
accurate without further investigation. As such, the next sections focus mainly on the 
limitations that might cause the factors identified in the safety mechanism model to 
fail to accurately reflect the factors which have an influence on the safety mechanism 
and perceived safety performance, and why. 
Firstly, the safety mechanism contains a number of inter-related elements, which are 
not usually differentiated as black and white, such as the difference between 
organisational climate and organisational culture, etc. Therefore, the distinctions 
between these elements may not be easily understood in the first place, and so may 
take some time for the reader to appreciate. Secondly, due to the difficulties in finding 
a benchmarking measurement of airline safety performance, the safety performance 
measured in this research is respondents' perceived safety performance. Thus, this 
handicap may deviate its factor score and regression to some degree as a result. 
Thirdly, as stated in section 6.7, the relatively low number of respondents from Africa, 
the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean, plus their response tendency, 
might cause a bias in the survey results; nevertheless, a larger proportion of 
questionnaires returned would add greater confidence to the conclusions of the thesis. 
With the limitations of the safety mechanism model in mind, the next section aim to 
explore its validation by comparing this model with other four safety programmes 
with proactive concept, which were discussed in Chapter 2. The comparison of these 
four programmes and the safety mechanism model are listed in Table 6-24. 
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Reason (1995b) points out that effective safety management requires both reactive 
and proactive information in order to guide an organisation to that region of the 
"safety space" associated with the greatest resilience to operational hazards. In both 
cases, though, it is necessary to identify the organisational and situational factors 
contributing to unsafe acts. As such, MESH employed Reason's philosophy and his 
model for programme development. Referring to Table 6-24, in MESH, front line 
personnel assess the local factors, and technical management assess organisational 
factors at periodic intervals. The aim is to identify factors in need of improvement and 
track the changes over time, with the help of computer software package. However, 
there is no literature which describes exactly how these factors were chosen. 
As to INDICATE, Reason's model was applied to develop the programme as well, but 
with a difference in focal point. The INDICATE programme focuses on the aims of 
identifying and resolving deficient aviation safety defences before the occurrence of 
mishaps. By dividing the experiment company into two groups and observing their 
operation, it provides a means of evaluating the effects of the programme. It is more 
suitable to small and medium sized airlines with budgetary limits. 
PERS is an error management system which can be used by non-experts in human 
factors because it is based on a human-factors approach to solving errors. PERS 
provides a way for airline personnel to analyse an error or potential error, to discover 
why it occurred, and then to see how they might go about changing systems, 
equipment or work patterns to prevent future errors. The solutions presented by PERS 
tend to be limited to exploring potentially hazardous situations by analysing the 
ongoing problems. 
LOSA highlights exemplary, as well as deficient performance, which shows airlines 
the areas in which they excel as well as those in need of improvement. A database is 
being developed that allows organisations to compare their results with those of other 
airlines. The focus of LOSA is mainly on flight crew and flight operations division. 
However, the expense of LOSA is too high to be afforded by airlines with budgetary 
limits. 
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Comparing the safety mechanism model with other programmes, it is found that aside 
from the contribution of organisational factors exploration and identification within 
the academic literature, this model also provides the airline industry with a 
"benchmark" of organisational factors which are an aggregation of the viewpoints of 
various representatives across all regions. The rating of each question (response) 
presents the tendency of each organisational factor, i. e. how important it is and to 
what degree it is to be satisfactory across regions. These organisational factors are 
also assessed by ANOVA to investigate whether significant differences exist across 
regions. It is important to understand the regional difference, especially when 
applying this model in the real world. Meanwhile, this model offers a "prototype" of 
the contributing organisational factors to the perceived safety performance. 
It is not the intention of this part of the thesis to suggest that the safety mechanism 
model is the best among these programmes, although the flexibility of this model's 
application exceeds that of other programmes. Its benefits include its relatively low 
cost, the fact that there is no limitation to specific divisions, it provides a platform for 
the integration of organisational factors and change management, etc. (see the 
application of the safety mechanism model in the following section). The purpose of 
the comparison is to show the differences between different programmes, and to 
hopefully validate the model by pinpointing its advantages, and the contribution that it 
makes to the literature and to the real world. This point should be emphasised. 
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6.11 The Application of the Safety Mechanism Model 
The case study of Air Ontario has demonstrated the retrospective application of the 
safety mechanism model, which is quite useful in retroactive safety management, e. g. 
accident/incident investigation. This portion of the study will add value to the 
application of the safety mechanism model in reality. The application of this model is 
its implementation in a practical situation, providing a vehicle for identifying 
organisational factors within airlines. In other words, there needs to be a change, but 
how can change be brought about in the existing organisation? A process of change 
management must be adopted in order to effectively embed the organisational factors 
that have been identified in the safety mechanism model. As mentioned previously, 
the factors identified serve as a benchmark and a prototype on a world-wide basis. 
Therefore, the airline can identify its own factor set (by replicating the questionnaire 
in its own organisation, or department, i. e. local factor-set), compare the results with 
the safety mechanism model, and decide which factors are in need of change. 
There are several well-known corporate change management tools. Six Sigma42 is one 
of them. Six Sigma provides a means to identify the major areas (project) for 
improvement, form the team, and apply the Define (D) Measure (M) Analyse (A) 
Improve (I) and Control (C) methodology43 to complete the project. By data collection 
and analysis, root causes of problems can be found, and direction for improvements 
are able to be identified. . 
42 Six Sigma -A vision of quality which equates with only 3.4 defects per million opportunities for 
each product or service transaction. This concept has been used in corporate management to 
improve deficient processes. In other words, Six Sigma is a highly disciplined process that helps to 
focus on developing and delivering near-perfect products and services. The essence behind Six 
Sigma is that defects are unknown and need to be identified. If you can measure how many 
"defects" you have in a process, you can systematically figure out how to eliminate them and get 
as close to "zero defects" as possible. General Electric (GE) is a role model famous as a Six Sigma 
organisation. 
43 DMAIC - (Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control) is a process for continual 
improvement purposes. It is systemic and fact based. This closed-loop process eliminates 
unproductive steps, explores new measurements, and applies controls for improvement (see 
Appendix T). 
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The following shows the application of the model by using the prototype factor set as 
a demonstration. As such, thirteen internal and four external factors were identified as 
influential factors of the safety mechanism. According to Figure 6-3 (page 231), they 
have the form: 
Y= F (XI, X2 ... X13) 
Y=F(EI... E4) 
Yj= . 486+ . 403*X2 +. 244 
* X3 +. 113 * X7 +. 133 * X12 
Where Y is the safety mechanism 
Yl is perceived safety performance 
Xs are internal factors, Es are external factors 
X2 is Employee safety behaviour 
X3 is Level of operational safety in operation and maintenance 
X7 is Impact of accidents/incidents 
X12 is Communication system 
As the survey result reveals, there are four influential factors for perceived safety 
performance, and it is suggested that these should be applied as the starting point for 
improvement. One point worth noting is that although "Employee safety concept" is 
identified as the biggest predictor of safety performance, it is however found that the 
"Employee safety concept" has the highest level of satisfaction, while the 
"Communication system" is less satisfactory. Therefore, "Communication system" is 
the factor in greatest need of improvement, if budget or resources allocation in a 
company is not enough to support all improvement plans at one time. 
By applying the Six Sigma approach, factors can be broken down to several 
manageable projects, collecting the improved results and achieving a better perceived 
safety performance. The details of the application of organisational factors using the 
Six Sigma approach are described as follows: 
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Referring to the denotation in previous page, break Yl down to a number of Xs of a 
manageable size for improvement. As such, 
Y1= F (X2, X3, X7, X12) 
X2, X3, X7, X12 are the focus or results of the process to be improved. Each X contains 
a Six Sigma project, which aims to explore possibilities for improvement. 
Take communication system (X12) for example: 
X12 =F (Zi, Z2, Z3, Z4.... ) 
where X12 is the communication system 
Zs are the actions needed to improve X12 
Each Six Sigma project encompasses three aspects, as follows: 
1. Who: cross-function team members (the major players) 
2. What: objectives, measurements } _... DMAIC process 
3. How: analysis, improvement, control tools 
The DMAIC processes of X12 could be detailed in Table 6-25. 
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X12 =F (Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4.... ), Zs will be identified in the "Analyse" phase. 
Table 6-25 The DMAIC Process of X12 "Communication system" 
Phase Action Goal 
Define What is important to the communication system Define "X12" 
(D) (critical factors)? 
Measure What and how is the process of communication 
system performing? Measure "X12" 
(M) How reliable is the obtained data? 
What are the critical defects causing variation? 
To what degree? 
Analyse 
For instance: 
Z, = Knowledge management system Find & Measure 
(A) Z2 = Performance evaluation system 
the "Zs" 
Z3 = Existing resources (bulletin, company mail, 
etc) and communication channels 
incorporation 
Z4= Rewarding system 
How to fix the critical defect (Zs)? 
What variation in critical Xs can be removed? 
Improve For instance: Improve the "ZS" 
(I) How much percentage of employee satisfaction/ 
benefit and communication channels can be 
increased by building a KM website? 
Control 
How can the improvement be maintained? Control "ZS" so that 
(C) For instance : 
there is no variation in 
"X, 2" the Maintain the website and free flow of channels 
It is worth noting that, Six Sigma is not panacea that can cure all the problems. 
Having demonstrated the Six Sigma methodology, there are also other change 
management tools that can assist practitioners in identifying these actions (sub-factors) 
which warrant the greatest amount of attention in improving the organisational 
factors. 
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Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
"But People who are freed from the confines of their box on the organization chart, 
whose status rests on real world achievement ... those are the people who develop the self-confidence to be simple, to share every bit of information available to them, 
to listen to those above, below and around them and then move boldly. " 
Jack Welch, 1989 
7.1 Conclusions - Thesis Aims Revisited 
Looking back to Chapter 1, five objectives have been set out. By summarising the 
findings which are aligned with the objectives for the reader, this chapter aims to bring 
together the knowledge gained throughout the investigations that formed the substance 
of this study. The achievement of this thesis and the findings, as well as its 
recommendations, will be discussed in the following sections. 
7.1.1 Objective One 
 To evaluate current airline safety management systems and become a 
reference text which can be used by academics and industry. 
Starting from Chapter 2, this thesis opens by defining safety as "risks are minimised to 
an acceptable level" and introducing the safety interactions in the air transport system, 
given that the safety of air travel and its inherent challenges have been with us since the 
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first passenger flight. By identifying the interaction of safety significant activities and 
external influence within the system, which are involved in conducting a safe flight, it 
was found that the external impacts are mainly from three aspects: technical innovation, 
growing traffic, and the regulatory environment. The innovation of technology 
increases the reliability and productivity of aircraft, which in turn stimulate the growth 
of air traffic. Nonetheless, it is the airline's responsibility to provide transportation as 
well as safety, each is mutually dependent on, and worthless without the other. 
Especially with the increasing competition in the airline industry, the safety records of 
airline not only are used as a basis for passengers for deciding which airline to choose, 
but also directly associates with the airline's reputation within the media and public. 
Meanwhile, given the complexity of aviation environment, the regulators play an 
important role in airline operation. These all exert influence on the airline safety 
management system (SMS). 
The subsequent literature review probes the evaluation of airline safety management 
system and clearly compares the empirical situations systematically, which identifies 
and rationalises the areas for improvement in the airline industry. It is concluded that 
safety is supported by organisational structure and regulations; fundamentally it is the 
concept and behaviours that define safety policy and principles, which influence the 
outcome of SMS. In addition, SMS must represent a pure closed loop. It must have 
facility for setting process and standards and subsequent reviews, and then adjustment 
is revised process or new process. The judge needs to consider what is acceptable and 
when there is a threat requiring change. The coverage of literature review and extent of 
evaluation is sufficient depth and quality to be used as a reference by academics and the 
industry. Therefore, the objective one - to evaluate current airline safety management 
systems and become a reference text which can be used by academics and industry, is 
achieved. 
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7.1.2 Objective Two 
 To investigate retroactive and proactive approaches to safety and their 
application within the airline industry. 
The evaluation of current airline safety management system leads to two main 
approaches to enhance and improve airline safety services in the present circumstances. 
One approach is that of retroactive measures; the other is the proactive measures. 
Traditionally retroactive approach to safety 
The main tasks of the second objective are to firstly review current after-fact measures 
to safety, including accident investigation, human factors, and risk management - 
evaluating the existing risk control tools to maintain safety quality. Within a complex 
system like the airline industry, it is necessary - and usually taken for granted - to trace 
back the causal factors leading to the accident. By identifying the strategies that would 
enable us to cope with the deficiencies, the control system of airline safety services can 
be improved. The value of accident investigation lies in learning the relevant lessons for 
future prevention. As such, accident investigation is an appropriate tool to find out 
unanticipated failures in technology, and serves the purpose of contributing to the 
human error database. Recent incident reporting systems are also emphasised. Their 
value lies mainly in understanding system and operational human performance, 
pointing out causes for concern and signal weaknesses before the system breaks down. 
Other impacts of accidents include the improvement of safety management and risk 
management. The concept of the safety management system is now extended to 
integrate existing knowledge of safety management and provide a systematic view of 
"know-how", to which this industry has woken. Risk management tools are also 
developed in order to collect safety information and prevent the identified errors, which 
were discovered in the human factor study. As human imperfection remains a fact of 
life, error management is developed to observe training (analyse workplace) 
behaviours in an attempt to help to understand operational human performance. 
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Causes of accidents serve as contributing and primary factors to this approach, while 
risk management, human factors and error management are the diagnostic tools. 
However, the low number of accidents makes it difficult for these after-fact measures to 
determine patterns and to establish what to do next. Although incident investigation can 
have both reactive and proactive concept, a few researchers have proposed that 
adopting a proactive approach would be more effective than simply reacting to 
accidents. As such, contemporary proactive approaches to safety are investigated. 
Proactive Approaches to Safe 
The main tasks in this part are to evaluate current proactive concept and measures, to 
develop a proactive approach to safety from a cultural and organisational dimension, 
and investigate the differences between retroactive and proactive approaches. The 
difference between retroactive and proactive safety management is in the treatment of 
the contributing causes of accidents and their underlying factors to prevent accidents 
from occurring again. The traditional approach to studying aviation safety has involved 
the analysis of accident data. Research has focused on finding factors that link to, for 
example, pilot-error accidents through systematic accident investigations. However, 
accidents still happen and the accident rate has not been significantly improved for 
several decades, which points to the need for a new approach in safety management. 
Proactive safety management moves away from individual error as the focus of 
understanding accident causation, to the organisational approach. This method assigns 
the responsibility from one person at the sharp end to all systems within an organisation. 
As such, the current contemporary approaches investigated in this thesis are designed to 
aim at a systematic approach to the identification and prevention of accidents. The 
concept is also designed to ensure continuous improvement by analysing whether the 
values of an airline's culture are consistent with good safety practices. Most important 
of all, the proactive approach aims to change the organisational culture surrounding 
errors or inadequate recognition, which degrade safety, and uncover the latent 
organisational conditions stemming from organisational culture. 
Chapter 2 presents the results of an exploration of empirical and theoretical findings 
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regarding the approaches to safety within the airline industry. The results also show the 
importance of and need for proactive approaches. To this end, the second objective- to 
investigate retroactive and proactive approaches to safety and their application within 
the airline industry is achieved. 
7.1.3 Objective Three 
 To develop a model for a `safety mechanism' in the context of proactive 
safety management 
It is evident from the research findings that proactive safety is an important but still 
relatively undefined task in the airline industry. What it lacks is a model to 
conceptualise the safety mechanism in proactive safety management, which 
encompasses the culture and climate considerations and organisationally influential 
factors. Therefore, the aim to establish a framework for the study of a proactive 
approach and for the evolution of airline safety management system by the 
development of a safety mechanism model, has been targeted and developed after 
investigating both approaches to safety. 
Chapter 3 therefore describes these methodologies applied in the study. These methods 
provide a framework which allows airline safety management system to be analysed in 
a systematic manner, especially as the main emphasis was on the fundamental 
objectives of the evaluation, i. e. to obtain a critique of some of the main problems 
relating to airlines' safety management system, and justify the best solutions for 
overcoming them. 
This proactive safety mechanism model is built upon the existing knowledge of what is 
thought to contribute to an effective proactive safety by adding an increased knowledge 
of the organisational factors, which serve to influence the proactive safety mechanism, 
and which will serve to be the predictors of the safety mechanism and performance of 
airline safety services. As such, this part of study is exploratory in focus and qualitative 
in nature. 
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In Chapter 4, it introduces that interviews were firstly undertaken to gain the empirical 
knowledge and experiences necessary to develop a safety mechanism for proactive 
safety management. Combined with the academic studies in previous chapters, it is 
found that management systems and programmes must provide an effective safety 
framework because it is the importance of safety to the organisation, and the workers' 
perception of the value of safety, that "manipulate" safety performance. 
A safety mechanism model consisting of organisational climate, organisational culture, 
safety climate, safety culture, safety philosophy and decision-making has been 
developed. This model is neither a model of proactive safety management nor an 
organisational safety culture/climate model. It is a model of the evolution of the airline 
safety services (performance) with proactive safety management in SMS. By means of 
defining the criteria and interaction between each layer, the discussion provides an 
appreciation of how the safety mechanism should fit within in the airline industry, and 
build upon the concepts which have been prominent within the literature to this point in 
time. Therefore, the third objective - to develop a model for a `safety mechanism'in the 
context of proactive safety management is achieved. 
7.1.4 Objective Four 
 To verify organisational factors that affect the safety mechanism and 
investigate the relationship between the factors. 
The model also focuses on the influential factors which impact upon the development 
of a safety mechanism. Given the need for an examination of the structure underlying 
the model, Chapter 5 therefore presents the result of model test, including a case study 
and safety survey, Chapter 6 analyses and discusses the results in order to verify the 
fourth objective. 
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Case study 
The case study presented in Chapter 5 provides a useful illustration of the myriad forces 
which conspire to define a system's safety mechanism. Given the complexity of the 
case, the case study provides the reader with a greater appreciation of the explanatory 
power of the model in relation to how the safety mechanism has developed and how the 
safety management system and services have evolved. 
Survey Results 
The main objective of this safety mechanism survey is to take a closer look at the 
relationships between the forces hypothesised to be at work, provide an assessment of 
these forces, verify the influential factors and validate the hypothesised factor structure 
in the safety mechanism. In short, it aimed to provide a framework for understanding 
the factors which underlie the development of a safety mechanism across regions. By 
the survey results, the primary contribution which this model makes to the literature is 
to expand the concept of proactive safety from a conceptualisation of what an effective 
organisational culture or safety culture should be to a comprehensive model which 
recognises the fact that the safety mechanism is a complex, multi-dimensional construct, 
which evolves with time according to a wide variety of organisational factors within the 
internal and external working environment of the airline industry. By doing so, possible 
remedial action for the evolution of airline safety management system and services can 
be recommended. 
r 
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To this end, four hypotheses were set to be explored and tested in this thesis. They are 
discussed in Chapter 6: 
Hypothesis 1: The safety mechanism is the composite of organisational 
climate/culture, safety climate/culture, safetyphilosophy, and decision-making. 
The definition of each layer will be redefined (except decision-making) to suit 
the airline industry. 
The first hypothesis is supported by the literature review and empirical findings. 
Hypothesis 2: The safety mechanism model will be demonstrated as a 
multi-dimensional construct, which will be influenced by a complex 
factor-structure. Meanwhile, this factor structure will also reflect the current 
environmental factors in the airline industry. 
The second hypothesis is supported by the case study and survey results, 
although a slight difference between the hypothesised factor structure and 
survey results was found out. 
Hypothesis 3: The organisational factors mediate the relationship between the 
safety mechanism and safety performance, and act as predictors of safety 
performance. 
The third hypothesis is supported by the literature and survey results. 
Hypothesis 4: The safety mechanism model is seen as being critical to the 
development of proactive safety management; however, the airline safety health 
and performance still needs the coordination of proactive and reactive safety 
management. 
The forth hypothesis is supported by the combined finding from the results of 
interview, case study and safety survey. 
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As such, the fourth objective - to verb organisational factors that affect the safety 
mechanism and investigate the relationship between the factors is achieved after these 
four hypotheses are supported by the research findings. 
7.1.5 Objective Five 
 To make recommendations concerning how airlines can fit the proposed 
safety mechanism model to the industry for the evolution of a safety 
management system. 
In Chapter 6, the limitations and application of the safety mechanism model are also 
discussed to validate the model. Moreover, section 7.2 provides the final 
recommendations in order to fit in the airline industry and make contribution for the 
evolution of an airline safety management system. The objective five is then achieved. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
The following are the recommendations in view of: 
1. Future research areas: 
Firstly, consistent monitoring of safety performance measurement is necessary to 
justify the model, because the essence of proactive safety management is to measure 
safety performance in operation on a regular basis, instead of measuring errors or the 
occurrences of incidents or accidents, which are used as measurement in retroactive 
safety management. 
Secondly, it would be interesting to conduct other factor-structures on a regional or 
country -wide scale. As Reason (1995a) has stated, "there is unlikely to be a single 
universal set of indicators for all types of hazardous operations, one way of 
communicating how safety health can be assessed is by listing the organisational 
factors that are currently measured. " Therefore, a listing of various organisational 
factor sets, plus ANOVA analysis of factors, can provide a clear and complex view from 
different angles and concerns. 
Thirdly, as mentioned previously, there are several change management tools in current 
use in industry, and documented in the literature. It is worth exploring tools other than 
Six Sigma to integrate the identified organisational factors into airline operations, to 
identify the actions (sub-factors) required for the improvement in daily operations (or 
on a regular basis), and to suit the different needs of different companies in different 
regions. 
Lastly, although a proactive safety concept is emphasised in this thesis, there is still a 
need to develop the retroactive approaches to safety, the concepts and methodologies of 
which are described in Chapter 2. Because retroactive safety management has proved 
fruitful for the entire airline industry, its value is without doubt. For example, perhaps 
accident investigation must improve in its global consistency. Organisations must 
however learn form the misfortune even if the accident report is not aimed at them. 
250 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
2. The airline safety management system: 
Due to the variability of the airline industry; individual airlines should focus on 
conducting safety surveys and their analysis to decide which of the factors are most 
critical to them. It is worthy noting that although English is an international language, it 
is recommended to use their native languages to design the questions in order to ensure 
the respondents fully understand the meaning and implication, when conducting the 
safety survey. By doing so, the most critical (important) areas in the airline can be 
identified (it is even better to conduct deep dialogue interviews to augment the survey 
analysis). 
One particular factor was also identified as critical to perceived safety performance, 
namely the barrier of organisational learning. This fact has two implications: (1) if the 
barriers confronted by the company are not removed, safety performance is unable to 
improve. So barriers of organisational learning are critical to airline safety 
performance. (2) to remove the barriers of organisational learning relies on change 
management, as discussed in Section 2.3.2.4. 
The latter implication echoes and justifies the tools adopted by the research to translate 
the factors into the company change management tools. Yet it is worth noting that in 
Section 2.3.2.4, change management is stated as the result of organisational learning, 
which is attributed to feedback in risk management, or broadly speaking, the safety 
management system. In other words, it is "mistakes" that drives the learning and 
change. This approach matches up with the retroactive concept. Compared with the 
change management tools adopted in the safety mechanism model, the latter help to 
identify the defects proactively and correct them in advance before they become 
"mistakes". Both of them, however, are equally important to airline operations. As 
such, airline managers need to evaluate and distinguish them carefully in order to 
choose suitable change management tools for airline operation. 
Moreover, the suggested change management tools require the cross function 
co-operation between different departments, similar to BA's example regarding culture 
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change (Appendix G). The thesis has also discussed the need for a complex interaction 
across all departments when addressing flight safety risks and business risks within the 
airline industry, and the interdepartmental training programmes associated with 
proactive training for employees in responding to assaults or potential assaults in 
Chapter 2. To this end, the systemic approach requires that organisational change is 
brought about by an improvement in organisational factors. Once this is done, the 
proactive safety mechanism will become stronger and stronger. 
Furthermore, one point worth emphasising is the fact that the identified internal 
organisational factors are all found to be significantly correlated with the impact of the 
regulatory environment. The role of the regulator and its relationship with airlines are 
described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 (the results of the interviews), where also 
identifies that airline safety climate is governed by the regulatory environment and 
regulators. It is obvious that the recent deregulation, globalisation and privatisation of 
airlines have strengthened the role and responsibilities of regulators, who provide many 
functions to the airline, especially in terms of safety monitoring and safety inspection. 
With their help, management's role is to develop a supportive system to identify 
barriers proactively and retrospectively so that all employees can strive for continuous 
improvement. The aim of evolution within airline safety management system can then 
be achieved. 
Lastly, in order to fulfil the recommendations to the airline industry and particularly to 
safety managers, a framework is developed to recommend how an airline safety 
management system may be benchmarked and improved by incorporating the research 
results from the thesis. 
In Chapter 4, the results of the interviews summarised a common framework of risk 
assessment in the airline industry, as presented in Figure 4-2 (page 120). Based on this 
finding, Figure 7-1 adds the main results of this research containing the extent of 
previous chapters as well as the application and recommendations mentioned in this 
chapter. The establishment of this figure provides the industry with a quick and clear 
picture of the structure regarding retroactive and proactive management in airline 
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safety management system, which also allows various airlines to assess themselves by 
comparing themselves with other airlines. 
To the end, by further providing this framework, it is hoped that the airline industry and 
particularly safety managers will become more aware of their positions and the 
competitive advantages of improving safety when conducting airline safety 
management system and safety performance. 
253 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Figure 7-1 A Generic Framework for Retroactive and Proactive Approach 
to Safety within Airline SMS 
Airline safety management system 
" Policies and principles/ Documentation/ Accountabilities/ Training/ Communication 
" Role of regulator: (Form safety climate) 
Retroactive approach 
Accidents/Incidents investigation: 
" Investigate structural failure 
" Identify human 
erroneous behaviour (human factors) 
..................... Risk.. Mana 
Hazards identification 
- Incident investigation 
- Reporting system 
- Auditing 
Identify process/procedure risks 
Assess risk and risk analysis 
Risk assessment, Evaluate data, Trend analysis 
Proactive approach 
Cultural dimension 
Organisational climate/culture, 
safety culture 
Result of incidents 
investigation 
Risk control (defences) and recovery 
Internal surveys, 
Risk programmes 
.................................................................................................................................................................. " 
Human and risk vs. Human, risk and culture vs. 
Retroactive programme Proactive programme 
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Develop safety survey based on the proactive 
safety mechanism: Organisational climate 
Organisational culture 
Safety climate 
Safety culture 
Safety philosophy 
Decision making 
List Organisational factors: 
Internal factors- 
1: Employee safety attitude & behaviour 
2: Employee safety concept 
3: Level of operational safety in 
operation and maintenance 
4: Corporate safety policy 
5: Personnel - quality of working life 
6: Employment of risk programme 
7: Impact of accidentrncidents 
8: Financial concern 
9: Procedures and documentation 
10: Commercial cost pressures 
11: Organisational structure and management commitment 
12: Communication system 
13: Necessity of safety reports 
External factors- 
1: Influences of region and country 
2: Public and the media influence 
3: Impact of regulatory environment 
4: Involvement of investment community 
Feed back and organisational change Change analysis 
" Build safety case Incorporate suitable change management 
tools: e. g. Six Sigma, etc. 
FOrganisational 
learning and change management 
e. g. Re-define policies and principles, evaluation system, 
training process, accountabilities, etc 
Safety Health= Retroactive approach+ Proactive approach 
(safety performance) (retroactive+ proactive safety management) 
q. 
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Finale 
In an attempt to provide transport and safety services, the airline industry involve an 
array of equipment, high technology and supporting services, etc. The complexity of 
this structure provides many opportunities for errors, some of which even result in 
serious incidents or accidents. Though aircraft accidents occur very infrequently, they 
undoubtedly have a high impact and pose a severe threat to airline viability. To prevent 
them from recurring, the industry throughout the world has invested substantial 
amounts of time and money in discovering the causes of accidents and incidents. In 
recent years, the airline industry has begun to analyse hazardous situations and to 
correct them before they result in accidents or incidents. However, even with this effort 
and the advance of technology, accidents still occur, and with each accident, public 
fears about air safety are fuelled. 
Accidents/incidents bring risk and fear into our lives, so people are motivated to satisfy 
these safety needs and search the reasons why they went wrong, which is the sprit of 
retroactive safety management. If this need is not met (e. g. to improve the reliability of 
aircraft), people will be stuck at this level, and will feel that something is lacking. Yet, 
the cause of dissatisfaction is easy to identify (e. g. causes of accidents/ incidents, 
human factors, etc. ). 
On the other hand, proactive safety management is like reaching the top level of 
self-actualisation. At this level, people start to pursue the self-actualisation needs, 
which are "the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that 
one is capable of becoming. " As though built into the human gene, everyone in the 
airline has the necessary concepts, attitudes, behaviours, knowledge, decision-making, 
etc. orientated towards safety. 
One metaphor is that retroactive approaches to safety are like plastic surgery. One can 
actually become more beautiful after the surgery but the fundamental genetic makeup is 
never changed. The way one thinks and behaves still remains the same as before. 
Offspring will inherit this genetic makeup, which may become a family trait. 
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Conversely, proactive approaches to safety are more like genetic engineering before a 
baby is even born, in order to create the right personality. This is the essence of 
proactive safety management. Therefore in summary, the ultimate contribution of this 
research is to provide airlines with reliable data, applicable references and practicable 
methodology to enable their safety management system to evolve at a fundamental, 
"genetic" level. 
257 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This page has been left blank intentionally 
258 
References- 
Aarons, R. N., Safety Cultures Vital in Business Aviation. Business & Commercial 
Aviation, September 1998,9. 
Abeyratne, R. I. R., The regulatory management of safety in air transport. Journal ofAir 
Transport Management. 4(1), 1998,25-37. 
Adams, G B. and Ingersoll, V. H., Painting over old works: The culture of organisations 
in an age of technical rationality. In: Organisational symbolism, Turner, B. A., (Eds), 
Berlin: Walther De Gruyter, 1989. 
Airbus Industrie, Global Market Forecast 1995-2014: a long range view. Blagnac: Airbus 
Industrie, 1995. 
Airline Business, The world airline ranking. 17(9), September 2001,57-92. 
AIR SAFETY WEEK, Next year "crucial " for safer skies accident reduction program. 
15 (14), April 2,2001,1-4. 
Air Transport Intelligence (ATI), Online Database. http: //www. rati. com 
Air Transport World, World airline report. 38(7), July 2001,49-150. 
Akhurst, D. and Vivian, M., The management of systems for safety and the virtual airline. 
Flight Safety Foundation/International Federation of Airworthiness in conjunction with 
the International Air Transport Association 50"' Annual International Air Safety Seminar. 
Arlington, Virginia, November 6,1997. 
Al-Harabi, A., Aviation maintenance in multicultural settings: the challenges of cultural 
tolerance and of employees' maintenance resource managementhuman factors 
awareness, Ph. D. Thesis, Cranfield University, College of Aeronautics, Air Transport, 
2001. 
Arbon, E. R., Mouden, L. H. and Feeler, R. A., The Practice of Aviation Safety. Flight 
Safety Foundation, FSF/CP-90/12, June 1990. 
Bacchi, M., Cacciabue, C. and O'Connor, S., Reactive and proactive methods for human 
factors studies in aviation maintenance. 9`h Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio, 
USA, 27 April -1 May 1997. 
Bailey, C. W., and Peterson, D., Using perception surveys to assess system effectiveness. 
Professional Safety, February, 1989,22-26. 
Barnett, A. and Higgins, M. K., Airline safety: the last decade. Management Science. 
35(l), 1989,1-21. 
259 
References 
Barnett, A. and Wang, A., Airline Safety: The Recent Record. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998. 
Beaty, D., The naked pilot: the human factor in aircraft accidents. Shrewsbury: Airlife, 
1995. 
Becker, T. A., Passenger Perceptions of Airline Safety: Marketing Safety Records. Flight 
Safety Foundation, Flight Safety Digest, October 1992. 
Berendsen, R., The Role of International Standards and Guidelines for Achieving System 
Safety. 3rd Annual Conference on Aviation Safety Management, London, 22-23 May, 
2000. 
Bisson, T., A Corporate Approach to Safety Management. Flight Safety Foundation 50th 
IASS, Washington DC, U. S., 4 November, 1997. 
Boeing, unpublished. Boeing Safety Program Model. Seattle, Boeing Airplane Group. 
Boeing, Current Market Outlook, Boeing Airplane Group, June 2001. 
Braithwaite, G R., and Caves, R. E., Airline safety - some lessons from Australia. The 
Aeronautical Journal, January 1997. 
Brown, R. L and Holmes, H., The use of a factor-analysis procedure for assessing the 
validity of an employee safety climate model. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 18(6), 
1986,455-470. 
Budworth, N., Strengthening the voice of the health of safety professional in the policy 
process. Proceedings of the RoSPAAnnual Congress, 1996. 
Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI), An Evaluation of the BASI-INDICATE Safety 
Programme, Canberra, 1998. 
Cabrera, D. D., Isla, R., and Vilela, L. D, An evaluation of safety climate in ground 
handling activities. In: Soekkha, H. M. (Ed. ), Aviation Safety, Proceedings of the 
IASC-97 International Aviation Safety Conference, Netherlands, 27-29 August, 1997. 
Chang, Y. 'n%! NM (in English: Air Transportation Management), 1St 
edition, Taipei: Ding Hang, 1998,2-14. 
Chang, Y. C., Influence of airline ownership rules on aviation policies and carrier 
strategies, PhD thesis, Cranfield University, 2002. 
Chapman, I., Maintenance Error Management Theory, MEMS Workshop, UK CAA, 
2000. 
260 
References 
Choularton, R., Complex learning: Organisational learning from disasters. Safety Science, 
39 (2001), 61-70,2001. 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Aviation Safety Management- An operator 
guide to building a safety programme, Australia, 1998. 
Collins Concise Dictionary & Thesaurus, New edition, Glasgow, UK: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1995. 
Cooper, M. D., and Philips, R. A., Validation of a safety climate measure. Paper presented 
at the British Psychological Society, Annual Occupational Psychology Conference, 
Birmingham, 3-5 January, 1994. 
Cox, S. and Cox, T., The structure of employee attitudes to safety: a European example. 
Work and Stress, 5(2), 1991,93-106. 
Curtis, T., Airline accidents and media bias: New York Times 1978-1994, (1997). 
http: //airsafe. com/nyt bias. htm 
Dannatt, R., The Role and Effectiveness of Government Regulation ofAir Transport 
Safety. 4th Air Transport Research Group Conference (ATRG), 2-4 July, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, 2000. 
Darlington, R. B., Factor Analysis. http: //comp9. psych. comell. edu/Darlington/factor. htm, 
2002. 
Dedobbeleer, N., Beland, F., and German, P., Is there a relationship between attributes of 
construction sites and workers safety practices and climate perceptions ? In : Das, B. 
(Ed. ), Advances in Industrial Ergonomics and Safety II, London : Taylor and Francis, 
1990,725-732. 
De Cock, G, Bouwen, R., de Witte, K., Organisatieklimaat: Een opdracht voor het 
personeelsbeleid? Praktisch Personeelsbeleid, Capita Selecta 16,1986,1-20. 
Degani, A. and Wiener, E. L., Philosophy, policies, procedures and practices: The four 
`P's of flight deck operations. In: Aviation Psychology in Practice, eds. Johnson, N., 
McDonald, N. and Fuller, R., Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1994,44-67. 
Doganis, R., The airline business in the twenty-first century. 1" edition, London: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Doganis, R., Airline trends, challenges and prospects. Visiting lecture note. Air transport 
Group, College of Aeronautics, Cranfield University, November 2001 a. 
ýý....... _.. __. _.. .... 261 
References 
Doganis, R., Flying off course, the economics of international airlines. 3Td edition, 
London: Routledge, 2002. 
Donald, I. And Cantor, D., Attitudes to Safety: Psychological Factors and the Accidents 
Plateau. Industrial Review and Report, 347,1993,3-8. 
Dumas, R., Safety and Quality: the human dimension, Professional Safety, 32 (12), 
December, 1987. 
Edkins, G. D., The INDICATE safety program; evaluation of a method to proactively 
improve airline safety performance. Safety Science. 30,1998,275-295. 
Edwards, C. J., Developing of safety case with an aircraft operator. IBC Conference on 
Aviation Safety Management, London, 20-21 May, 1999. 
Edwards, C. J., Developing of a hazard model for an aviation safety case. FSF, IFA & 
IATA Joint Meeting on "Enhancing safety in the 21st century", Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
November, 1999a. 
Earnest, R. E., Characteristics of proactive & reactive safety systems. Professional Safety, 
42 (11), 1997,27-29. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Human Factors Guide for Aviation Maintenance, 
1995. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Aviation Requirements (FAR) Part 121, 
1996. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Strategy Document, 1997a. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Human Factors Issues in Aviation Maintenance 
and Inspection, Aviation Medicine, 1997b. 
Ferry, S. T., Modern accident investigation and analysis. The USA: Wiley & Sons, 1988. 
Fischoff, B., Acceptable risk: a conceptual approach. Risk: Health, Safety & Environment, 
5 (1), 1994,1-28. 
Fitts, P. M. and Jones, R. E., Analysis of factors contributing to 460 `pilot error" 
experiences on operating aircraft controls (TSEAA-694-12). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: 
Aero medical Laboratory, 1947. 
Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), The Dollars and Sense of Risk Management and Airline 
Safety, Flight Safety Digest, May 1999a. 
262 
References 
Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Icarus Committee, Airline Safety: Airline Management 
Self-Audit, Flight Safety Digest, May 1999b. 
Flin, R., Meams, K., O'Connor, P., and Bryden, R., Measuring safety climate: identifying 
the common features. Safety Science, 34(2000), 2000,177-192. 
Furnham, A., and Gunter, B., Corporate assessment: auditing a company's personality. 
London: Routledge, 1993. 
Geller, E. S., Ten Principles for Achieving a Total Safety Culture. Professional Safety. 
September, 1994,18-24. 
Glennon, D. P., Measuring organizational safety climate. Australian Safety News, 23-28 
January 1982. 
Glendon, A. I., Stanton, N. A., and Harrison, D., Factor analysing a performance shaping 
concepts questionnaire. In: Roberton, S, A. (Ed. ), Contemporary Ergonomics 1994: 
Ergonomics for all. London: Taylor& Francis, 1994,304-345. 
Glendon, A. I., and Stanton, N. A., Perspectives on safety culture. Safety Science, 34, 
2000,193-214. 
Glendon, A. I., and Litherland, D. K., Safety climate factors, group differences and safety 
behaviour in road construction. Safety Science, 39(2001), 2001,157-188. 
Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN), Operator's Flight Safety Handbook. FAA, 
Issue 1, June 2000. 
Goglia, J., NTSB Report, the Fourteenth Annual Symposium on Human Factors in 
Aviation Maintenance, Vancouver, March 38-30 2000. 
Green, R. G., Muir, H., James, M., Gradwell, D. and Green, R., Human Factors for 
Pilots. 2nd ed., London: Avebury, 1996. 
Grimaldi, J. V. and Simonds, R. H., Safety Management, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin Inc., 1984. 
Grose, V. L., Managing risk: systematic loss prevention for executives. Englewood, Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1987. 
Guldenmund, F. W., The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research. Safety 
Science, 34 (2000), 2000,215-257. 
Hague, P. N., Questionnaire Design. London: Kogan Page, 1993. 
......, ý_ a .. _. 263 _, _ .... _ _..... __. . 
References 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., Black, W. C., Multivariate Data Analysis with 
Readings. 4th edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995. 
Hale, A. R. and Glendon, I. A., Individual Behavior in the Control of Danger. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 1987. 
Hamilton, C., "Back to Basics" Safety Audits, 10`h EASS "Managing Aviation Safety- 
Back to Basics", Flight Safety foundation (FSF), Amsterdam, Netherlands, March 1998. 
Hammer, W., Handbook of system and product safety. New Jersey USA: Prentice 
Hall, 1972. 
Hampden-Turner, C., Corporate Culture, London: Piatkus, 1994. 
Handy, C. B., Understanding Organisations, 3rd Ed., London: Penguin Books, 1985. 
Hart, C., The Global analysis and information network (GAIN), 
http: //www. nasdae. faa. gov/GAIN/presentation/Chris Hart sneech. htm 
(30 January, 1999) 
Hawkins, F. H., Human Factors in Flight. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2nd edition edited by 
Harry W. Orlady, 1993. 
Hayward, B., Culture, CRM and aviation safety, Aviation Safety for the 21st Century in 
The Asia Pacific Region, Asia Pacific Regional Seminar. The Australian and New 
Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investigators (ANZSASI), Brisbane, Australia, 29-31 
May 1997. 
Head, T., Report into Glider conspicuity trail held at RAF Bicester in June and 
October 2002. Human Factor Group, Cranfield University, 2003. 
Heinrich, H. W., Petersen, D., and Roos, N., Industrial accident prevention: A safety 
management approach. 5`h ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980. 
Heimreich, R. L., Managing human error in aviation. Scientific American. 276( 5), 1997, 
62-67. 
Heimreich, R. L., Culture threat, and error: assessing system safety. Safety in Airlines- 
The Management Commitment, Joint conference of the Royal Aeronautical Society and 
the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators, 3-4 June 1999, London, UK. 3.1-3.10. 
Heimreich, R. L., A closer inspection: what really happens in the cockpit, Flight safety 
Australia, January-February 2001,32-35. 
264 
References 
Heimreich, R. L. and Wilhelm J. A., CRM and Culture: National, Professional, 
Organ isational, Safety. 9"' Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio, USA, 27 April -1 
May 1997. 
Herrero, S. G, Saldana, M. A., Campo, M. A., and Ritzel, D. 0., From the traditional 
concept of safety management to safety integrated with quality. Journal of Safety 
Research, 33 (2002), 1-20,2002. 
Ho, L. C., A critical analysis of airline safety management with reference to pilots and 
aviation authority officers. Ph. D. thesis, Cranfield University, UK, 1996. 
Hobbs, A., Maintenance human factors: Learning from errors to improve systems, in B. J. 
Hayward and A. R. Lowe (eds) Aviation Resource Management, Vol. 1, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000,347 - 355. 
Hofstede, G, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980. 
Hofstede, G, Cultures and Organisations: Software of the mind: Intercultural 
Cooperations and Its Importance for Survival. London: McGraw-Hill, 1994. 
Hollnagel E., Human Reliability Analysis-Context and Control. London: Academic Press, 
1993. 
Holtom, M., FOQA: Aviation's Most Importance Safety Tool. "Enhancing Safety in the 
2 1s` Century", FSF, IFA and IATA Joint Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 1999. 
Hood, C., Jones, D. K., Pidgeon, N. F., Turner, B. A. and Gibson, R., Risk management. 
In: Risk: Analysis, perception and management, London: The Royal Society, 1992. 
Hsu, Y. L, An Analysis of the Impact ofAccidents on Airline Performance. MSc thesis, 
Cranfield University, UK 1999. 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Safety in Operations, The 20th Technical 
Conference of IATA, Istanbul, 10-14 November 1975. 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Passenger Forecast 1998-2002, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 1998. 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Aviation Information and Research, 
September 2001 Industrie Briefing, Geneva, Switzerland, 2001. 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Passenger Forecast 2001-2005, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2002. 
,.,. _. _... 265 
References 
International Civil Aviation Organisation ( ICAO), Accident Prevention Manual ICAO, 
Montreal, Canada, 1984. 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Human Factors Digest No. ], ICAO, 
Montreal, Canada, 1989. 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Circular 247, Human Factors Digest 
No. 10: Human Factors, Management and Organisation, ICAO, Montreal, Canada 1994. 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Human Factors Training Manual. 
(Doc 9683) ICAO, Montreal, Canada, 1998. 
International Federation of Airworthiness (IFA), Engineering Solutions to Human 
Problems, videos and training package, 1998. 
Janic, M., An assessment of risk and safety in civil aviation. Journal ofAir Transport 
Management, 6 (2000), 2000,43-50. 
Johnson, D., Turning safety on its head. Industrial Safety & Hygiene News. October 
1994. 
Johnson, G, and Scholes, K., Exploring Corporate Strategy. 2nd Ed., New York London: 
Prentice-Hall, 1988. 
Johnston, N., CRM: Cross-cultural perspectives. In: Cockpit resource management. 
Wiener, E. L., B. G, Kanki and Heimreich, R. L., (Eds. ) San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
1993. 
Johnston, N., Managing risk in flight operations. In: Applied Aviation Psychology, Ed. 
Hayward, B. J., H. and Lowe, A. R (Eds. ). Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996,1-19. 
Joint Airworthiness Association (JAA), Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR) 25.1309 
Large Aeroplanes, July 1996. 
Joint Airworthiness Association (JAA), Joint Airworthiness Requirements JAR-OPS 1 
Commercial Air Transportation (Aeroplanes). March, 1998. 
Kuang Fu Publishing, SI AN O, 3<A (in English: Those which transportation creates 
history), 1988. 
Lauber, J., Safety cultures and the importance of human factors. The CRMAdvocate, 94 
(4), 1994,1-3. 
Lauber, J., In: The Fallible Human. AEROSPACE, August 1996. 
266 
References 
Laurent, A., Human Resource Management in International Firms, Ed., Evan, P., London: 
Macmillan, 1990. 
Lawrence, B. M., Managing Safety Through the Aircraft Lifecycle- An Aircraft 
Manufacturers Perspective. Aviation Safety Management Conference, 20-21 May, 
London, 1999. 
Learmount, D., Safety. Flight International, 2 Jan, 2001,64. 
Lee, T., Perceptions, attitudes and behaviour: the vital elements of a safety culture. Health 
and Safety, October, 1996,1-15. 
Lowrance, W. W., Of acceptable risk. William Kaufmann 1976. 
Manzella, J. C., Achieving safety performance excellence through total quality management. 
Professional Safety, 42(5), 1997,26- 28. 
Marquardt, M. and Reynolds, A., The Global Learning Organization. Gaining 
Competitive Advantage Through Continuous learning. Burr Ridge, III: Irwin 
Professional Publishing, 1993. 
Maurino, D. E. Cross cultural perspectives in human factors training: Lessons from the 
ICAO Human Factors Programme. The International Journal ofAviation Psychology, 
4(2), 1994,173-181. 
Maurino, D. E., Reason, R., Johnston N., and Lee, R. B., Beyond Aviation Human 
Factors. London: Ashgate Publishing, 1995. 
Maurino, D. E., In: The fallible human, AEROSPACE, August 1996. 
Maurino, D. E., CRM. Past, Present and Future. Paper presented in 9th Symposium on 
Aviation Psychology, Ohio, USA, 27 April -1 May 1997. 
Maurino, D. E., Tired of sweeping up at the end of the parade, Flight Safety Australia, 
January-February 2001,36-39. 
McDonald, N. and Ryan, F., Constraints on the development of safety culture: A 
preliminary analysis. The Irish Journal of Psychology, 13(2), 1992,273-281. 
McFadden, K. L., and Towell, E. R., Aviation human factors: a framework for the new 
millennium. Journal ofAir Transport Management, 5,1999,177-184. 
McIntyre, G. R., Patterns in safety thinking. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. . 
267 
References 
McIntyre, G. R., The application of system safety engineering and management 
techniques at the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Safety Science, 40,2002, 
325-335. 
Merritt A., Replicating Hofstede: A study of pilots in eighteen countries. Paper presented 
in 9th Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio, USA, 27 April-1 May 1997. 
Merritt A. and Heimreich, R. L., Creating and sustaining a safety culture: some practical 
strategies. In: Applied Aviation Psychology, Ed. Hayward, B. J., H. and Lowe, A. R. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996,20-26. 
Morley, F. J. J., Ripples in a pond: a comprehensive, generalised model of the evolution 
of safety culture. PhD thesis, Cranfield University, 1999. 
Morrison, S and Winston, C., Air Safety deregulation and public policy. The Bookings 
Review, 6,10-14, Winter, 1988. 
Moses, L. M., and Savage, I. (eds. ), Transportation Safety in an Age of Deregulation. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Muir, H. and Thomas, L., Passenger safety in very large transport aircraft. The 
Aeronautical Journal, April, 2003,201-206. 
Nagel, D. C., Human error in aviation operations. In: Human factors in aviation. Ed. 
Nagel, C., and Wiener, E. L., San Diego: Academic Press, Inc., 1988. 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-97/06): 
In-Flight Fire and Impact with Terrain, ValuJet Airlines, Flight 592, DC-9-32, N904 Vi 
Everglades, Near Miami, Florida. May 11,1996. NTSB, Washington, 1997. 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Aircraft Accident Report (DCA82AAO11), 
Air Florida, Flight 90, B737, Washington, January 13,1982. NTSB, Washington, 1983. 
Neal, A., Griffin, M. A., and Hart, P. M., The impact of organizational climate on safety 
climate and individual behavior. Safety Science, 34,2000,99-109. 
Niskanen, T., Safety climate in the road administration. Safety Science 17,1994,237-255. 
Overall, M., Managing Safety Management. Effective Safety, IBC Conference for Health 
& Environment Management, London, 20-23 September, 1999. 
Panes, J., Evolution of the Aviation Safety Paradigm: Towards Systemic Causality and. 
Proactive Actions. In: Applied Aviation Psychology, Ed. Hayward, B. J., H. and Lowe, A. 
R. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996,39-49. 
268 
References 
Pasman, H. J., Risk informed resource allocation policy: safety can save costs. Journal of 
Hazardous Material, 71 (2000), 2000,375-394. 
Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic 
Books, 1984. 
Petersen, D., What should be use and why. Professional Safety, 43 (10), 1998. 
Pidgeon, N., Safety culture and risk management in organization. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology 22(1), 1991,129-140. 
Pidgeon, N., and O'Leary, M., Man-made disasters: why technology and organizations 
(sometimes) fail, Safety Science, 34,2000,15-30. 
Profit, R., Systematic safety management in the air traffic services. London: Euromoney, 
1995. 
Rasmussen, J., Trends in human reliability analysis. Ergonomics, 28 (8), 1985, 
1185-1196. 
Reason, J. Human Factor. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Reason, J., Comprehensive error management in aircraft engineering. Human Factors in 
Maintenance. The Aerotech 94 Congress. London: Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
1994. 
Reason, J., A systems approach to organizational error. ERGONOMICS. 38( 8), 1995a, 
1708-1721. 
Reason, J, In: Beyond aviation human factors: safety in high technology systems. Edited 
by D Maurino, N Johnston, J. Reason and B. Lee, Aldershot: Avebury Aviation, 1995b. 
Reason, J., Managing the risks of organizational accidents, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997. 
Robbins, S. P., Essentials of Organisational Behaviour. 3rd edition, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall, 1992. 
Rohner, R. P., Towards a conception of culture for cross-cultural psychology. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15,1984,111-138. 
Rose, L. N., Profitability and product quality: Financial indicators and airline accident 
performance. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA. 
1988. 
Rose, L. N., Fear of flying? Economic analyses of airline safety. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 6(2), Spring 1992,75-94. 
.. W.., __.. 269 ..... ýý... , 
References 
Sadgrove, K., Complete guide to business risk management, Aldershot: Gower, 1996. 
Sales, E., Prince, C., Browers, C. A., Stout, R. J., Oster, R. L. and Cannon-Bowers, J. A., 
A Methodology for enhancing crew resource management training. Human Factors. 
41(l), 1999,161-172. 
Savage, J., The Use of Flight Data in Airline Safety Management, Joint conference of the 
Royal Aeronautical Society and the Guild of Air pilots and Air Navigators- Safety in 
Airline- The Management commitment. 3-4 June, 1999. 
Sayce, A., Interview notes of Safety Regulation Group, UKCAA. December 2001. 
Schein, E. H., Organisational culture and leadership. 2°d edition, San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1992. 
Schneider, B., Organisational Climates: an essay. Personal Psychology 28,1975, 
447-479. 
Shrivastava, P., A Typology of Organisational Learning Systems. Journal of Management 
Studies, 21(1), 1983,7-28. 
Sharples, C., An airline's view of airline safety management, Focus on Commercial 
Aviation Safety, 24, Autumn 1996,12-16. 
Shorrock, S. T and Kirwan, B., Development and application of a human error 
identification tool for air traffic control. Applied Ergonomics, 33 (2002), 2002,319-336. 
Smircich, L., Concepts of culture and organisatioanl analysis. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28 (1983), 1983,339-358. 
Smith, C., High risk business. Airline Business, 12(11), November 1996,68-69. 
Smith, T. A., Will safety be ready for workplace 2000. Professional safety, 41(2), 1996, 
37-38. 
Smith, D., Making sense of disaster : issues in organisational learning. IBC Conference 
on Aviation Safety Management, London, 20-21 May, 1999. 
Stacey, R. D., Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics. London: Pitman, 
1993. 
Taylor, A. F., Human Factors. Lecture note from the short course "Accident 
Investigation", 1999. 
270 
References 
Taylor, F. and Y. L. Hsu, Evaluation of reactive and proactive approaches to safety within 
the airline industry, paper presented at the Fourth Pacific International Conference on 
Aerospace Science and Technology (PICAST 4), Taiwan, 21-23 May, 2001a. 
Taylor, F. and Y. L. Hsu, The Impact ofAccidents on Airline Performance. Paper 
published and allowed to present in the 9th WCTR Conference, Seoul, July 22-27 2001b. 
The Economist, How safe is your airlines? 342 (7999). January 1 1th -17`h, 1997,15. 
Transport Canada, Risk Management and Decision-making in Civil Aviation, TP 13095, 
Canada, April 2001 a. 
Transport Canada, Introduction to Safety Management Systems, TP 13739, Canada, April 
2001b. 
Turner, B. A., Exploring the Industrial Subculture. London: Macmillan, 1971. 
UKCAA (Civil Aviation Authority in United Kingdom), Human Factors and Aircraft 
Maintenance Handbook. Issue 2, UK, August 2000. 
UKCAA (Civil Aviation Authority in United Kingdom), CAP 712: Safety Management 
Systems for Commercial Air Transport Operations. UK, May 2001. 
Warner, F., Introduction. In: Risk: Analysis, perception and management, London: The 
Royal Society, 1992. 
Watkins, M., Investigation of the Impact of the Airbus A3XX on Airport Operation. MSc 
Thesis, Cranfield University, 1997. 
Wells, A., Commercial Aviation Safety, Blue Ridge Summit, Pa: TAB Books, 1991. 
Westrum, R., Cultures with requisite imagination. In: Wise, J., Hopkin, V. D. and Stager, 
P. (Eds. ), Verification and validation of complex systems: Human factors issues. Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag, 1993. 
Westrum, R., Organisational dynamics and safety. In: McDonald, N., Johnston N. and 
Stager, P. (Eds. ), Application of psychology to the aviation system. Aldershot, UK: 
Avebury, 1995. 
Westrum, R., Human factors experts beginning to focus on organizational factors in 
safety, ICAO Journal, October 1996. 
Whorton, J. W. and Worthley, J. A., A perspective on the challenge of public management: 
Environmental paradox and organisational culture. Academy of Management Review, 6, 
1981,357-363. 
271 
References 
Wiener, E. L., Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error, Flight Safety 
Digest, February, 1995. 
Wiener, E. L., Chidester, T. R., Kanki, B. G, Palmer, E. A., Curry, R. E. and Gregorich, S. 
E., The impact of cockpit automation on crew coordination and communication: I. 
Overview, LOFT evaluations, error severity and questionnaire data. NASA Report 
CR-177587, Moffett Field, CA, NASA-Ames Research Center, 1991. 
Williamson, A. M., Feyer, A. M., Cairns, D., and Biancotti, D., The development of a 
measure of safety climate: the role of safety perceptions and attitudes. Safety Science 25, 
1997,15-27. 
Woods, H. R., Aviation Safety Programs. USA: IAP, Inc., 1992. 
Zohar, D., Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied implications. 
Journal ofApplied Psychology, 65(1), 1980,96-102. 
272 
Bibliography 
Air Transport World, Sorting Out the Answers. 30(4), April 1993,82-84. 
Chan, H., Can airline public relations activities suppress the effect of negative 
publicity caused by safety incidents? MSc thesis, Cranfield University, 2001. 
Maslow, A. H., Motivation and Personality. 2nd ed., New York: Hamper and Row, 
1970. 
Ale, B., Smith, E., and Pitblado, R., Safety around airports- Developments in the 
1990s and the Future Directions. P Annual Conference on Aviation Safety 
Management, London, 22-23 May, 2000. 
Bailey, J., Could you please confirm......? Airline Business, 15(1), 1999,36-37. 
Barnett, A., Abraham, M., Schimmel, V., Airline safety: some empirical findings. 
Management Science, 25(11), 1979,1045-1056. 
Boeing, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents - Worldwide 
Operations 1959-2002, Boeing Airplane Group, May 2003. 
Braithwaite, G R., Caves, R. E., and Faulkner, J. P. E., Australian aviation safety - 
observations from the `lucky' country. Journal ofAir Transport Management, 4, 
1998,55-62. 
Cooper, D. Measurement of Safety Climate: A component analysis, paper 
presented at IOSH meeting, February 1, London, 1995. 
Cooper, W. E., CFIT: How do we terrain-proof our pilots. In: Applied Aviation 
Psychology, Ed. Hayward, B. J., H. and Lowe, A. R. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1996,89-96. 
Crosby, P. B., Lets talk quality. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989. 
Deacon, A., The role of safety in total quality management. The Safety and Health 
Practitioner, 12(1), 1994,18-21. 
DO 178B/ED-12B Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification, 1992. 
Doganis, R., The airport business. London: Routledge, 1998. 
273.., ý_ý, 
Bibliography 
Donoghue, J. A., Safety responsibility. Air Transport World, 32 (2), 1995. 
Edkins, G. D., Reducing operating costs through proactive safety: Lessons from 
Australia. Paper presented at the International Air Transport Association "Inflight 
Management 99' Conference, Amman, Jordan 3-5 May 1999. 
Evan, J. R. and Lindsay, W. M., The management and control of quality. 3rd 
edition, New York: West Publishing, 1995. 
Fewings, R., Introduction to Airports, Lecture note. Air Transport Group, College 
of Aeronautics, Cranfield University, 2001. 
Garvin, D. A., How the Baldrige Award really works. Harvard Business Review, 
69 (6), 1991,80-95. 
Goetsch, D. L., Occupational safety and health for technologist, engineers and 
managers. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1999. 
Goldbaum, E., Airline & Safety: Computer project aims to prevent errors, 
Reporter-State University of New York at Buffalo, 28(14), December, 1996. 
Guild, S., Picking up the pieces. Airline Business, 11(3), March 1995. 
Hampden-Turner, C., Corporate Culture for Competitive Edge. A user's guide. 
London: the Economist Publications, 1990. 
Hudson, P., Reason, J., Wagenaar, W., Bentley, P., Primrose, M. and Visser, J., 
Tripod DELTA : proactive approach to enhanced safety. Journal of Petroleum 
Technology, 46,1994,58-62. 
Hudson, P., van der Graaf, G C., and Verschuur, W. L. G, Perceptions of 
Procedures by Operators and Supervisors. HSE Conference of the Society of 
Petroleum Engineers, Caracas, 1998. 
Hughes, C. S., Managing Quality. 79th Annual Meeting of Transportation 
Research Board (TRB), Washington DC, 9-13 January, 2000. 
Keating, S. D., How can aviation insurance underwriting be made more 
profitable? 
MSc thesis, Air Transport Group, Cranfield University, 1994. 
Kotler, P., Armstrong, G, Saunders. J., and Wong V., Principles of marketing. 2nd ed., 
London: Prentice Hall Europe, 1999. 
274 
Bibliography 
Kotter, P. J. and Heskett, L. J., Corporate culture and performance. New York: 
The Free Press, 1992. 
Lee, P. Y., The Price of Saving Passenger Lives with Reference to Asia Pacific and 
Latin America. MSc thesis, Air Transport Group, Cranfield University, 2000. 
Lyle, C., Guiding international civil aviation into the 21" century. Presentation of 
ICAO's Strategic Action Plan, Montreal, 22 May 1997. 
McDonald, N., Corrigan, S. Daly, C. and Cromie, S., Safety management systems 
and safety culture in aircraft maintenance organisations. Safety Science, 34(2000), 
2000,151-176. 
McVicker, S., Practical Risk Assessment for Use in Safety Management Systems 
for Small-to Medium-sized Airlines. 10th EASS -Managing Aviation Safety-Back 
to Basics, Amsterdam, Netherlands, March 1998. 
Morrell, P., Airline Finance. 2nd ed., Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. 
Moses, L. M., and Savage, I., The effect of airline pilot characteristics on 
perceptions of job safety risks. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2,1989,335-351. 
Nelms, D. W., Passenger Violence. Air Transport World, 35 (3), 1998,35-42 
Philips, E. H., Cargo Carriers Seek Stronger Ties With MRO Providers, Aviation 
Week & Space Technology, August 27,2001. 
Porter, L. J. and Parker, A. J., Total quality management - the critical success 
factors. Total Quality Management, 4 (1), 1993,13-22. 
Roland, H. E., and Moriarty, B., System Safety Engineering and Management. 2nd 
edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1990. 
Sagan, S. D., The limits of safety: organisations, accidents and nuclear weapons. 
New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1993. 
Sage, A. P. and White, E. B., Methodologies for risk and hazard assessment: a 
survey and status report. IEEE Transaction on System, Man, and Cybernetics 
SMC-10,1980,425-441. 
Salazar, N., Applying the Deming philosophy to the safety system. Professional 
Safety. 34 (12), 1989,22-27. 
275 
Bibliography 
Samson, D. And Terziovski, M., The relationship between total quality 
management practices and operational performance. Journal of Operations 
Management, 17(1999), 1999,393-409. 
Saunders, I., Managing quality and risk. Journal of Occupatioanl Health and 
Safety, 11(6), 1995,579-586. 
Scherkenbach, W. W., Deming 's Road to Continual Improvement. Knoxville, TN : 
SPC press, 1991. 
Schwartz, D., From safety indexing to risk management, FSF/ICARUS Committee 
Report, 1998. 
Senge, P. M., The f fth discipline fieldbook: strategies and tools for building a 
learning organization. London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994. 
Shaw, S., Airline Marketing and Management. 3rd cd., London: Pitman, 1990. 
Siomkos, G. J., Managing airline disaster: the role of consumer safety perceptions 
and sense-making. Journal ofAir Transport Management, 6(2), 2000,101-108. 
Slovic, P., Perception of Risk. Science, vol 236.1987,280-285. 
Smith, D., The Kegworth aircrash- a crisis in three phases ? Disaster Management, 
4(2), 1992,63-72. 
Smith, T. A., Managing for continuous improvement of safety performance- Focus 
on the customer. Professional Safety, 40,1995,18-23. 
Taylor, A. F., Airline Crisis Management Training by Simulation. SAGSET 
seminar paper, September 1997. 
Transport Canada, Promotional video, 1998. 
Yeahiya, M., Aviation insurance and the trend in the aviation insurance market. 
MSc thesis, Air Transport Group, Cranfield University, 1991. 
276 
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In the aviation industry, the most widely used definition is the one developed by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO, Annex 13,1994). In order to 
effectively prevent accidents and promote aviation safety, ICAO revised the content of 
annex 13 in March of 1994. It suggests its state members to define "serious incident" 
and to thoroughly investigate them. The current version revised in 2001 has clearly 
defined the serious injuries. 
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT: 
An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight 
until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: 
(a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: 
" being in the aircraft, or 
" direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which 
have become detached from the aircraft, or 
" direct exposure to jet blast; 
EXCEPT when the injuries are from natural causes, self inflicted or inflicted 
by other persons, or when the injures are to stowaways hiding 
outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or. 
(b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: 
" adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight 
characteristics of the aircraft and 
" would normally require major or replacement of the affected 
component. 
EXCEPT for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the 
engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to 
propellers, wing tips, antenna, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents 
or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or 
(c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. 
Note 1. For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within 
thirty days of the date of the accident is classified as a fatal injury 
by ICAO. 
Note 2. An aircraft is considered to be missing when the official search has 
been terminated and the wreckage has not been located. 
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INCIDENT: 
An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation. 
SERIOUS INCIDENT: 
An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred. 
Note 1. The difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only 
in the result. 
Note 2. Examples of serious incidents can be found in Attachment D of 
Annex 13 and in the ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual 
(Dot 9156) 
SERIOUS INJURIES: 
An injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and which: 
a) requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 
seven days from the date the injury was received; or 
b) results in a fracture of any bone (expect simple fractures of fingers, 
toes, or nose); or 
c) involves lacerations which cause sever haemorrhage, nerve, muscle 
or tendon damage; or 
d) involves injury to any internal organ; or 
e) involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more 
than 5 percent of the body surface; or 
involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious 
radiation. 
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Performance 
B. 1 The Immediate Impact on Operation Performance 
- Crisis Management 
Crisis management is the "first aid" of the breach in the airline's safety services relationship, 
because following an accident the airline must deal effectively and courteously with its 
passengers and crew, with the victims, both alive and dead and also with their friends and 
relatives. At the same time it will have to deal with the media and with business, political and 
other pressures resulting from the accident (Taylor, 1997). These are the immediate effects 
resulting from an accident. They not only instantly affect the airline's operation but also may 
have a significant influence in the following undertaking. 
The effects resulting from an accident i. e. death, injuries and property damage, the 
relationship with media, public image and load factor will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
B. 1.1 Death, injuries, and property damage 
When an airline is created, it is obligated to take on the responsibilities of transportation and 
safety, which are worthless without each other, just like the industry's coins of value. As such, 
once there is a failing on each side, the airline must be responsible for the outcome and 
dealing with the following details: the death, injuries, and damaged property, which are the 
immediate effects, resulting from the accident and the most threatening crisis for any airline. 
Once an accident has occurred, the airline duty Operation Control Manager receives 
information that something has gone wrong. According to the call-out list and designated 
process, key personnel are informed with great urgency. Upon the notification of an accident, 
various departments are involved and emergency facilities are activated in accordance with 
Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs). Emergency Response Manuals vary with different 
airlines and countries. However, in order to achieve an effective management, emergency 
response procedures should at least cover the following: (see Figure B-1) 
Figure B-1 Emergency Response P 
Accident 
Headquarter Aý,, 
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ICC MIC PIC 
Relief Aircraft Local 
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SRC RA 
TEC 
Source: Adapted from Taylor, 1997 
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(1) The Headquarters Response - Crisis Management Centre (CMC) includes 
a. Media Information Centre (MIC) 
b. Passenger Information Centre (PIC) 
c. Incident Control Centre (ICC) 
(2) The Local Response 
a. The local Accident Control Centre (LA CC) 
b. The Survivors Reception Centre (SRC) 
c. The Friends and Relatives Reception Centre (FRRC) 
d. The Reputation Area (RA) 
e. Liaison with local hospitals and hotels 
(3) The mobile response is involved in the activation of 
a. the ReliefAircraft 
b. the Incident Support Team (IS7) 
In order to assist with local response, airlines have plans to dispatch an aircraft to carry 
personnel and specialists to the scene of the accident. Most of the IST members are trained 
volunteers who provide support to the airline local staff, and with the handling of the incident 
and those involved. 
The Emergency Response Procedures will inevitably affect the normal aircraft and aircrew 
scheduling with dramatic changes. Due to the damage or the loss of the accident aircraft, the 
airline has to reschedule the timetable. For example, an aircraft may need to be taken out of 
normal service as a relief aircraft; or the airline may need to lease another aircraft from 
elsewhere as a replacement. Ground staff may also be asked to perform additional work to 
handle trivial tasks during the critical period. These are classified into the uninsured costs of 
the accident. As to the public, they need to be informed about the changed time-tables as soon 
as possible in order to reschedule their own plans. 
B. 1.2 The relationship with the media 
Few news events have such a powerful draw as aviation disasters. It is the dramatic nature of 
aircraft accidents that attracts the media and grabs the headlines. Data reveals that from 1978 
to 1994, the New York Times disproportionately reported fatal events involving jet aircraft 
and fatal events in the U. S. or involving US carriers (Curtis, 1997). 
Once an accident has occurred, the first task for the newsroom is to despatch reporters to the 
scene so that they can collect all possible information and pictures describing the event and its 
immediate aftermath. Consequently, inaccurate information may be reported to the public due 
to lack of verification. 
As such, more and more airlines are recognising that dealing with the media is also a major 
part of crisis management because the way in which airlines respond to media enquiries will 
determine the tone in which an accident is reported. If the media is not supplied with constant 
factual information then it is possible that conjectures and rumours will make the front page 
of many newspapers for days or weeks. Bailey (1999) described an example of a TWA 800 
explosion: the company's initial public response antagonised the media and maladroit public 
comments fed the growing media portrayal of an airline which was uncaring and 
unresponsive to the feelings of the victims' families. The public outcry led to the introduction 
of the Airline Disaster Family Assistance Act, later extended to include foreign carriers. This 
has imposed a significant financial and logistical burden on airlines operating to, from and 
within the US. 
Hence, it is of vital importance to deal with the media properly, which not only helps the 
airlines to communicate positively with the public, but creates a win-win scenario. The power 
of media can never be underestimated. 
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B. 1.3 Reputation, public image and load factor 
While the accident airline is likely to suffer the most, rebuilding confidence quickly is crucial. 
Because the load factor is always in direct proportion to its public image and reputation. For 
example, following the A300 crash at Nagoya in April 1994, China Airlines experienced a 20 
percent decline in the number of passengers during May and did not notice an increase until 
December. 
Another example is that of British Midland. In the aftermath of the Boeing 737 accident in 
1989 near the UK's East Midlands airport, the chairman of British Midland, Sir Michael 
Bishop, went to the scene quickly and spoke to the media as well as expressing concern and 
sympathy for victims' families. According to the observation of Guild (1995), British Midland 
suffered no subsequent loss of traffic on the route from London Heathrow airport to Belfast. 
Five years later, British Midland claimed to be the market leader on that route. 
Dealing with its clients, the passengers, and the crew, as well as their relatives, friends and the 
media is never easy. Besides that, an airline must continue to be fully operational for months 
and years to come and ensure that, despite any accidents. This, of course, makes the recovery 
from accident harder. 
A Boeing spokesman once said: "Ours is a business that is based almost entirely on public 
confidence. " Indeed, in today's competitive market, a carrier perceived as being not as safe as 
others is less favourable to the travelling public. As the airline business is highly dependent on 
public confidence, so the question is: How to recover the airline's public image should an 
accident occur? There are various answers to this question. 
Take US Air for example. Following an accident in 1994, and in order to rebuild the public's 
image, a full page advertisement revealed the fact that the company planned to hire outside 
organisations to scrutinise safety and in addition appoint a new vice president for safety. This 
resulted in controversial discussions. Some aviation consultants thought the more quickly the 
airline returned to normal operation the better, without the need to draw public attention to the 
event. Nevertheless, some people argued that USAir did the right thing to inform the public of 
their plans and were searching for a solution to remedy the situation. 
There can be no right or wrong regarding the strategies of coping because different reactions 
and strategies vary with different types of airline and their nationality. One implication worth 
noting is that few managers have had the opportunity of acquiring the necessary knowledge to 
deal with such a crisis since an aircraft accident is a rare occurrence. Therefore, Taylor (1997) 
suggests that it is not sufficient to know that there is a chapter on accidents somewhere in a 
manual. There is a clear need for intensive training, and without this a crisis could very easily 
become a catastrophe. 
B. 2 The Impact on Financial Performance- Costs of Accident 
It seems fairly simple that accident costs are the sum of all reportable damage, injury, and 
illness costs. People tend to just look at the costs of accident in terms of monetary costs which 
will affect airlines directly. In fact, accident costs vary largely from airline to airline and 
country to country. Their sums are not entirely determined by economic consideration. 
Costs of aircraft accident are classified into two categories: Insured Cost and Uninsured Cost 
(or Hidden cost). The former are the actual claims paid by insurance companies, commonly 
compensation payments and medical expenses. The latter are those costs not related to the 
compensation payments directly and hidden in some departments of the company such as 
damaged reputations, lower productivity, etc. which can be neither quantified nor estimated. 
Therefore, the monetary value is not always the most critical factor. 
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From the above, there are two fundamental points that should be noted in relation to the cost 
of accidents: firstly, there are economic consequences of aviation safety; secondly, the costs 
and benefits of safety cannot be measured only in economic terms. 
Although the economic consideration of accident costs is not the first priority for every airline, 
accident costs could have an influence on the airlines' financial performance. These costs can 
individually and collectively drain the company's financial reserves. Those which are tangible 
and able to be measured by monetary value, such as loss of business, the expenditure of a 
crisis management centre, costs of accident investigation, etc. will affect the airline's cash 
flow and profitability directly. 
Meanwhile, those costs that stem from the intangible uninsured costs also have a significant 
impact. A damaged reputation, lower brand loyalty, decreasing company morale, and so on, 
would shake the confidence of stockholders and employees, and lower the company's stock 
price. These intangible costs can even acquire greater importance than direct financial effects 
measured by accounting methods. In some cases they have caused the collapse of a company. 
Therefore, given insured costs are covered by proceeds from insurance for the crashed aircraft, 
the accident company cannot expect to recover all the uninsured costs as the premiums are too 
high to be afforded, particularly when safety costs, like the safety improvement and safety 
prevention cost (investment), are included. 
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C. 1 The Concept of Quality 
One of the most influential individuals in the quality revolution has been Dr. Edwards 
Deming. It was in 1950 when Japan had a weak economy and a reputation for manufacturing 
cheap and low-quality goods, that a group of visionary scientists, engineers, and businessmen 
brought to Japan an American management consultant, Dr. Deming. He not only taught the 
Japanese industry how to use a tool called statistical process control to achieve continuous 
improvement in quality but he also brought a philosophy for the total management of a 
company. 
Thirty years later Japan had become one of the world's greatest industrial powers, having has 
achieved a reputation for quality that was unsurpassed. Witnessed by business and industries 
in other countries, in 1980s "Quality" grew in popularity for companies to focus on. Quality 
awards, such as the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA) in the US, were 
consequently being established to provide quality criteria in several industrialised countries. 
Particularly over the last 10 years, industry's commitment to quality has significantly affected 
the activities and tasks performed to create products and provide services (Manzella, 1997). 
Almost any production company has a quality control or quality assurance department, which 
has allowed companies to increase quality and productivity with less supervision. 
In the early stages of development, the concepts of quality and excellence have focused 
primarily on external customers - providing "quality" products, improving customer 
satisfaction and building better customer relationships. Gradually, the management system 
exists not to ensure the management's orders are executed but to help employees and remove 
barriers that prevent them from doing the job (Smith, 1996). 
Understanding and recognising quality in civil aviation is important. There are several reasons. 
Firstly, quality influences travel demand and market share from a customer's point of view. 
Secondly, the performance of carriers is of interest to the regulators, carriers themselves and 
the public. Knowing the information and position can help to enhance quality of carriers. 
Lastly, the outcomes of a specific aspect of quality, such as air safety, are engaging people's 
curiosity, 
C. 2 Linking Quality with Safety 
A remarkable evolution in quality assurance specifications has taken place during the last 35 
years (Hughes, 2000). This evolution has taken the form of various quality-improvement 
initiatives, which have produced several forms of specifications, each an improvement on the 
previous one: 
  Statistically orientated end-result specifications (1960s); 
  Statistical quality assurance (1970s); 
  Total quality management (1980s) 
In other words, the evolution of quality management shows three stages: quality control, 
quality assurance and total quality. Similar stages can be found in SMS, including safety 
control, safety assurance and total safety (Herrero et al., 2002). The objective of quality is to 
improve the quality of the product through the detection and elimination of defects. It is 
similar to the objective of safety which is the reduction of injuries through the elimination of 
unsafe acts and work conditions. 
One of the first contribution, relating to the integration of quality with safety was by Dumas 
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(Herrero et al., 2002). In 1987, after carrying out a study for more than 5 years, Dumas 
discovered that quality programmes and safety programmes have the same components, i. e. 
successful safety programmes and successful quality programmes are based on the same solid 
foundations (Dumas, 1987). 
Manzella (1997) affirms that in order to obtain excellent safety results, one needs to integrate 
the safety system into the quality management system. Table C-1 illustrates the similar 
elements of quality and safety. He comments that quality and safety principles are essentially 
the same. As Crosby (1989) states, "Safety is a great analog for understanding quality. 
Everything in safety is about relating to the absolute of quality management. " 
Table C-1 The Principles and Relationship of Quality and Safety 
SAFETY vs. QUALITY 
Goal: Zero accidents Goal: Zero defects 
Incident analysis 
Written policies, procedures 
and guidelines 
Safety committees 
Employee participation 
Statistical analysis 
All accidents are preventable 
Event analysis 
Documented policies, procedures 
and work instructions 
Quality circles, employee 
involvement team 
Empowerment 
Control charts, statistical process 
control 
All non-conformances are preventable 
Source: Manzella, 1997 
C. 3 From TOM to Safety 
Following the evolution of quality management, TQM has been a popular intervention all 
around the world, especially in industrialised countries (Garvin, 1991; Evans and Lindsay, 
1995; Samson and Terziovski, 1999). It is a management framework set up to deliver 
self-regulatory compliance. 
Since 1992, the UK's occupational health and safety has been viewed as an integral part of 
TOM, which is based upon two respects: the model, HS (G) 65, and the norm, BS (British 
Standards) 7850 (Deacon, 1994) (see Figure C-1). HS (G) 65 is used for safety and health 
management, while BS 7850, the quality regulation added to the traditional concept of TQM 
that satisfaction of the client, the safety, the health, the environment and the managerial 
objectives are checks to each other. 
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Figure C-1 Model of Integrated Quality Safety 
TQM 
HS(G)65 BS7850 
Health and safety Quality 
BS: British Standards are developed and maintained by BSI British Standards, which is the 
UK's National Standards Body. 
HS (G) 65: Published by HSE (Health & Safety Executive, British agency) as practical guide for 
directors, managers, health and safety professionals and employee 
Source: Deacon, 1994 
Although there are always going to be debates about how to categorise elements of TQM 
(Samson and Terziovski, 1999) or there is less agreement as to what the key elements of TQM 
are and what the critical factors are that influence the TQM implement process (Porter and 
Parker, 1993), there is a widespread consensus that TQM is a way of managing organisations 
to improve their overall effectiveness (Porter and Parker, 1993) and TQM has demonstrated 
that it is an effective way of maximising the long-term competitiveness of a company and can 
improve the effectiveness of the programmes of safety and health (Goetsch, 1999). 
To this end, JAR - OPS 1 (aeroplanes) and 3 (helicopters) demand the delivery of safety and 
airworthiness. Based on the ICAO recommended practice (Annex 6 part 1), JAR- OPS states 
that an operator shall establish an accident prevention and flight safety programme, which 
may be integrated with the quality system, including programmes to achieve and maintain risk 
awareness by all persons involved in operations. They instruct the operator to design and run 
a "quality system" with its "quality assurance programme" to demonstrate regulatory 
compliance. In addition, the ISO 9000 international standards can also help to implement a 
quality system. It offers some useful advice that procedures should be documented only where 
a lack of documentation may detract from quality. 
With the well-defined management structure, TQM is actually no more than a formalised 
method of communication to ensure the right measures are taken at the right time to satisfy 
JAR-OPS 1&3 requirements and the company's intentions for compliance, as well as the 
various construct requirements for Health & Safety, the Environment and so on. 
The famous PDSA (Plan, Do, Study and Act) quality cycle, also called Deming Wheel (see 
Figure C-2), provides the tools needed to accomplish continuous improvement in quality, 
productivity and safety. 
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Figure C-2 Using PDSA for Safety 
Incorporate improvement 
in the system 
Look for another safety 
problem 
Evaluate fording 
Does safety improve? 
Do it again - improve 
plan 
Find safety problem 
Define it - common or special 
team work on solutions 
Operational definition of safe 
design an improvement 
Implement the design 
on a small scale 
Source: Adapted from Smith, 1995 
Scherkenbach (1991) provides a useful outline of how to operationally define PDSA in eight 
steps: 
I. Plan: Develop a plan to improve 
Step 1: Identify the opportunity for improvement 
Step 2: Document the present process 
Step 3: Create a vision of the improved process 
Step 4: Define the scope of the improvement effort 
II. Do: Execute the plan 
Step 5: Over a period, pilot the proposed changes on a small scale with customers 
III Study: Study the result 
Step 6: Observe what you learned about the process improvement 
IV. Act: Adjust the process, based on new knowledge 
Step 7: Operationalise the new mix of resources 
Step 8: Repeat the cycle 
These steps are, in'fact, the processes of TQM. They describes how this cycle works in a 
particular company, bringing into its scope all existing documentation and management 
practices and making improvements. Most important of all, the implication from this cycle is 
what the tools of the Quality Assurance Programme are and how to use them to achieve 
(measure) quality. 
Salazar (1989) points out two tools exist that can be used to measure the quality of a safety 
programme: 
1. Safety inspections that identify the practices, behaviours, and unsafe conditions; and 
2. Safety audits that identify the actions carried out by top management of the company 
that affect positively the system of safety. 
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C. 4 Total Safety Management (TSM) versus TQM 
TSM is safety management written and practiced using the principle of TQM (Herrero et al., 
2002). The similarities and differences between TQM and TSM are listed in Table C-2. 
According to Goetsch (1999), TQM makes everybody involved in the progress of quality, and 
TQM also makes the Director of Quality act as both coordinator and assistant. TSM makes 
sure everybody is involved in the topics of safety, and the functions of the Safety Directors 
would be those of coordinating the processes and facilitating the necessary resources. 
Table C-2 Differences and Similarities between TQM and TSM 
TQM TSM 
Know the processes 
Minimise the errors 
Center on prevention 
Reduce variations 
Know the sources of risks 
Minimise the risks 
Center on prevention 
Reduce the uncertainty 
Deepen in the satisfaction of the client Deepen in the safety of the workers 
the organisation and the clients 
The problems are caused more by The accidents and injuries are caused 
the system than by the individuals more by faulty planning than by the people 
Source: Saunders, 1995 
Manzanedo (1994) advancs the concept of TSM, indicating that many concepts, principles, 
rules, technical and objectives of the TQM could move the TSM with a single change of 
quality for safety (quoted from Herrero et al, 2002). This is reflected in the organisational 
structure (see Figure C-3) suggested by FAA (GAIN, 2000), where the Flight Safety Officer 
has a similar position to the Quality Manager. When the management functions of safety and 
quality are the same, these two positions can be combined in one, as some airlines do. Also 
CAP 712 (UKCAA, 2001) indicates that in most small and medium sized companies it is 
expected that the flight safety and quality tasks will have many common points and there 
could, therefore, be no objection to the combination of the roles in one staff member. 
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Figure C-3 An Example of Organisational Structure 
Chief Executive Officer 
Flight Safety Officer I11 Quality Manager 
Operations II Maintenance II Others 
Note: 
Safety & Quality functions may be combined under the same management function. 
Formal Reporting 
Formal Communication 
Source: GAIN, 2000 
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There are various techniques to perform risk analysis. The following are some tools 
frequently used in the airline industry: 
1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
PRA quantifies the probabilities and consequences associated with accidents and 
malfunctions by applying probability and statistical techniques as well as various 
consequence evaluation methods. 
2. Hazard Mode and Effect Analysis (HMEA) 
This in-depth risk analysis has also been called Reliability Analysis for Preliminary 
Design (RAPD), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure Mode, Effect, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA). Basically it is a tabular 
analysis used to analyse the effects of system and sub-system failures on a system's 
operation. This bottom up analysis is a simple method and useful for complex systems. 
3. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
FTA is a graphical method commonly used in engineering and systems safety engineering. 
It is used to assess a system by identifying an end event and examining the range of 
potential contributory events. FTA documents qualitatively the potential causal chains 
leading to the head event, and accommodate quantitative analysis of the probability of the 
head event. 
4. Event Tree Analysis 
The purpose of Event Tree Analysis is to organise, characterise, and quantify potential 
accidents in a methodical manner by modelling the sequence of events that result from a 
single initiating event. This analysis is used when time sequence is important and is a 
useful tool for analysing emergency response to system failures. 
5. Flight Operation Risk Assessment (FORAS) 
FORAS is a tool that will assess the accident/incident risk associated with a flight 
operation. FORAS is designed to give safety managers and other users a quantitative 
assessment of specific risk for an operation, broken down into a variety of subgroups, by 
fleet, region, route or individual flight. This assessment is performed using a 
mathematical model which synthesises a variety of inputs, including information on crew, 
weather, management policy and procedures, airports, traffic flow, aircraft and dispatch 
operations. The system will identify those elements that contribute most significantly to 
the calculated risk, and will be able, in some cases, to suggest possible interventions. Two 
risk categories were identified in the first stage of FORAS: Controlled Flight into Terrain 
(CFTT) and in-flight injuries due to atmosphere turbulence. 
6. Risk Analysis Matrix (RAM) 
Using RAM, it is possible to standardise the qualitative risk assessments and categorise 
the hazard using the criteria the airlines consider important. Although there might be 
different formats of RAM, the essence is the same. In RAM, risk is calculated as a 
function of both the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the likely outcome. The 
Risk Matrix shown in Figure D-1 is based upon the one regularly used by British Airways 
Safety Services in their monthly safety bulletin `Flywise'. 
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Five categories of risk are identified: 
A: Severe - an incident requiring the highest priority for resources and action. 
B: High- incidents of significant concern which take priority over most other 
incidents. 
C: Medium- incidents requiring the attention and action of a line department. 
D: Low- an incident of low concern which normally requires no further action. 
E: Minimal- incidents that are of statistical interest only. 
Figure D-1 The Risk Matrix 
Likelihood of occurrence 
oý 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
HIGH C B A 
MEDIUM D C B ý- 
LOW E D C 
l 
Source: Flywise 
7. Risk specific safety index products - performance indicators 
A safety rating system that assesses the declining or substandard operational performance 
can provide airlines with risk indicators and an early warning signal thus allowing an 
early remedial action. For example, Schwartz (1998) suggests a Risk Index Performance 
Indicator for FSF. The risk indexing products include: 
1. Primary product 
"a set of risk-specific safety indices 
2. Secondary products 
" associated trend measure 
" global (organisational trend indicator) 
And the potential uses of risk index are: 
" Performance analysis 
" Benchmarking 
" Relational database 
" Performance predictor 
" Safety management 
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To achieve the efficiency and safety of an organisation, the operation concepts and 
documentation it is very important to maintain consistency and logic. An airline's safety 
documentation, can be viewed as a hierarchy containing three tiers: policies, procedures and 
records (Ho, 1996), as shown in Figure E-1. 
Figure E-1 The Documentation Pyramid 
PI ES f- Define goal, mission 
Manuals OCED S and what should 
be done 
f- Define who, when, where 
and how to do 
RECORDS Evidence for improvement 
Source: Adapted from Ho, 1996 
Policies 
The policy statement is a document stating the company's missions and goals, and defines 
what will be done and what should be done. It should be clearly written and easy to 
understand. 
Procedures 
With the stated policies, procedures are made by the users to operate the equipment efficiently, 
as such procedures are not inherent in the equipment. Degani and Wiener (1994) argued that 
procedures are a form of quality assurance by management and regulating agencies over the 
operators; they exist to specify unambiguously six things: 
1. What the task is 
2. When the task is conducted (time and sequence) 
3. By whom it is conducted 
4. How the task is done (activities) 
5. The sequence of actions 
6. What type of feedback is given (callout, actions etc. ) 
Since procedures are working instructions, it is noted that they should be designed to be 
consistent with the policies. For example, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are a set of 
procedures that provide operators with step by step guidance for their task. Standardisation 
ensures the best method of operation and makes sure employees behave in a consistent and 
predictable way. Following SOPS can maintain the services quality and can achieve a certain 
level of safety. It is a part of the assurance system. 
Records 
Records are the evidences for improvement, also serving as one means to check if policies 
and procedures have been followed. Ideally, all departments should review their practices and 
procedures periodically to ensure compliance. Although records also show problems 
un-reviewed, they do provide valuable and traceable information and data for management, 
who can check the need for initiating corrective action. 
Manuals 
Manuals are the documents recording SOPs. They specify the priorities and goals of work and 
procedures for different departments. Manuals should be revised periodically in order to meet 
the company's needs for safety improvement. 
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The Aircraft Dispatch and Maintenance Safety (ADAMS) consortium has also produced a 
paper-based tool, similar to the MEDA form but much expanded (UKCAA, 2000). Other tools 
(shown in Table F-1) are computerised versions of the MEDA form, some with data analysis 
capabilities. 
Table F-1 Other MEDA-like Approaches 
Tool Description 
TEAM (Tool for Error Analysis in Developed by Galaxy Scientific'', customised 
Maintenance) for each airline. 
AMMS (Aurora Mishap Management Developed by ex-MEDA and ex-US Air Force 
Sv teni) personnel. It is a commercially available 
system, designed for use in the transport 
industries. PC based but adds the costing 
element. 
BASIS MEI (BASIS maintenance Error Developed by BA. 
Investigation) 
MEDA/SEDA This software package is the BF Goodrich 
adaptation of the Boeing MEDA software. 
U KCAA MEMS FMS (Maintenance Error A customised generic version of the BF 
Management System Free MEDA Software) Goodrich software. 
Source: UK CAA, 2000 
Galaxy Scientific, a software company in the USA were the software supplier to Boeing during the 
development of MEDA so TEAM naturally utilises the MEDA tool but provides a personalised 
front end for the user (Chapman, 2000). 
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Transformation 
The establishment of major culture changes appears to be rare but is feasible (Ho, 1996). 
Management can direct cultural shift by articulating the desired values, and reinforcing the 
proper norms; however, management must be sincere in their efforts in this direction. Two of 
the most well known examples are Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) and British Airways 
(BA). Not only were the culture of their companies changed, but also their fortunes. 
G. 1 The Case of SAS 
In the early 1980s, SAS went through a spectacular turnaround process. The new president, 
Jan Carlzon, had discovered that the reputation of SAS rested upon the millions of "moments 
of truth", i. e. verbal encounters between airline staff and passengers, instead of the products 
provided, the safety of the aeroplanes, the convenience of schedules and so on. Yet the 
"moments of truth' usually last at most less than thirty seconds. So he led the company to 
switch from a product-and-technology orientation to a market-and-service orientation in the 
four years from 1980 to 1983. The background and circumstances of SAS before and after 
this cultural change are listed in Table G-1. 
Table G-1 The Cultural Change Case: SAS 
Company feature SAS 
Size 
Length of major cultural 
change effort 
Loss reported before 
change effort (after) 
Leader background 
Career path 
Medium 
From 1980-1983 
Small loss reported in 1980 
(2 percent of revenues) 
Unconventional insider 
Grew up in SAS, but not 
in the core business 
Source : Kotter and Heskett, 1992 
G. 2 The Case of British Airways 
Similarly, BA's cultural change was under the new leadership of Colin Marshall in 1983. After 
witnessing the success of SAS, the new CEO began to put the culture transformation into 
practice. Hampden-Turner (1990) notes the following actions and considerations that occurred 
in BA: 
1. Sending out clear signals. Five cultural signals were sent by Marshall: 
" Making decisions: making mistakes is more forgivable than not 
deciding in the first place. 
" Face the customers: need to start to face outward, toward customers. 
" Names, not titles: no one should hide behind titles or job descriptions. 
" Cross-functional groups: large committees are replaced by small groups in parallel, 
charging them with responsibilities. 
" Less hierarchy: reduce the number of levels of hierarchy. 
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2. Cultural research 
A major research into customer attitudes towards BA was conducted. The findings 
showed that BA was "cold, aloof, uncaring and bureaucratic" to its customers. This was 
due to military and technology in its cultural orientation until the early 1980s. In fact, BA 
also found that culture is really what customers buy. Production innovation can be rapidly 
imitated and copied from other airlines, but culture can not be copied. It has to be learned. 
3. Changing the culture through training programmes 
The human resources department started to organise and initiate several training 
programmes, which pushed human dynamics into more positive patterns. Meanwhile, the 
empowerment message from Marshall was clearly given by showing that grass roots staff 
were the only people who could help the organisation. 
4. Extending change throughout the organisation 
It was not enough to galvanise the ground staff and the cabin crews alone. Cultural 
changes in one section of an organisation must pervade the whole organisation in order to 
last and be successful. Managers were trained to create a vision for the whole organisation 
so that they could identify with their top management group, followed by a vision for the 
group they managed. Subordinates had to be shown how their job contributed to the larger 
objective. 
5. Management theory can be applied to real management 
BA's version of the seven Ss diagram is shown in Figure G-2. The seven Ss, mobilised by 
an overall Strategy, include hiring the right Staff, training them with the right Skills, 
managing them in the Style required, Sharing values with them, installing the right 
Systems and improving the Structure. By using such a model, culture and strategy can be 
united as a whole. 
Figure G-2 BA's Version of Seven Ss Diagram 
Structure 
Staff II Systems 
Strategy 
Skills ýýý Shared 
Style 
Source: Hampden-Turner, 1990 
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BA had, eventually, turned itself round and made a great improvement (see Table G-3). The 
successful story of BA has now become a touchstone of the cultural change issue. BA 
revealed the essence of its success, which is "what we have got to build are the kind of groups 
that nurture individuality and the kind of individuals that can sustain and develop groups. " 
That clearly showed the organisational culture BA would like to build (for all groups) and the 
importance of subcultures (as groups consisting of individuals). 
Table G3 The Cultural Change Case: BA 
Company feature 
Size 
Length of major cultural 
change effort 
Loss reported before 
change effort (after) 
Leader background 
Career path 
BA 
Large 
From 1982-1988 
Significant loss reported in 1981 
(7 percent of revenues) 
Outsider 
Become CEO at BA in 1983. 
Came from Sears Holdings 
Source : Kotter and Heskett, 1992 
The other key to cultural and organisational changes is to maintain the changes, which was 
also achieved by BA, although it did face some dilemmas. While cultural transformation is 
taking place, in order to sustain competitive advantage, maintaining changes, providing 
feedback and adjusting the changes are necessary. This concept and its associated processes 
are now commonly termed the learning organisation. Senge (1994) notes that "Learning 
organisations are the places where people continually expand their capacity to create the 
results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where 
collective aspiration is set free and where people are continually learning how to learn 
together. " As such, the best consequence of cultural changes can result in organisational 
learning, and a learning organisation can cultivate a better culture. Organisational change is 
then achieved. 
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APPENDIX H Four Proactive Safety Programmes 
H. 1 Managing Engineering Safety Health (MESH) 
1. Origin and objectives 
Managing L', nginecring Salety Health (MESH) is a programme created for British Airways 
Engineering Company in 1992 by a team lead by Professor James Reason from the University 
of Manchester. It is a set of diagnostic instruments for making visible, within a particular 
engineering location, the situational and organisational factors most likely to contribute to 
human factors problems (Reason, 1994; Maurino et al, 1995). 
Designed to assess the safety climate of an organisation, the measures of MESH give an 
indication of the system's state of safety (and quality), both at the local workplace level and in 
general. It is a system of measuring a number of local and organisational factors and the 
interplay between them. 
2. Philosophy 
According to Maurino et al (1995), the underlying philosophy of MESH is: 
  High standards of safety, quality and productivity are all dependent on organisational 
'health'. 
  `Health' is assessed and controlled through regular measurements of `vital 
signs' at both local and system levels. 
  M1; S11 identities those 2-3 factors most in need of correction and measures remedial 
efforts so that a system's state of health can be assessed and controlled. 
  MESH is designed to provide the measurement necessary to sustain long-term system 
fitness. 
The programme identifies three basic groups into which accident-producing factors fall 
(Maurino et al, 1995; CASA, 1998). These are shown in Figure H-l: 
  human fallibility (at the organisational and workplace levels) 
  Technical and procedural shortcomings 
  Local hazards. 
Figure 11-1 Accident-producing Factors in the Workplace 
Human Technical & 
Fallibility Procedural 
Note: Grey area is for demonstration 
Local 
Hazard 
Shortcomings 
Source: Maurino et al, 1995 
The content of each of these buckets (the grey area in Figure H-1) will never be empty 
completely although they can change from time to time. Imagine that each bucket gives off 
particles. The fuller the bucket, the more it gives off. MESH is designed to give up-to-date 
indication of the fullness of the buckets, if we assume accidents and incidents arise when 
these particles combine by chance in the presence of some weak or absent defence. It does 
this by sampling selected ingredients in each bucket (Maurino et al., 1995). 
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3. Process of assessment 
As such, a system's safety health can be assessed by first listing the "ingredient factors", 
which are divided into organisational factors and local factors. Exactly what local factors are 
assessed depends on the workplace. Different factors can be developed for different 
workplaces. They are intended to give a short-term indication of the accident-producing 
factors present within a particular workplace. 
Table H-1 shows the 12 local factors, which were derived from a survey of the problems 
encountered by maintainers in a line `casualty' hangar. Ideally around 25 percent of the 
workforce are required to rate each local factor for the extent to which it causes problems in a 
limited number of recent jobs. Ratings are made on a weekly basis. 
MESH also assesses the impact of upstream organisational factors upon a particular 
workplace, as shown in Table H-2. Those who are in charge of the department or hangar, i. e. 
line managers, rate how much each organisational factor has caused problems in that site. 
These ratings are made quarterly. 
Table H-1 Local Factors Measured in an Operational Hangar 
1. Knowledge, skills and experience 
2. Morale 
3. Tools, equipment, parts 
4. Qualit of support Local 5. Fatigue factors 6. Pressure 
7. Time of day/night 
8. Environment 
9. Computers 
10. Paperwork, manuals, procedures 
11. Inconvenience 
12. Personnel safety features 
Source: Adapted from Maurin et at., 1995; Reason 1995a 
Table H-2 Organisational Factors Measured in Each Workplace 
1. Organisational structure 
2. People management 
3. Provision and quality of tools and equipment Organisational 4. Training and selection factors 5. Commercial and operational pressures 
6. Planning and scheduling 
7. Maintenance of buildings and equipment 
8. Communication 
Source: Adapted from Maurino et al., 1995; Reason 1995a 
For convenience, Reason (1995a) has pointed out that assessments are made directly on 
computers by using the mouse or keyboard. The assessors are randomly selected and are 
anonymous in order to keep MESH as a sampling tool. When logging on to the MESH 
programme, assessors are asked to give their grade, trade and location. MESH employs direct 
a 5-point rating of the dimensions with regard to specific locations and tasks. For example, 
the questions are phrased as follows: "To what extent has this factor (either local or 
organisational factor) been a problem in carrying out these jobs (a previously specified list of 
3-5 recently performed tasks)? " 
The results of both local and organisational measurements are converted into bar diagram 
profiles, graphically on an x and y-axis, with the x-axis being the factors and the y-axis being 
the extent of the problem. Figure H-2 shows a schematic local factor profile. 
298 
Appendix H Four Proactive Safety Programmes 
When completing their rating, assessors are provided with a profiled summary of their own 
input together with a cumulated profile for all ratings made over the past four weeks (Maurino 
et al., 1995). The whole diagnostic package is implemented within a linked suite of computer 
programmes into which all the gathered information and sample results are fed and then 
tracked. Their purpose is to identify the two or three factors most in need of remediation. As 
mentioned previously, MESH is a sampling tool. It samples jobs and tasks to identify those 
factors most likely to come together to cause future incidents. It also tracks the progress of 
subsequent remedial actions. 
In MESH, the local factor assessments are made at weekly intervals by a randomly selected 
proportion of the workplace in each of a variety of workplaces (i. e. operational hangars, 
majors overhaul hangars, workshops, etc. ). The organisational factors are assessed at 
three-monthly intervals by technical management in each location because these are the 
people best placed to judge the impact of "upstream" organisational factors upon the 
reliability of their various workplaces (Reason, 1995a). 
4. Advantages 
Reason (1995a) also suggests that by identifying factors in need of improvement and tracking 
the changes over time, MESH enables the maintenance of adequate safety health, comparable 
to a long-term fitness programme, in which the focus of remedial efforts switches from 
dimension to dimension as previously salient factors improve and new ones come into 
prominence. 
In terms of training, MI: SII is directly used by front-line personnel for reporting their own 
points of view. The MESH end user is able to use the system without needing any further 
training because it is characterised by a single phase and tool. The language within MESII is 
simple and the items it addresses are so broad and generic that they could be applied in any 
other environment. 
The advantages of MESI1 can be thus summarised as follows: 
  Staff are all involved in safety. 
  Managers can prioritise remedial actions and check upon their impact. 
  Direct safety resources where they are most needed. 
 I : ncourage better communications between management and staff. 
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5. Limitations 
Although the first impression of MESH appears to be that it is easy, the implementation of 
this tool may lead to some difficulties. Caution must be expressed when interpreting the 
implied meaning of results when employing a single rating scale method of investigation. Due 
to personal tendencies, some people tend to use only the extreme of the scale, while others 
tend to use only the middle area. 
In addition, when using a computerised system, the "bigger picture" is not always so readily 
available. As such, the MESH users have no access to any overview of the global structure 
and the items to be rated are displayed on separate rating pages. 
Meanwhile, the factors rated in MESH have very general meanings and can be interpreted and 
rated according to different interpretations. Consequently, the results obtained by MESH are 
not sufficiently detailed for suggesting proper corrective actions. 
MESH has never been applied by low capacity operators, and would be beyond the resources 
of smaller operators. Although it has also been implemented by Singapore Airlines 
Engineering Company, this programme is not adopted widely by other airlines and has not 
achieved the significant improvements in safety performance that were originally expected. A 
number of improvements and modifications are currently being made as a result. 
6. Other MESH-Like applications 
MESH employs a systemic approach to safety management and is readily adapted to a range 
of industries and disciplines. Prior versions of MESH-like instruments have been developed 
for the oil and railway industries. Later versions are now being evaluated by the US nuclear 
power generation industry (IFA, 1998). Meanwhile, Shell International uses a similar method 
in its tanker and exploration operations in the form of Tripod-DELTA. Likewise, British Rail 
currently employs a proactive instrument called REVIEW, which has also been used at West 
Australian Railways. (In the case of REVIEW and Tripod-DELTA, only organisational factors 
are assessed. The judgments are made regularly by supervisors in differing activities and 
locations, via a computer programme. Tripod assessments are made quarterly; those for 
REVIEW are made at approximately monthly intervals. ) 
H. 2 Identifying Needed Defences In the Civil Aviation Transport 
Environment (INDICATE) 
1. Origin and objectives 
INDICATE is a safety programme that has been developed in consultation with the Australian 
regional airline industry for proactive purposes. The name is based on the underlying purpose 
of the programme which is to identify and resolve deficient aviation safety defences (Edkins, 
1998). It provides a formal communication channel for aircraft operators to regulations, 
policies and standards to the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BAST) in Australia. It is also 
known as BASI-INDICATE. 
2. Underlying philosophy 
The basic premise underlying the INDICATE programme is that generally people working 
within the aviation industry will report safety hazards if given sufficient opportunity and the 
right work environment. However, some individuals are reluctant to report safety hazards for 
fear of blame or retribution, especially if the problem reflects negatively on company 
management. Alternatively, safety hazards report may be reported but with little feedback 
given to the reporter; and some smaller airlines do not have formally appointed operational 
safety officers, to whom staff can access directly and can confidentially report safety hazards. 
300 
Appendix H Four Proactive Safety Programmes 
Consequently potential safety problems remain undetected. 
INDICATE was designed to minimise this type of communication problem by providing a 
simple but structured process to ensure that consistent and high-quality safety information is 
disseminated to all company staff. This is achieved by first educating staff about the concept 
of safety defences (BASI, 1998). 
Edkins (1998) points out that safety defences are barriers or safeguards put in place to protect 
a system from both human and technical failure. He presents a modified version (Figure 2-22 
in chapter 2) of Reason's model of organisational accident causation (see Figure 2-20 in 
chapter 2). 1 
Edkins argues that each of the organisation, workplace and person/team components of 
Reason's model are difficult to identify before an accident because latent failures are usually 
unforeseeable, workplace factors are dynamic, and errors or violations are unpredictable. This 
model implies that the integrity of safety defences can be more accurately determined as they 
are more tangible and thus more measurable components within a system. Regularly 
evaluating defences provides a tangible means by which latent organisational failures can be 
identified. The INDICATE programme has therefore been designed to regularly evaluate 
airline safety defences so that the potential risk of an accident can be minimised. 
3. Basic elements of the INDICATE programme 
The INDICATE programme involves establishing and maintaining the following six core 
safety activities (CASA, 1998; Edkins 1998,1999; BASI, 1998): 
i. Appointing an operational Safety Manager or Safety Officer who is 
available to staff as a confidante for safety related issues 
ii. Conducting a regular series of staff meetings to identify safety hazards within 
the operation 
iii. Establishing a confidential safety hazard reporting system 
iv. Conducting regular safety meetings with management 
v. Maintaining a safety information database 
vi. Ensuring safety information is regularly distributed to all staff 
4. Methodology 
Co-operation was agreed with Kendell Airlines, an Australian regional airline, to trail the 
INDICATE programme. Commencing in July 1996, it took eight months to complete the trial 
and determine whether or not the programme had had a positive influence on the airline's 
safety performance. 
Since Kendell operates out of two major regional centres, the INDICATE programme was 
implemented in one regional centre as an intervention group (INDICATE base - 81 staff) 
while the other served as a control group (non-INDICATE base - 72 staff). This enabled a 
comparison at the end of the trial period to objectively evaluate any changes in safety 
performance across the two bases. Table H-3 summarises the six core elements of the 
INDICATE programme as well as showing differences in application across the intervention 
and control groups. 
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Table H-3 Differences in Application of the INDICATE Programme Across Both 
Experimental Groups 
Six core safe activities of the INDICATE programme 
I. Appointing an operational Safety Manager or Safety Officer who is 
available to staff as a confidante for safety 
related issues 
Yes No 
ii. Conducting a regular series of staff meetings to identify 
safe hazards within the operation 
Yes No 
iii. Establishing a confidential safety hazard reporting system Yes No 
iv. Conducting regular safety meetings with management Yes No 
v. Maintaining a safety information database Yes No 
vi. Ensuring safety information is regularly distributed to all staff Yes No 
A: Intervention group (INDICATE base) 
B: Control group (non-INDICATE base) Source: Adapted from Edkins, 1998 
5. Evaluation criteria 
There are many potential measures of airline safety performance, including the absolute 
number of fatal and non-fatal accidents; fatal and total accidents per million departures; 
passenger fatalities per million passengers or per million miles, etc. Regardless of which 
measure is used, it is important that it is examined regularly if a safety management 
programme is to be effective in improving safety performance. Nevertheless, accidents are so 
rare in airline operations that they cannot be used as a statistically reliable index of safety 
performance. 
As such, the INDICATE programme was evaluated based upon the following five safety 
performance criteria (Edkins, 1998; BASI, 1998). The criteria were used in both intervention 
and control groups to determine whether the programme would achieve an improvement in 
airline safety performance over the eight month period. These criteria were: 
1. Airline safety culture 
2. Airline staff risk perception of aviation safety hazards 
3. Staff willingness to report safety hazards 
4. Action taken on identified safety hazards 
5. Staff comments about safety management 
These criteria were chosen because safety culture and hazards risk perception have been well 
researched within various industries and show a strong relationship to workplace accidents. 
However, they are essentially attitudinal measures which should not be relied upon in 
isolation. In addition, the remainder of the criteria were included because they are more 
tangible indicators of the programme's success and were considered complementary to the 
attitudinal criteria. All the criteria should provide a comprehensive evaluation of the validity 
of the INDICATE programme (BASI, 1998). 
6. Brief description of each criterion 
1. Airline Safety Culture 
In order to measure changes in safety culture during the eight month trial, the Airline Safety 
Culture Index (ASCI) was developed. A questionnaire consisting of 25 positively worded 
statements was constructed and each statement requires a response on a five point Likert scale, 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Based on Brown and Holmes (1986), 
Cooper (1995) and ICAO (1994), a number of items were developed regarding the following 
core dimensions: management commitment (2 items), management action (6 items), 
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employee commitment (4 items), level of perceived risk (1 item), beliefs about accident 
causation (2 items), emergency procedures (1 item), the provision of safety training (2 items), 
and safety communication (7 items). 
The questionnaire was administered on three occasions to both groups; prior to the 
implementation of INDICATE, at the mid term of the trial, and at the end of the trial period. 
By comparing the difference in both groups at different periods, it is expected that the 
intervention group would demonstrate a better safety culture score when compared with the 
control group. 
1. Staff Risk Perception of Aviation Safety Hazards 
ICAO's Accident/ Incident Reporting System was used to compile a list of the most 
frequently occurring safety hazards in commuter/regional airlines from 1979-1996. The list of 
aviation safety hazards was presented to staff both in the intervention group and control group 
at the beginning and the end of trial. It required respondents to rate each of the hazards 
according to their potential to affect the safety of airline passengers. Each hazard was rated in 
accordance with its hazardousness and the likelihood of it occurring within the airline 
environment. The questionnaire produced an individual risk perception score for both 
hazardousness and likelihood. 
It was expected that there would be little difference in risk perception between groups at the 
commencement of the trial. Nevertheless, a significant reduction in the mean hazardousness 
and likelihood scores of staff in the intervention group was expected. 
2. Staff Willingness to Report Safety Hazards 
During the eight month period, both intervention and control groups had chances to access a 
confidential safety reporting system to inform management about safety hazards that they felt 
had potentially serious safety implication. Identical information on how to use the reporting 
system was given to both groups. It was expected that the intervention group would have 
submitted more reporting hazard report forms, compared with the control group. 
3. -Action Taken on Identified Safety Hazards 
It was also expected that the intervention group would have achieved more action on safety 
hazards compared with the control group because the implementation of the INDICATE 
programme within the airline provides a structured framework to address safety hazards. 
5. Staff Comments About Safety Management 
Staff were given the opportunity to complete a free response section in the safety culture 
questionnaire before and at the conclusion of the trail. It was expected that staff in the 
intervention group would have more positive comments about safety management compared 
with the control group, at the end of trial. Figure H-5 contains the summary of the 
methodological design in the eight month trial. 
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Figure H-5 The Methodological Design in the Eight Month Trail 
July 96 July 96 July 96 March 97 April 97 
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"Safety action - "Safety action 
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7. Implementing INDICATE 
Within the company there is a Co-ordinator or Safety Officer who is responsible for running 
the programme. Depending on the size of the operation, this function may be part of 
someone's existing duties, or be the responsibility of a dedicated position. 
Approximately every month a safety meeting was conducted with the managers from each 
section (technical crew, cabin crew, maintenance crew, ground crew, operations and 
union/association groups). At these meetings safety issues raised by staff or management, at 
any level, were discussed. 
8. Results 
The evaluation results reveal that there is a clear difference between the intervention and 
control groups. According to Edkins (1998) and BASI (1998), staff in the Intervention group: 
  are more positive about safety management 
  are more willing to report safety hazards 
  have more confidence in management's ability to address safety issues 
  feel there is a better quality of safety communication between management and staff 
and between different operational departments 
9. Benefits 
In Australia, it is a legal requirement to report air safety incidents via an Aviation Safety 
Incident Report (ASIR). However, there is a recognised problem of under-reporting, which in 
part stems from a lack of awareness about what should be reported despite this mandatory 
requirement. 
The programme provides a simple and structured process to encourage staff to report safety 
hazards and deficiencies within their work area. The safety information database and software 
allows management to address all safety-related concerns. Furthermore, senior management 
regularly meet with safety staff to determine what to do about identified hazards. It is clear 
that consistent communication of safety-related information within an organisation is crucial 
for improving staff attitudes towards safety. 
In addition, INDICATE provides a computer programme to assist the company in detailing all 
reported concerns. The software programme: 
" records the nature of each safety hazard 
" records any action (or lack of action) taken on each hazard 
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" maintains the confidentiality of the reporter 
" generates a recommendation for either: 
-a departmental manager 
- senior management 
- appropriate aviation authorities 
Where the information on the hazard is sent depends on the nature of the hazard and who is 
best equipped to assist in rectifying an identified problem (CASA, 1998). 
As such, a number of benefits of INDICATE are concluded: 
1. Encourages better communication between management and employees about 
safety. 
2. Reveals critical areas for development of procedures or training and for priority 
inspections. 
3. Provides a framework for feedback as to the efficacy of assumptions made about 
hardware or operational procedures. 
4. Provided a baseline for management decisions regarding safety issues. 
5. Provided a cost-effective safety management tool. 
Edkins (1998) explains that the results of the INDICATE trial suggest that measuring safety 
culture provides a useful method for monitoring changes in company safety performance and 
may assist in identifying elements of a safety management programme that require 
improvement, such as a hazard reporting system. 
Most importantly of all, the evaluation of the INDICATE programme illustrates that the 
greatest source of variance is not necessarily aircraft equipment or the category of operation, 
but the real cost from the safety culture of organisations within the aviation system. A small 
to medium size airline, operating within a limited budget, does not have to spend large 
amounts of money to improve its own safety culture. The benefits from implementing such 
initiatives will ultimately help to improve operational safety and, in some cases, reduce 
operating costs. 
Currently there are over twenty passenger carrying operators of varying sizes both Australia 
and overseas which have implemented the INDICATE programme, which is easily tailored to 
the varying requirements of different sizes of operation. 
H. 3. Proactive Error Reduction System (PERS) 
1. Origins 
The PERS programme is funded by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Aviation 
Medicine and devised by Dr. Colin Drury at the University at Buffalo (UB), the State 
University of New York (IFA, 1998). The FAA-funded project began in 1989 following a 
Congressional hearing prompted by an incident in which 18 feet of roof pulled away from an 
Aloha Airline jet as it was flying over the Pacific Ocean. A flight attendant was sucked from 
the plane and 61 passengers were injured. 
2. Underlying philosophy 
For years, Drury and his co-workers have analysed errors by airline workers in detail. They 
are using this knowledge to build practical tools that allow users to arrive quickly at solutions 
to errors made by airline workers. 
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PERS is an error management system which can be used by non-experts in human factors 
because it is based on a human-factors approach to solving errors. The idea behind this is that 
one should not just determine the immediate cause of the error, but examine all the things that 
lead up to it. As such, this programme, as shown in Figure 2-23, is structured to use the 
repeating patterns found in incident data in order to help airlines move from the recognition of 
human factors as an issue to practical human factors solutions. 
3. Advantages 
There are four distinct functions within the programme: 
1. A comprehensive error management system which can combine many existing data 
collection and analysis systems (eg. MESH, MEDA). In other words, it facilitates the 
importing of data from other systems such as other audits and MESH, and links 
databases of maintenance errors with databases of known solutions. 
2. PERS facilitates the identification of error-prone situations by using 
- error audit of specific tasks 
- error assessment like MESH. 
3. PERS supports error management strategies, identifying situations for 
design/procedure changes. 
4. PERS facilitates error reporting by employing 
- error reporting modules like MEDA (an error-reporting system with interfaces to 
MEDA) 
- critical incident reporting modules. 
PERS provides a way for airline personnel to analyse an error or potential error, to discover 
why it occurred, and then to see how they might go about changing systems, equipment or 
work patterns to prevent future errors. PERS not only tells airline workers what to do if an 
error occurs, but it also tells them what to do even if what has occurred are not actual errors, 
but error-prone situations. 
4. Scenario 
For example, suppose that an aircraft was hit by a ground vehicle driven by a mechanic. The 
programme will ask: Why was the mechanic there? What was the mechanic doing? Why was 
he in a hurry? 
In one instance, it was found that drivers of ground vehicles often put the vehicles into neutral, 
but did not turn them off when they got out of the vehicles for the simple reason that the 
engines got so cold that they would be difficult to restart (Goldbaum, 1996). Therefore, by 
providing such detailed information about an incident, the airline should be able to pinpoint 
and address the chain of events that lead up to the error. 
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HA Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA) 
1. Origins and objectives 
LOSA was developed by the team of Professor R. Heimreich at the University of Texas, USA. 
Under LOSA, flaws in human performance and prevalence of error are taken for granted and 
the objective becomes improving the context within which human perform. LOSA ultimately 
aims to introduce a buffer zone or time delay between an error and the point at which its 
consequences become a threat to safety. The better the buffer or the longer the time delay, the 
stronger the tolerance of the operational context to the negative consequences of human error 
(Maurino, 2001). 
2. Underlying philosophy 
LOSA are programmes that use expert observers to collect data about crew behaviours and 
situational factors on normal flights. Observations generate a narrative of the flight classified 
by phase, and these are conducted under strict no jeopardy conditions, which means that no 
crew are at risk for observed actions. Observers code observed threats to safety and how they 
are addressed, errors and their management, and specific behaviours that have been associated 
with accidents and incidents. 
Data from LOSA provides a picture of system operations that can guide organisational 
strategy in safety, operations, and training. Helmreich (2001) points out that a particular 
strength of LOSA is that the process identifies examples of superior performance that can be 
reinforced and used as models for training. Data collected in LOSA are proactive and can be 
used immediately to prevent adverse events. 
3. Methodology of LOSA 
The critical difference between a LOSA flight and a line check is LOSA's guarantee of 
anonymity for the crew. Data are entered into a de-identified database and no crew actions are 
reported to management or the regulatory agency. 
In LOSA, error is classified as deviation from organisational or crew exceptions or intentions. 
Errors committed by the flight crew are described and coded along with actions taken to deal 
with the consequences of the errors. Table 2-6 in chapter 2 lists the various errors and 
remedial strategies employed in LOSA. 
4. Advantages of LOSA 
One of the important aspects of LOSA is the fact that it captures exemplary as well as 
deficient performance, which provides airlines with the areas in which they excel as well as 
those in need of improvement. 
The other strength is that a database is being developed that allows organisations to compare 
their results with other airlines. Such comparisons help in interpreting the significance of the 
number of procedural and decision errors observed and the effectiveness of threat and error 
counter-measures. The data allow management to prioritise safety initiatives and training 
departments can use the information to develop targeted training. 
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Meanwhile, the informative aspect of LOSA data is the ability to link threat recognition and 
error management with the specific behavioural markers that from the core of CRM. Using 
LOSA, a model incorporating the Swiss Cheese model has been developed (Helmreich, 1999). 
It recognises both overt and latent threats, and how they fit into the management of error and 
undesired states. 
These markers emerge very clearly in observer ratings of the actions taken by effective crews. 
Those who deal proactively with threat and error exhibit the following behaviours: 
- active captain leadership 
- briefing known threats 
- asking questions, speaking up 
- decisions making and reviewed 
- operational plans clearly communicated 
- preparing/planning for threats 
- distributing workload and tasks 
- vigilance through monitoring and challenging 
Although the challenge for the implementation of analysis of normal operations is to 
overcome the obstacles presented by a blame-oriented industry, LOSA has been appreciated 
by various airlines which are willing to make the investment in conducting the necessary 
observations and analyses. In addition, the value of LOSA has also been recognised by ICAO 
and has gained support to conduct a "LOSA Week" to promote this programme to interested 
countries. 
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An accident is the undesired event (unwanted consequence) due to loss of control. 
Consequently, it may result in damage to the elements of a system. A domino 
sequence originally presented by Frank Bird, Jr. and now updated by Heinrich, 
Petersen & Roos (1980) clearly states the accident sequence in a loss of control 
system by explaining the five key loss control factors in order of dominoes (see 
Figure I-1). 
Within this system, control as a function of professional "Management" is optimised 
through five established steps that systematically produce desired results. Origin, like 
etiology, refers to the sources and its appropriated identification with the basic or 
underlying cause serves to reinforce the desire to achieve a more effective control. 
Figure 1-1 An Accident Sequence Domino 
Management Origins 
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Source: Revised from Heinrich, Petersen & Roos, 1980 
The immediate cause is usually a "Symptom" of a deeper underlying problem. Safety 
managers and quality control managers frequently refer to these causes as unsafe 
acts/conditions or substandard acts/conditions. Historically they are regarded as the 
most important factors to attack. 
An accident is described as an undesired event that results in death, injury, or property 
damage. When considering the broader implications of accidents with "Contact", we 
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can see some more important relationships between the safety, environment, and 
exposure factors, and the importance of interface between related human elements in a 
coordinated loss control system. 
"Injury" has been frequently used to mean bodily damage or harm through traumatic 
accident. Damage, as used in this injury factor, is intended to cover broadly all types 
of tangible and intangible property damage. To optimise loss reduction, the safety 
manager will also direct substantial attention to control countermeasures at this last 
factor in the sequence. It is also referred to as the post-contact stage. 
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+ Safety performance and management 
1) What is the organisational structure to manage safety? 
2) How safety performance is monitored, measured and audited? 
3) Key indicators? Any statistics are used to indicate the changes in performance? 
4) How to decide the safety level? 
5) What is the safety management system in your company? 
6) What are the components of a SMS? 
+ Hazard discovery and reporting (risk management) 
1) The use of risk assessment methods or tools? 
By whom? How often? Who approves? 
2) What steps are taken in the company to identify and rectify hazards? 
  Is there a reporting system in place? 
  What is the focus of the system? 
  Who does the reported information go to? (organisational level or national 
level? ) 
  Is the reported information visible used within the organisation? 
  Are employees encouraged to report hazards? How? 
ºý Safety information 
1) Who manages the safety information? 
2) Any safety publication within the company to reveal the safety information? 
3) What is the relationship between safety information and discipline procedures? 
Any feedback to employees? 
4) Safety manual? Scope? 
5) Any regular safety meeting with other companies? 
6) Barriers? 
311 
Appendix J Interview Questions 
+ Safety culture 
1) Any cultural approach in safety management? 
2) Focus on long term or short term? 
3) Any conflicts between safety and production goals? 
4) Safety goal? Included in company mission statement? 
5) Leadership 
6) Communication 
+ Industry 
1) What is the role of organisation within industry (e. g. regulator, operator, service 
provider)? 
2) What are the main hazards faced within the industry? 
3) What is the degree of risk? 
+ Regulator 
1) Do regulators provide sufficient information? 
2) What's the role of regulator? 
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ACES Colombia Air Tahiti Britannia Airways 
Aegean Aviation Air Transat British Airway 
Aer Lingus Air Vegas British European 
Aero Lloyd Air Wisconcin British International Helicopter 
Aeroflot Air Zambique, British Med. Airways 
Aerolineas Argentinas Air-India British Regional Airlines 
Aerolitoral Airline of South Australia British World 
Aeromexico Airlink Pty Ltd Brymon Airways 
Aeropelican Airours Internaional BWIAWest Indies Airways 
Air 2000 AirTran Airways Canada 3000 Airlines 
Air Afrique Alaska Airlines Canada 3000 Cargo 
Air Algerie Alitalia Canadian Regional 
Air Berlin All Nippon Airways Cape Air 
Air Botnia Allegheny Cargolux 
Air Caledonie Alliance Cathay Pacific 
Air Canada Aloha Airlines CCAir 
Air Canada Regional Alpine CCM Airlines 
Air China America West Airlines Cebu Pacific Air 
Air Dolomiti American Chautauqua Airlines 
Air Europa American Eagle Airlines China Airlines 
Air France American Trans Air China Eastern Airliens 
Air Guinee Amtran China Hainan Airlines 
Air Hong Kong Arkia Israeli Airlines China Northern Airlines 
Air Jamaica Asiana Airlines China Northwest Airlines 
Air Kazakhstan Atlantic Coast Airlines China Southern Airlines 
Air Liberte Atlantic Southeast Airlines China Xinjiang Airlines 
Air Littoral Atlas CityFlyer Express 
Air Macau Augsburg Airways CityJet 
Air Madagascar Austral Lines Aereas Climber 
Air Malawi Australian Air Express Comair 
Air Malta Austran Airlines Comair Limited 
Air Mauritius Aviacsa CommutAir 
Air MidWest Avianca Condor 
Air Moldova AZZURRAir Continental 
Air Namibia Bankok Airways Continental Express 
Air New Zealand Bering Continental Micronesia 
Air Nippon Biman Bangladesh Airlines Copa Airlines 
Air Nostrum/Iberia Reg Binter Canarias Corporate 
Air One bmi british midland Corseair 
Air Pacific Bouraq Croatia 
313 
Appendix KAirlineDistribution List 
Air Philippines Braathens Crosair 
Air Seychelles Brit Air Crossair 
CSA Czech Airlines Hawailian Airlines Luthansa CityLine 
Cyprus Airways HeavyLift Cargo Luxair 
Delta Horizon Air Maersk Air 
Delta Air Transport Iberia Airlines Maersk Air UK 
Deutsche BA Icelandair Malaysia Airlines 
DHLAirways Impluse Macair 
Dniproavia Indian Airlines MalEv 
Domodedovo Indonesia Air Transport - IAT Mandala 
Dragonair Iran Air Mandarian 
Eagle Airways JAL Martinair 
Eastern Australia JALways Meridiana 
easyJet Japan Air System Merlin Express 
Egyptair Jet Airways Mesa Airlines 
EI Al JetBlue Airways Mesaba Airlines 
Emirates JMC Airlines Mexicana 
Era Kendell MIAT- Mongolian Airlines 
Ethiopian Airlines Kenmore Harbor Middle East Airlines 
EuroLOT Kenya Airways Midwest Express 
Eurowings KLM Monarch 
EVA Air KLM cityhopper National Airlines 
Evergreen International Airlines KLM uk National Jet 
Express Airlines I Korean Air Negeria 
Far East Air Transport KrasAir Nepal Airways 
FedEx Express Kuban Nippon Cargo 
Fine Kuwait Airways Nordeste LA Regionals 
Finnair LAB Flying Service Northwest 
First Air LAM Mozambique Olympic Airways 
Flight West LanChile Oman Air 
Flying Colours LAPA Pacific Airlines 
Frontier Airlines Lauda Air Pakistan 
Fujairah Air Lauda Air Spa Pakistan International Airlines 
Garuda Indonesia Lietuva Palmair Flightline 
Gemini Lineas Aereas Allegro Pearl Aviation 
Ghana Airways Lithuanian Pelangi Air 
Go Lloyd Aereo Boliviano PGA- Portugalia 
Grand Aire Inc LOT Polish Airlines Philippine Airlines 
Great Lakes Love Air Polar 
Gujarat Airways LTU International Airways Premiair 
Gulf Air Lufthansa Pulkovo Airlines 
Gulfstream International Airliens Lufthansa Cargo India Qantas 
314 
Appendix KAirlineDistribution List 
Hapag-Lloyd Lumbini Airways Qatar Airways 
Regionair TAROM 
Regional Compagnie Aerienne 
Europeene Thai Airways International 
Rio-Sul THY Turkish Airlines 
Royal Air Maroc Trans States Airlines 
Royal Airlines TransAsia Airways 
Royal Brunei Airlines Transavia Airlines 
Royal Jordanian Airlines Transbrasil 
Royal Nepal Airlines Transaero 
Royal Phnom Penh Airways Transeast 
Ryan International Airlines Transtate 
Ryanair Tunisair 
SAAirlink Turkmenistan Airlines 
Sabena TWA 
Sahara Tyrolean Airways 
SAS UNI Airways Corps 
SAS Commuter United 
Saudi Arabian Airlines UPS 
Shandon US Airways 
Shanghai Airlines Vanguard Airlines 
SIA Varig 
Sibir Airlines VASP Brazilian Airlines 
SilkAir Vietnam Airlines 
Skyway Virgin Atlantic Airways 
Skyways Express Virgin Blue Airlines 
SkyWestAirlines Virgin Express 
South African Airways VLM Airlines NV 
Southern Winds Volare Airlines Spa 
Southwest WestJet Airlines 
Spanair Wideroe's Flyveselskap 
Spirit Airlines World Airways 
Spirit Airlines Wuhan 
SriLankan Airlines Xiamen Airlines 
Sun Country Airlines Yemenia 
Sunshine Express Yunnan Airlines 
Sunstate 
Swissair 
Syrianair 
TACA International Airlines 
TAM Linhas Aereas 
TAP Air Portugal 
Taquan 
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APPENDIX L Covering Letter & Questionnaire 
Air Transport Group 
Building 115 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Cran field UNIVERSITY 
School of Engineering 
Cranfield College of Aeronautics 
Cranfield, Bedfordshire MK43 OAL 
England 
Fax +44 (0) 1234 752207 
Direct Dial + 44 (0) 1234 754236/7 
I am a PhD student, in the Department of Human Factors and Air Transport (School of 
Engineering, Cranfield University, UK), conducting research into the airline safety 
management. The purpose of my research is to evaluate current airline safety management, 
investigate organizational factors affecting flight safety and justify the best practice for safety 
improvements within the airline industry. 
It would be greatly appreciated if you could spend a few minutes completing the attached 
questionnaire. This research is not sponsored by any outside organization. The information 
you provide will be used strictly for the purpose of this study and all replies will be treated as 
highly confidential. A summary of the results can be provided if required. 
If you are not the appropriate person to fill in this questionnaire, may I ask you to pass it on to 
the appropriate person since it is an important part of my dissertation. Completed 
questionnaires may be returned in the FREEPOST envelope provided. No postage is required. 
Alternatively, the fax and email addresses, as indicated below, may be used to return the 
questionnaires. 
Fax: +44 (0)1234 752 207 
Email: y. l. hsu. 1999@cranfield. ac. uk 
Should you have any questions or require any further information regarding the survey, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. It is hoped that you will find time to make a contribution 
to this research, which hopefully, will benefit the aviation industry. Thank you very much 
indeed! 
Yours faithfully 
Iris HSU 
Department of Human Factors and Air Transport 
Cranfield University 
15 November 2001 
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Ref. No.: 
Airline Safety Management 
Questionnaire 
Please provide your point of view on these questions. All 
information given will be treated as strictly confidential. Results of 
this survey will be calculated in aggregate form so that neither 
airlines nor individuals can be recognized. 
Region: Q Africa Q Asia & Pacific Q Latin America & Caribbean 
Q Europe Q Middle East Q North America 
Position in your airline: 
Airline (optional): 
Name (optional): 
Contact address (optional) 
Tel: 
Fax: 
E. mail: 
18 1 
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This survey examines the factors which might influence the way your organization 
deals with safety issues. Please respond with reference to your own organization. 
For each question, please circle the number which corresponds to the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with the statement. 
strongly strongly 
disagree - agree NIA 
1. There is an organizational awareness towards 1234567 
safety in the airline. 
2. Employees know how to perform their job in a 1234567 
safe manner. 
3. Employees use correct safety procedures to 1234567 
carrying out the jobs. 
4. Employees ensure the highest levels of safety 1234567 
when they carry out the jobs. 
5. Employees believe flight safety is an important 1234567 
issue. 
6. Employees feel that it is important to maintain 1234567 
safety at all times. 
7. Employees voluntarily carry out the tasks or 1234567 
activities that help to improve safety. 
8. Employees are encouraged to submit ideas to 1234567 
improve safety in the airline. 
9. Safety rules can be followed without conflicting 1234567 
with work practices. 
10. Safety problems are openly discussed between 1234567 
employees. - 
11. There is good communication between different 1234567 
groups in the airline. 
12. There is an appropriate Emergency Response 
Plan. 1234567 
13. After an accident has occurred, appropriate 
actions are usually taken to reduce the chance of 
reoccurrence. 1234567 
14. After an incident has occurred, appropriate 
actions are usually taken to reduce the chance of 1234567 
reoccurrence. 
15. There is a documented business continuity plan 1234567 
in the event of accidents. 
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16. Changes in working procedures and their effect 
on safety are effectively communicated to 
employees. 
17. Personnel are confident about their future with 
the airline. 
18. Morale is good. 
19. Good working relationships exist in the airline. 
20. Employees' jobs are well defined. 
21. The size of the airline has an influence on 
organizational safety culture. 
22. The airline's history has an influence on 
organizational safety culture. 
23. Airline ownership has an influence on 
organizational safety culture. 
24. An adequate system exists for transmitting 
critical information regarding safety within the 
airline. 
25. An adequate system exists for exchanging 
critical information regarding safety problem with 
other airlines. 
26. Data* collection, analysis and presentation has 
an influence on safety performance. 
( *Data obtained from the operation, risk assessment, 
maintenance, and aircraft manufactures) 
27. Management is concerned for the cost more than 
safety. 
28. Safety budget is the first item to be reduced 
when commercial pressures emerge. 
29. Safety rules are adhered to even under cost 
pressures. 
30. There is no conflict between safety and financial 
goal. 
31. Shareholder's welfare and airline's organizational 
safety culture are correlated. 
32. Safety committee has an influence on 
organizational safety culture. 
33. Senior management commitment plays an 
important role in determining the safety 
performance. 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree N/A 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Appendix L Covering Letter & Questionnaire 
34. The values of management are identified as 
being safety orientated. 
35. Safety management aims are sufficiently 
supported within the airline. 
36. Leadership has an influence on organizational 
safety culture. 
37. There is correlation between the quality 
assurance system and organizational safety 
culture. 
38. An effective ongoing hazard identification 
program has an influence on organizational 
safety culture. 
39. Confidential reports should be properly de- 
identified in order to foster organizational safety 
culture. 
40. There should be a procedure established for 
acknowledging safety-related reports. 
41. Risk audit, risk assessment, and risk evaluation 
have an influence on organizational safety 
culture. 
42. Potential errors, consequences and recovery 
points are identified in training. 
43. Training is carried out by individuals with relevant 
operational experience. 
44. Workload is reasonably balanced. 
45. Frustrations that arise from factors outside staff 
control can be accommodated without adversely 
affecting work. 
46. There are adequate opportunities to express the 
views about operational problems. 
47. Final decisions about safety investment are 
made by Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
48. There is an effective mechanism by which the 
safety manager or the safety committee can 
report to the CEO and make recommendations 
for a change or action. 
strongly.. 
disagree , ---- ----,. 
strongly 
agree NIA 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
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49. In the event of CEO making an unfavorable 
response to a safety recommendation, there is a 
procedure whereby the matter is monitored by 
the safety manager or the safety committee until 
resolved. 
50. Personnel's decision-making is affected by the 
organizational safety culture 
51. Safety statements and policies of an airline 
define the management's intention in safety 
matters and airline's commitment to safety. 
52. The policy statements define the airline's 
fundamental approach towards safety. 
53. The airline has a clearly stated set of goals and 
objectives. 
54. The roles and responsibilities for personnel in the 
safety management system are clearly defined 
and documented. 
55. An effective documentation management system 
ensures the availability of procedures. 
56. Written work procedures match the way tasks are 
done in practice. 
57. The recommendations and suggestions from the 
industry safety committee are adhered to all the 
time. 
58. Safety information from aviation safety 
authorities is highly valued. 
59. The regulations from the aviation safety authority 
have an influence on organizational safety culture. 
60. The relationship with the Media has an influence 
on organizational safety culture. 
61. The customer's reaction has an influence on the 
organizational safety culture. 
62. Consumer habits have an influence on 
organizational safety culture. 
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63. The perceived corporate image has an influence on 
organizational safety culture 
64. The organization's investments on other 
business are correlated with the organizational 
safety. 
65. The investors' prospective has an influence on 
organizational culture. 
66. The stock market's reaction has an influence on 
organizational culture. 
67. The country culture and organizational culture 
are correlated. 
68. The country economic influence and 
organizational culture are correlated. 
69. Regional geographical influence and 
organizational safety culture are correlated. 
70. Regional economical influence and 
organizational safety are correlated. 
71. Regional religion influence and organizational 
culture are correlated. 
72. Regional cultural influence and organizational 
safety are correlated. 
73. How would you rate the safety performance of 
your company with respect to the rest of your 
industry? 
(1: below Average for Industry 
6: Above Average for Industry) 
Please offer any suggestions or comments if any: 
strongly E___.. strongly disagree agree NIA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1234567 
Below Above 
Average Average 
Thank you very much for your time. Your help has been highly appreciated!! 
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APPENDIX M Participants Comments 
1. The answers above incorporate both flight safety and ground safety. The level 
of safety awareness among flight crews is higher than the level among ground 
crew staffs and management. A lot of progress has been made in that domains 
since the establishment of Corporate Safety a year ago. Still, a lot of effort is 
required to achieve a fully comprehensive Safety Management System. 
2. Previous poor management is very hard to overcome. The employees become 
very untrusting and unwilling to accept that new management cares about 
safety. 
3. Our company is a young one and is the flight safety department. The present 
answers are from similar audits we made internally, a couple months ago. 
4. Bottom Line - if CEO is highly safety conscious then so is organization. If he 
is not- the culture is not established. 
5. We are committed to the safest flight operation possible. Therefore, it is 
imperative that we have uninhibited reporting of all incidents and occurrences 
that in any way affect the safety of our operations. We urge to every single 
employee to help us in providing our outcomes and our employees with the 
highest level of flight safety achievable within our working environment. 
6. Q'67-72 is my case. I think in some region of the world, the answer would be 
very different. 
7. We are a regional airlines serving a domestic/international parent airlines. 
Group integrates do sometimes affect/influence issues relating to customer 
focus, your survey doesn't address that issue. 
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8. Our CEO is also the accountable management person agreed with our local 
regulatory authority. This also has a big influence in out airlines safety culture. 
9. The safety department is only five months old and the above reflects the 
existing situation which I hope to improve on safety (health). 
10. To question 31,1 am sure shareholders think differently - they don't see the 
correlation. 
11. Question 47 investment decision doesn't have to go to CEO that far. 
12. In the last 4 questions I was not sure whether regional reflects to a region 
within the world, i. e. middle east, sub-Saharan Africa, etc. or if it means region 
within a country. My responses were based on regions within a country. 
13. The concept that safety should come from the "Top" is completely true. 
Another point is that many times and at many organisations. The upper 
management does not know well about safety; they are at the kindergarten 
level while safety people are at "PhD". Lack of understanding and 
communication. 
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External Loading Factors 
1) Internal Factors - 
Variables Loading Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
V03 0.815 0.170 0.126 0.026 0.146 0.212 0.112 0.074 0.117 -0.027 0.083 0.023 -0.012 0.016 0.041 
V04 0.774 0.034 0.103 0.088 0.159 0.069 0.172 -0.059 0.248 0.100 0.061 0.020 -0.050 0.084 -0.014 
V07 0.640 0.384 0.080 0.242 0.160 -0.013 0.054 -0.047 -0.085 -0.154 0.172 0.052 0.002 0.064 0.056 
V02 0.608 0.170 0.224 -0.010 0.049 0.409 0.078 0.103 0.196 0.096 -0.119 -0.030 0.100 -0.026 0.004 
Vol 0.462 0.156 0.158 0.221 0.197 0.198 0.175 0.242 0.361 0.109 0.052 -0.021 -0.057 0.091 -0.051 
V09 0.161 0.834 0.170 0.121 0.058 0.043 0.054 0.163 0.241 0.064 0.002 -0.027 -0.002 0.076 -0.016 
VOS 0.166 0.830 0.187 0.125 0.065 0.057 0.073 0.158 0.228 0.064 0.015 -0.026 0.007 0.084 -0.020 
V06 0.550 0.609 0.196 0.148 0.089 -0.005 -0.056 0.099 -0.076 0.050 0.170 0.048 -0.025 0.127 0.180 
V08 0.296 0.537 -0.076 0.049 0.236 0.321 0.030 0.204 -0.081 -0.022 -0.113 0.229 0.138 -0.103 -0.026 
V35 0.076 0.434 -0.060 0.317 0.158 0.387 0.130 0.055 0.228 0.279 0.429 -0.030 -0.138 0.026 0.017 
V46 0.097 0.106 0.940 0.054 0.118 0.073 0.054 0.041 0.092 0.025 0.042 0.045 0.011 0.017 0.031 
V43 0.101 0.082 0.930 0.069 0.116 0.098 0.045 0.035 0.095 -0.011 0.064 0.038 -0.008 -0.019 -0.005 
V48 0.138 0.127 0.885 0.051 0.143 0.057 0.035 0.048 0.064 -0.002 0.027 -0.013 0.045 0.096 0.047 
V42 0.343 0.086 0.420 0.409 0.206 0.200 0.090 -0.060 -0.031 0.097 -0.039 0.140 0.056 -0.176 0.000 
V53 0.049 0.194 0.085 0.821 0.016 0.055 0.178 0.152 0.092 0.088 0.008 0.050 0.094 -0.087 -0.046 
V52 0.068 0.019 0.077 0.763 0.034 0.118 0.235 0.208 0.164 0.154 0.043 -0.017 0.166 0.119 -0.088 
V55 0.274 0.260 0.069 0.568 0.063 0.152 -0.013 0.081 0.294 -0.018 0.136 0.099 0.022 -0.239 0.106 
V51 0.189 0.033 0.133 0.517 -0.114 0.032 0.300 0.345 0.166 0.122 -0.151 -0.023 0.117 0.242 -0.254 
V17 0.107 0.036 0.058 0.018 0.825 0.032 0.176 -0.003 0.075 0.170 -0.001 0.212 0.037 0.117 -0.102 
V18 0.230 0.051 0.173, -0.013. 0.821 0.066 -0.001 0.067 0.104 0.049 0.169 -0.080 -0.154 0.007 -0.058 
V45 0.080 0.286 0.229 0.175 0.619 0.014 0.072 0.068 -0.016 -0.070 -0.060 -0.006 0.010 -0.293 0.139 
V19 0.282 0.086 0.222 -0.008 0.599 0.085 0.122 0.253 0.279 0.044 -0.022 -0.057 -0.142 0.176 -0.029 
V20 0.299 0.091 0.163 0.314 0.345 0.032 0.176 -0.003 0.075 0.170 -0.001 0.212 0.037 0.117 -0.102 
V26 0.199 0.035 0.196 0.100 0.106 0.718 0.106 0.138 0.060 -0.040 0.060 0.124 -0.172 0.050 0.033 
V38 0.191 0.096 0.034 0.043 0.285 0.685 0.285 -0.067 0.166 -0.012 -0.026 -0.052 0.188 0.240 0.020 
V24 0.180 -0.046 0.415 0.237 -0.100 0.515 -0.100 0.163 -0.071 0.132 0.087 0.189 0.199 0.078 0.021 
VII 0.181 0.047 0.064 0.197 0.136 0.155 0.849 0.063 0.041 0.049 0.093 0.039 0.052 0.015 0.141 
V12 0.160 0.043 0.061 0.237 0.145 0.172 0.777 0.088 0.052 0.038 0.122 0.012 0.057 0.003 0.109 
V13 0.160 0.189 0.224 -0.033 0.277 0.151 0.738 0.115 0.176 0.324 -0.030 0.328 0.151 -0.091 0.160 
V10 0.001 0.324 0.124 -0.026 0.113 0.144 0.700 0.166 0.415 0.162 -0.087 0.094 0.185 -0.155 -0.014 
V30 0.084 0.152 0.016 0.204 0.102 0.079 0.059 0.876 0.085 0.107 0.061 -0.002 0.033 -0.076 0.034 
V31 0.232 0.228 0.105 0.179 0.104 0.081 0.093 0.854 0.078 0.136 -0.051 0.000 0.018 -0.037 -0.012 
V54 0.399 0.047 0.064 0.197 0.117 -0.056 -0.117 0.064 0.669 0.107 0.108 0.035 0.014 -0.033 0.132 
V56 -0.051 0.043 0.061 0.123 0.129 0.070 0.082 0.126 0.576 0.086 0.270 0.121 0.160 -0.045 0.097 
V49 0.165 0.216 0.160 0.325 0.151 0.247 0.190 0.008 0.536 0.087 0.023 0.169 -0.143 0.137 -0.103 
V27 -0.006 0.231 0.035 -0.092 0.057 -0.170 -0.234 -0.098 -0.156 -0.818 -0.023 -0.005 -0.031 0.027 -0.109 
V28 0.278 0.047 0.089 0.229 0.197 -0.123 0.261 -0.108 -0.044 -0.675 0.161 0.197 -0.104 0.157 0.203 
V34 0.301 -0.160 -0.084 0.193 0.188 -0.096 0.241 0.185 0.026 0.534 0.132 0.381 -0.220 0.173 0.056 
V29 -0.006 0.250 0.160 0.048 0.296 -0.155 0.153 0.176 -0.014 0.517 0.157 0.413 -0.230 0.175 0.121 
V21 0.226 0.189 0.214 -0.025 -0.214 0.300 0.047 -0.144 0.141 -0.142 0.695 0.122 0.070 -0.119 0.002 
V22 0.052 -0.082 0.045 0.323 0.189 0.391 0.130 0.098 -0.020 0.046 0.665 -0.047 0.075 0.151 -0.097 
V33 0.139 0.067 0.162 -0.168 -0.114 0.011 0.311 0.077 0.236 0.278 0.437 -0.049 -0.100 0.047 -0.003 
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Appendix N Rotated Component Matrix for Internal & External factors 
V23 0.325 0.277 0.033 0.260 0.129 0.149 0.214 0.299 0.240 0.008 0.403 0.144 0.072 -0.178 0.002 
V25 0.430 -0.006 0.094 0.067 0.298 0.172 0.244 -0.103 0.296 -0.053 -0.026 0.605 0.147 0.179 0.042 
V50 0.276 0.046 -0.013 
1-0.033 0.277 0.151 0.091 0.037 -0.022 0.071 -0.125 -0.502 0.101 0.180 0.184 
V15 -0.035 0.135 0.045 0.177 -0.136 0.065 0.111 0.261 0.223 0.033 -0.069 0.441 -0.023 -0.123 -0.097 
V16 0.073 0.189 0.224 0.240 0.012 0.014 0.043 0.115 0.176 0.324, -0.030 0.328 0.151 -0.091 0.160 
V39 0.124 -0.029 0.011 -0.064 0.037 0.352 0.036 0.018 0.052 0.084 00095 0.036 0.817 0.079 -0.141 
V40 0.035 0.266 0.288 -0.119 -0.094 0.037 0.223 0.156 0.054 -0.281 -0.026 -0.107 0.528 0.345 0.256 
V41 0.294 0.169 0.090 0.051 0.049 0.184 -0.041 -0.128 -0.037 -0.095 0.031 0.037 0.181 0.701 0.037 
V47 0.161 -0.017 0.060 0.123 0.117 -0.057 -3.557 -0.031 0.094 0.009 -0.103 -0.031 -0.100 0.001 0.820 
V32 0.166 0.285 0.040 0.325 0.129 0.080 0.071 0.292 -0.062 0.243 0.182 0.074 0.087 0.268 0.392 
2) External Factors - 
Factors 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
70 0.879 0.127 0.004 0.113 
69 0.857 0.123 0.000 -0.020 
72 0.804 0.154 0.076 0.027 
68 0.715 -0.230 0.164 0.096 
71 0.685 0.168 -0.150 0.296 
61 0.034 0.881 0.003 0.053 
63 0.103 0.777 0.035 0.054 
62 0.083 0.757 -0.029 0.210 
60 0.181 0.546 0.435 0.283 
58 -0.038 -0.005 0.809 -0.072 
59 -0.019 0.165 0.756 0.273 
57 0.097 -0.051 0.750 -0.017 
65 0.038 0.226 0.011 0.797 
66 0.242 -0.079 0.024 0.788 
64 0.049 0.331 0.131 0.555 
67 0.180 0.027 0.187 0.219 
328 
APPENDIX 0 Alpha Values for Internal & External Factors 
1) Internal Factors - 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
V03 . 815 
V04 . 774 
V07 . 640 
V02 . 608 
Vol . 462 
V09 . 834 
V05 . 830 
V06 . 609 
V08 . 537 
V35 . 434 
V46 . 940 
V43 . 930 
V48 . 885 
V42 . 420 
V53 . 821 
V52 . 763 
V55 . 568 
V51 . 517 
V17 . 825 
V18 . 821 
V45 . 619 
V19 . 599 
V26 . 718 
V38 . 685 
V24 . 515 
Vil . 849 
V12 . 777 
V13 . 738 
VIO . 700 
V30 . 876 
V31 . 854 
V54 . 669 
V56 . 576 
V49 . 536 
V27 -. 818 
V28 -. 675 
V34 . 534 
V29 . 517 
V21 . 
695 
V22 . 665 
V33 . 437 
V23 . 403 
V25 . 605 
V15 . 441 
V16 
. 328 
V39 . 817 
V40 . 528 
AI ha . 85 . 846 . 89 . 83 . 82 . 74 . 759 . 93 . 72 . 04 . 61 . 
66 . 54 
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Appendix O Alpha Values for Internal and External Factors 
2) External Factors - 
Factors 
Variables 
Factorl Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
70 
. 879 
69 
. 857 
72 
. 804 
68 
. 715 
71 
. 685 
61 
. 881 
63 . 777 
62 
. 757 
60 
. 546 
58 
. 809 
59 
. 756 
57 
. 750 
65 
. 797 
66 
. 788 
64 . 555 
Reliability 
(Alpha) 
0.8575 0.7854 0.686 0.636 
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APPENDIX P Mean and Standard Deviation of 
Internal and External Factor Scores 
1) Internal factors - 
Factor 1 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -0.63922 . 8892058 Africa 3 0.35631 1.1738282 
Europe 36 0.31140 . 9568387 Asia and Pacific 36 0.07855 1.0234124 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.30452 . 4907790 Middle East 2 0.02391 
. 5595636 
Factor 2 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.05703 
. 9077366 Africa 3 0.29888 . 2097007 Europe 36 0.02356 1.0386296 
Asia and Pacific 36 0.13639 . 8940901 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -1.20469 1.1258093 
Middle East 2 -0.94312 2.1768678 
Factor 3 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -. 1167249 1.2608643 
Africa 3 . 4161720 . 5230922 
Europe 36 . 1434193 . 8517345 
Asia and Pacific 36 -. 1018476 1.0343227 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 . 2528859 . 7532800 
Middle East 2 -. 7207907 . 8191174 
Factor 4 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.27234 
. 8722531 Africa 3 0.20191 
. 6216546 Europe 36 -0.44308 1.2119959 
Asia and Pacific 36 0.24465 . 8027764 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 0.13786 . 
4579773 
Middle East 2 -0.07165 . 6006844 
Factor 5 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.05100 
. 9153141 Africa 3 0.01032 . 5199314 Europe 36 -0.05361 1.1199545 
Asia and Pacific 36 0.02347 . 9439098 Latin America and the Caribbean 5 0.14110 . 8994528 Middle East 2 -0.38663 2.4425141 
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Appendix P Means and Standard Deviation of Internal and External Factor Scores 
Factor 6 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.16137 
. 7284979 Africa 3 -0.43425 1.1351994 
Europe 36 -0.08888 1.1968939 
Asia and Pacific 36 0.09050 . 9292668 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.09189 1.1633706 
Middle East 2 -0.92322 . 1899493 
Factor 7 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.06720 1.1130961 
Africa 3 0.55952 
. 3892361 Europe 36 0.07701 
. 8364943 Asia and Pacific 36 -0.07538 1.1201511 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.54081 . 
7475811 
Middle East 2 -0.25566 1.7282853 
Factor 8 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.32917 . 9702956 Africa 3 0.12134 . 6369803 Europe 36 -0.15066 1.1318192 
Asia and Pacific 36 -0.01434 . 9148090 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.05188 1.1005971 
Middle East 2 -0.15911 . 1319623 
Factor 9 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.17659 
. 9438688 Africa 3 0.37270 1.1803107 
Europe 36 -0.08588 1.0087299 
Asia and Pacific 36 -0.02776 . 9871342 Latin America and the Caribbean 5 0.03291 1.4968176 
Middle East 2 -0.53837 . 9182260 
Factor 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.05404 1.1028550 
Africa 3 -0.25663 . 4709795 Europe 36 0.10972 1.0229031 
Asia and Pacific 36 0.42071 . 9438381 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.12281 1.1838685 
Middle East 2 -0.29334 1.2140648 
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Appendix P Means and Standard Deviation of Internal and External Factor Scores 
Factor 11 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -0.05329 1.0395035 
Africa 3 0.81012 . 5241767 
Europe 36 -0.07998 1.1712296 
Asia and Pacific 36 -0.05820 . 7823002 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 0.35314 1.1636854 
Middle East 2 0.97525 2.382782E-02 
Factor 12 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.31854 1.0178718 
Africa 3 0.34801 . 6752834 
Europe 36 0.02561 . 9357360 
Asia and Pacific 36 -0.30011 1.0211141 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 0.17671 1.2877234 
Middle East 2 0.47327 . 3039628 
Factor 13 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 0.02816 . 8662379 
Africa 3 0.11566 . 4541094 
Europe 36 0.16807 1.0695120 
Asia and Pacific 36 -0.21146 1.1172311 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.00735 . 2146302 
Middle East 2 0.31609 . 1977127 
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Appendix P Means and Standard Deviation of Internal and External Factor Scores 
2) External factors - 
Factor El 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -0.09102 . 9365840 Africa 3 0.93939 . 1280186 Europe 36 -0.00948 . 9958194 Asia and Pacific 36 -0.05993 1.1070402 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 0.28506 . 9391227 Middle East 2 0.12890 . 1224544 
Factor E2 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -0.03430 1.0597765 
Africa 3 0.67918 . 3656843 Europe 36 -0.14582 1.1735208 
Asia and Pacific 36 0.05530 . 7391132 Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.03162 1.2493247 
Middle East 2 1.06694 1.0080965 
Factor E3 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -0.51725 1.1415366 
Africa 3 0.78367 . 5608238 Europe 36 -0.04268 . 9389754 Asia and Pacific 36 0.30931 . 9178501 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 -0.15646 . 6343100 Middle East 2 0.10613 1.2918311 
Factor E4 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 -. 1713927 1.1113964 
Africa 3 -. 4350394 . 7676257 Europe 36 -. 1214183 1.0891926 
Asia and Pacific 36 . 1732103 . 8271913 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 . 5836195 1.1682217 Middle East 2 
. 1465730 . 6180094 
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APPENDIX Q Table of ANOVA and Mean/Standard Deviation 
for Internal & External Factors 
1) Internal factors - 
Factor 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Si . 
Between Groups 13.661 5 2.73 2.99 . 01 
Within Groups 89.33 9 . 91 
Total 103.00 103 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.4182 . 8093 
Africa 3 4.9333 . 8327 
Europe 36 4.8722 . 6764 
Asia and Pacific 36 4.7833 . 7788 
atin America and the Caribbean 5 4.3600 . 
6693 
Middle East 2 4.2000 1.697 
Factor 2 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 10.065 5 2.013 2.12 . 06 
Within Groups 92.93 9 . 94 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 5.0818 . 6780 
Africa 3 5.5333 . 2309 
Europe 36 5.1667 . 6616 
Asia Pacific 36 5.1500 . 6868 
atin America and the Caribbean 5 4.3200 . 0640 
Middle East 2 4.2000 . 2627 
Factor 3 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Si . Between Groups 3.292 5 . 65 . 64 . 66 Within Groups 99.70 9 1.017 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.7273 . 1545 Africa 3 5.4167 . 5774 Europe 36 4.9861 . 7652 Asia Pacific 36 4.8542 . 9662 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.8000 . 5420 Middle East 2 4.1250 . 2374 
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Appendix Q Table ofANOVA and Mean/Standard Deviation for Internal &c External Factors 
Factor 4 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 11.082 2.21 2.36 
. 04 Within Groups 91.91 9 . 93 
Total 103.000 1031 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 5.0341 . 8739 Africa 3 5.5000 . 8660 Europe 36 4.5000 
. 9524 Asia Pacific 36 4.8958 . 8585 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.9000 . 
7202 
Middle East 2 4.1250 . 1768 
Factor 5 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Si . Between Groups . 579 5 . 11 . 111 . 99 Within Groups 102.421 9 1.04 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 3.8523 . 9019 Africa 3 3.8333 . 0408 Europe 36 3.8194 . 9975 Asia Pacific 36 3.9653 . 9931 Latin America and the Caribbean 5 3.8000 . 5969 Middle East 2 2.7500 . 0607 
Factor 6 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.465 5 . 69 . 682 . 63 Within Groups 99.53 9 1.01 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.9773 
. 7192 Africa 3 5.1667 . 5204 Europe 36 4.9028 . 8091 Asia Pacific 36 4.9306 
. 8527 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 5.0140 . 8023 Middle East 2 4.2500 1.4749 
Appendix Q Table ofANOVA and Mean/Standard Deviation for Internal & External Factors 
Factor 7 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.05 . 61 . 598 . 701 
Within Groups 99.95 98 1.02 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.6818 1.0065 
Africa 3 5.0000 1.0000 
Europe 36 5.0833 1.1307 
Asia Pacific 36 4.8056 1.1166 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 5.4000 . 
8944 
Middle East 2 4.0000 2.8284 
Factor 8 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of S uares DF Mean S uares F Si . 
Between Groups 3.429 . 686 . 675 . 
64 
Within Groups 99.571 98 1.01 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.4318 1.1051 
Africa 3 4.3333 . 5774 
Europe 36 3.8472 1.2468 
Asia and Pacific 36 4.0556 1.1388 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 3.9000 1.5969 
Middle East 2 3.7500 1.0607 
Factor 9 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.981 . 396 . 
38 
. 85 
Within Groups 101.01 9 1.031 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.3182 . 9825 
Africa 3 5.2500 . 4330 
Europe 36 4.3125 . 8668 
Asia Pacific 36 4.4653 . 8518 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.3000 1.2796 
Middle East 2 4.6250 . 8839 
Appendix Q Table ofANOVA and Mean/Standard Deviation for Internal & External Factors 
Factor 10 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.134 . 42 . 415 . 83 
Within Groups 100.86 9 1.02 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 3.7273 . 5871 
Africa 3 3.5833 . 6292 
Europe 36 3.7847 . 6385 
Asia and Pacific 36 3.9653 . 6712 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 3.6000 . 5184 
Middle East 2 2.6250 . 5303 
Factor 11 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.90 . 98 . 
981 . 43 
Within Groups 98.091 9 1.001 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.8977 . 8579 
Africa 3 5.5000 . 4330 
Europe 36 4.9444 . 6947 
Asia Pacific 36 4.7917 . 6982 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.5000 1.1319 
Middle East 2 4.5000 . 7678 
Factor 12 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.466 5 1.29 1.31 . 26 Within Groups 96.534 9 . 98 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 3.9432 . 7438 
Africa 3 4.6667 . 3819 Europe 36 4.2292 
. 6824 Asia Pacific 36 4.1458 
. 8093 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 3.8500 . 5755 
Middle East 2 4.0000 1.4142 
Appendix Q Table ofANOVA and Mean/Standard Deviation for Internal & External Factors 
Factor 13 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of S uares DF Mean S uares F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.88 . 57 . 565 . 
72 
Within Groups 100.11 98 1 1.02 
Total 103.000 1 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 5.4773 . 6633 
Africa 3 5.5000 . 8660 
Europe 36 5.2361 . 7120 
Asia Pacific 36 5.2083 . 6254 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 5.5000 . 
8660 
Middle East 2 5.2500 . 3536 
2) External factors - 
Factor El 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Si . 
Between Groups 3.4021 . 68 . 
669 . 64 
Within Groups 99.59 9 1.01 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 3.536 . 906 
Africa 3 4.667 . 306 
Europe 36 3.628 1.028 
Asia and Pacific 36 3.639 1.113 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.040 . 
740 
Middle East 2 4.000 . 283 
Factor E2 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.56 . 91 . 
90 . 47 
Within Groups 98.433 98 1.00 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.1136 1.0738 
Africa 3 5.0000 . 2500 
Europe 36 4.1111 1.1235 
Asia Pacific 36 4.3472 . 7399 
Latin America and the Caribbean : 
L 
4.3000 . 
1911 
Middle East 2 5.3750 . 8839 
Appendix Q Table ofANOVA and Mean/Standard Deviation for Internal & External Factors 
Factor E3 
Analys is of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 11.383 5 2.27 2.43 . 04 
Within Groups 91.61 9 . 93 
Total 103.00 103 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 4.2273 1.0047 
Africa 3 5.5556 . 5092 
Europe 36 4.6481 . 8124 
Asia Pacific 36 4.8981 . 7425 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.5333 . 
5055 
Middle East 2 4.6667 1.4142 
Factor E4 
Analysi s of Variance (ANOVA) 
Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Squares F Si . 
Between Groups 4.571 . 914 . 91 . 47 
Within Groups 98.42 9 1.00 
Total 103.00 10 
Region #Cases available Mean Std. Deviation 
North America 22 3.6364 1.1311 
Africa 3 3.7778 1.0715 
Europe 36 3.6759 . 9904 
Asia Pacific 36 4.0278 . 9771 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5 4.4667 1.2824 
Middle East 2 4.1667 . 2357 
APPENDIX R Multiple Regression Result 
Self-rated Safety Performance vs. Organisational Factors 
Multiple R . 733 
R2 . 538 
RZ Adjusted . 619 
Standard Error . 535 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Squares FP 
Regression 4 33.007 8.252 28.822 . 000 
Residual 99 28.343 . 286 
Variables in Equation 
Variable B SEB Beta 
Factor 2 . 403 . 083 . 
388 
Factor 12 . 244 . 073 . 
275 
Factor 7 . 113 . 051 . 
164 
Factor 3 . 133 . 
064 . 158 
(Constant) . 486 . 413 
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APPENDIX S Correlation of Internal and External Factors 
E1 E2 E3 E4 
Factor 1 . 008 . 216* . 421** . 146 
Factor 2 -. 021 . 272** . 314** . 141 
Factor 3 -. 059 . 055 . 455** . 165 
Factor 4 . 020 . 163 . 352** . 235* 
Factor 5 -. 127 . 107 . 394** . 150 
Factor 6 . 014 . 155 . 327** . 155 
Factor 7 -. 012 . 164 . 355** . 219* 
Factor 8 -. 050 . 047 . 224* . 198* 
Factor 9 -. 069 . 244* . 419** . 121 
Factor 10 . 198* . 131 . 207* . 226* 
Factor 11 . 216* . 367** . 339** . 109 
Factor 12 -. 105 . 118 . 371** . 079 
Factorl3 . 087 . 017 . 25* . 142 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Internal Factors External Factors 
1: Employee safety attitude & behaviour El: Influences of region and country 
2: Employee safety concept E2: Public and the media influence 
3: Level of operational safety in E3: Impact of regulatory environment 
operation and maintenance E4: Involvement of investment 
4: Corporate safety policy community 
5: Personnel- quality of working life 
6: Employment of risk programme 
7: - Impact of accident/incidents 
8: Financial concern 
9: Procedures and documentation 
10: Commercial cost pressures 
11: Organisational structure & 
management commitment 
12: Communication system 
13: Necessity of safety reports 
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APPENDIX T DMAIC Process in Six Sigma 
Y=F (X1,.. X) 
Where Y is the output (business focus) 
Xs are the input (processes) 
Phase Action Goal 
What are the critical factors to the business 
Define focus (from internal and/or external 
Define "Y" 
(D) customer point of view)? 
What and how is the process (The Y) Measure 
performing? Measure the "Y" (M) 
How reliable is the obtained data? 
What are the critical defects (Xs) causing Analyse Find and Measure deficiency? 
(A) the "Xs" 
To what degree of the variation? 
( Xs: room for improvement) 
How to fix the critical defect (Xs)? 
Improve 
" " What variation in critical Xs can be Improve the Xs 
(Iý 
removed? 
Control Control "Xs" so no 
How to maintain the improvement? 
(C) variation in " Y" 
Source: combined from various authors 
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